

Vladislav B. SOTIROVIĆ



FROM THE BALKAN HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY AND POLITICS



Scientific articles in English

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Collection of seven scientific articles in English



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POLITICS**

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The Balkans after the First and Second Balkan Wars, 1912–1913

1. THE *MEMORANDUM* (1804) BY THE KARLOVCI METROPOLITAN STEVAN STRATIMIROVIĆ¹

Introduction

The goal of this article is to consider and analyze the text of a critical but heretofore neglected, document and historical source on the question of Serbian liberation from Ottoman rule and its national unification. The document was written in 1804 during the first months of the First Serbian Uprising against the Ottoman oppression.²



The Serbian nation was divided at the dawn of the 19th century by the borders of Ottoman pashaliks and by the state frontiers that separated the lands under Ottoman control from those under the Habsburg Empire. The beginning of the 19th century was a turning point in the history of the Serbs. From that time the modern history of the Serbs and Serbia begins. The birth of modern Serbian history begins with the First Serbian

Uprising (1804–1813) when, after three hundred and fifty years of Ottoman rule the Serbs in central Serbia (i. e., from the area of the *Beogradski pašaluk*)³ rose against the Turks. This uprising was the most important, biggest, and most glorious national revolt in Serbian history. However, this historical event was meaningful not only for the Serbs who lived within the *Beogradski pašaluk* but for the entire Serbian

¹ This article is written as a part of the COST Action IS0803: “Remaking Eastern Borders in Europe: A Network Exploring Social, Moral and Material Relocations of Europe’s Eastern Peripheries”. The research on the topic and writing the text are financed by the COST Action.

² About the uprising see in M. B. Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia 1804–1918*, I, (New York, London, 1976); W. S. Vucinich, *The First Serbian Uprising 1804–1813* (New York, 1982); V. H. W. Temperley, *History of Serbia* (New York, 1969); M. Ђорђевић, *Политичка историја Србије, I, 1804–1813* (Београд, 1956).

³ *Pašaluk* is Serbian version of the biggest Ottoman administrative province – pashalik. The governor of pashalik had the title of Pasha (in Serbian, Paša).

population who lived outside of the pashalik and the Ottoman Empire (i.e., in the Habsburg Monarchy). They had a significant interest in the fate of the insurrection. All Serbs, either from the Ottoman Empire or the Habsburg Monarchy, saw the insurrection as a pivotal event in the process of national liberation and unification within the borders of a single national state.⁴

Stevan Stratimirović, the Karlovci Metropolitan from 1790 to 1836, and the head of the Serbian church in the Habsburg Monarchy, was one of those Serbs dreaming about national freedom, independence and unification. His crucial and most influential political discourse on national emancipation and political consolidation is contained in *Memorandum*, written in June 1804. However, his central political idea of bringing together all Serbs into a single united national state was not ever realised.

This article proposes answers to four important questions connected with Stratimirović's plan to liberate and unite all Serbs:

- under which political-diplomatic circumstances of international relations and historical conditions was *Memorandum* written?
- which specific territory had to be included into the borders of an autonomous Serbian state under Ottoman suzerainty and Russian protectorate?
- who was to rule over this state?
- how important was the *Memorandum* to the further development of Serbian political ideology and thought?

To date, the most distinguished examination of the topic of this article was that of protojerej St. M. Dimitrijević in his 1926 book.⁵ However, except for the fact that the book contains the text of the original *Memorandum* its value to the topic and main problems discussed in this article is limited. In other words, Dimitrijević did not attempt to provide answers to any questions responsive to the topic of this article. Moreover, he did not address the importance of the *Memorandum* to Serbian secular national ideology since Stratimirović's plan was seen by Dimitrijević only as a contribution to the

⁴ For a discussion of the *Beogradski pašaluk* see: Д. Пантелић, *Београдски пашалук пред први српски устанак (1794–1804)* (Београд, 1949).

⁵ Ст. Т. Димитријевић, *Стевана Стратимировића, Митрополита Карловачког План за ослобођење српског народа* (Београд, 1926).

development of Serbian church ideology. However, Dimitrijević's work inspired Serbian historian Đoko M. Slijepčević to write in 1936 the book about Stevan Stratimirović.⁶ Nevertheless, it was primarily Stratimirović's personality as a head of Serbian national church in the Habsburg Monarchy that was described in this work. Slijepčević dealt very little with Stratimirović's political ideas. Shortly thereafter, Slijepčević wrote a reliable biography of Stratimirović but his intention was not to deal with the Metropolitan's political thought. Finally, another Serbian historian, Dimitrije Ruvarac, wrote his account on Stratimirović's work. But, unfortunately it was only a report on Stratimirović's geographic notes apropos Turkey written in 1803 and 1804.⁷

International politics and historical circumstances in which the Serbs lived at the turn of the 19th century

At the beginning of the 19th century, after centuries of Ottoman rule, relations between Turks and Serbs remained unchanged. The population of the *Beogradski pašaluk* was sharply divided into Muslim and Christian. The Muslims, composed of converted domestic Slavs and ethnic Turks, were landlords while all non-Muslims were serfs-peasants (*reaya*). The Serbs were second class citizens economically, politically and ethnically subjugated and religiously and socially discriminated. The Serbs and the Muslims were religiously exclusive and in permanent conflict with each other.⁸ The Orthodox Serbs, unlike the ethnic Turks or the Slavic Muslims, did not accept the Sultan's policy of Ottomanisation of all citizens of the Ottoman Empire. For the Serbs it was an alien, oppressive and burdensome state because the Ottoman Empire and its social organization were created and functioned according to Islamic religious law.⁹ The mind of the Serbs was

⁶ Ђ. М. Слијепчевић, *Стеван Стратимировић, Митрополит Карловачки као поглавар цркве, просветни и национално-политички радник* (Београд, 1936).

⁷ Д. Руварац, *Географске белешке о Турској Митрополита Стевана Стратимировића из године 1803 и 1804* (Београд, 1903).

⁸ Х. Шабановић (ед.), *Турски извори о српској револуцији 1804* (Београд, 1956), 200–204.

⁹ В. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* (Cambridge, 1984), 43–44. More about the relations between Islamic religious law and Ottoman state's system see in: Н. Inalcik, *The*

preoccupied with the re-creation of the mediaeval national empire which was dismantled by the Turks in the years of 1371–1459.¹⁰

The last two decades of the 18th century marked the period of Serbian national revival, the era of the creation of national awareness.¹¹ Political, economic, and cultural developments of the Austrian Serbs influenced their fellow citizens in the Ottoman Empire. The national political ideology created by the Serbian religious intelligentsia in southern Hungary tremendously influenced the Serbs of the *Beogradski pašaluk* mainly through the church propaganda.¹² The role of the Serbian Orthodox church in the creation of cultural and national identity during the time of the Ottoman occupation and its contribution to national liberation was of inestimable importance.¹³ The Serbian Orthodox church however identified the fate of the Serbian people with that of their church and presented itself as the principal saviour of the nation. The Serbian church organization in the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire was intimately linked with the Russian Orthodox church. Russian cultural and religious influence among the Austrian and Ottoman Serbs was consequently very high particularly in the matter of the Serbian literal language.¹⁴ The Serbian Metropolitanat of Sremski Karlovci represented a key link between the Patriarchate in Moscow and the Serbian Orthodox believers in the Balkans.

The leading and most influential representative of the Metropolitanat of Sremski Karlovci was its Metropolitan Stevan Stratimirović. In the early years of his church career he was a bishop of Buda until the Timisoara's Council of the Serbian church in the Habsburg Monarchy in 1790. In this council he became not only the Metropolitan of the Serbian church in

Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300–1600 (New York, 1973); N. Itzkowitz, *Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition* (New York, 1972).

¹⁰ В. Чубриловић, *Историја политичке мисли у Србији у XIX веку* (Београд, 1982); Р. Љушић, *Вожд Карађорђе*, I (Смедеревска Паланка, 1993), 133–145; А. Ивић (уредник), *Списи Бечких архива о првом српском устанку, I, 1804* (Београд, 1935); С. Стратимировић, “Објашњење постанка и узроци устанка српских хришћана 1804”, *Српски књижевни гласник*, 18 (Београд, 1907).

¹¹ М. Екмечић, *Дуго кретање између клања и орања. Историја Срба у Новом веку (1492–1992)* (Нови Сад: Евро Ђунти, 2010), 127–150.

¹² Т. Judah, *The Serbs. History, Myth & Destruction of Yugoslavia* (New Haven and London, 1997), 48–72.

¹³ S. Ćirković, “Religious factor in Forming of Cultural and National Identity” in D. Janjić (ed.), *Religion & War* (Belgrade, 1994), 146–160.

¹⁴ A. Albin, “The Creation of the Slavono-Serbski Literary Language”, *The Slavonic and East European Review*, XLVIII (113), 483–492.



The Balkans in 1856 divided between The Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy

Austria but the leader of the entire Serbian population inside the Habsburg Monarchy.¹⁵ Stratimirović was not interested only in church affairs; Serbian national problems occupied his mind even before the First Serbian Uprising broke up. Thinking about Serbia's liberation and national unification he wrote a letter addressed to the Habsburg Emperor Joseph II on July 1st, 1786. This document contains the Metropolitan's personal proposal on how to resolve Serbian national problems inside the Ottoman Empire.¹⁶ To the Emperor Stratimirović

¹⁵ М. Јовић, К. Радић, *Српске земље и владари* (Крушевац, 1990), 142–146; В. Ђоровић, *Историја Срба* (Београд, 1993), 510, 514, 528–537.

¹⁶ Ђ. М. Слијепчевић, *Стеван Стратимировић митрополит Карловачки као поглавар цркве, просветни и национално-политички радник* (Београд, 1936), 172.

proposed that the Austrian army intervene against the Turks and liberate the Serbs inside the *Beogradski pašaluk*.¹⁷

During the Austro-Turkish War of 1788–1791 and the Russo-Turkish War of 1787–1792 the Serbian patriots and public workers from the Habsburg Monarchy undertook serious diplomatic activities in order to attract the support of foreign powers in the liberation of Serbia.¹⁸ In July 1791 Stevan Jovanović, Vasilije Radovanović and Jovan Milović sent a special petition regarding the living conditions of the Serbs in the *Beogradski pašaluk* to Stevan Stratimirović. The letter was for the Austrian Emperor. They appealed for amnesty for all Serbs who had fought against the Turks on the Austrian side after the end of the war between Austria and Turkey. Amnesty was to be acquired from the Turkish Sultan by the Austrian authorities during the peace negotiations 1791 in the town of Svishtov. The Karlovci Metropolitan handed over this petition to the Habsburg sovereign probably after insertion of his own corrections to the document.¹⁹ Stevan Stratimirović actually became a representative of all Serbs either from Austria or Turkey to the Habsburg court. He was very well informed about the Serbs from the Ottoman Empire because he maintained connections with the well-known church's representatives and national leaders from Serbia. Stratimirović, for instance, had very long talk in Sremski Karlovci with the Serbian émigrés from Turkey connected with the question of Serbian autonomy and the self-government inside the Ottoman Empire. This conversation was held just before the Austro-Turkish war ended in 1791. Stratimirović's conversation with the Serbians about the "Serbian question" became subsequently the substructure for his *Memorandum* of 1804.

Several projects connected with the reconstruction of the Serbian state were drafted during the 18th century:

- by the Serbian Patriarch Arsenije IV Jovanović-Šakabenta (1736/1737),
- by the Austrian Count Waldemar Schmettau (1774),
- by the Serb from Austria David Narandžić (1785, 1788),

¹⁷ *Летопис Матице Српске*, књига 143 (Нови Сад, 1885), 111–112.

¹⁸ Д. Павловић, *Србија за време последњег аустријско-турског рата (1788–1791)* (Београд, 1910).

¹⁹ Д. Павловић, *Србија за време последњег аустријско-турског рата (1788–1791)* (Београд, 1910), 264–265.

- by one other Austrian Serb Dimitrije Vujić (1797/1798), and
- by the Montenegrin Metropolitan Petar I Petrović-Njegoš (1798).

All of these projects influenced the Karlovci Metropolitan to design his own plan for autonomous Serbia. The idea of the semi-independent an autonomous Serbian Duchy inside the Ottoman Empire however did not occupy only Stratimirović's mind. The Serbs from Austria like arhimandrit Stevan Jovanović, arhimandrit Arsenije Gagović and nobleman Sava Tekelija were inspired with the same political concept. Tekelija for instance submitted his own *Memorandum* to the German-Austrian Emperor Francis II in 1805 suggesting that the Austrian army help the Serbs to re-establish their national medieval empire.²⁰ In 1802 a Serbian nobleman from Arad, Sava Tekelija, realized that support of some mighty European country was indispensable to Serbian national liberation and the re-making of the Serbian national state. In contrast to Stratimirović, Tekelija saw Austria as a protector of the Serbs and Serbia. The leader of the First Serbian Uprising Đorđe Petrović-Karađorđe (Kapareoprđe, i.e., Black George) during the initial months of the rebellion also belonged to the circle of the Serbian national workers who turned their eyes towards the Habsburg Monarchy.²¹ The Serbian russophiles on the other hand were represented by the Herzegovinian arhimandrit Arsenije Gagović. He travelled just before the beginning of the uprising in 1803 to Russia on a diplomatic mission undoubtedly on Stratimirović's initiative. The purpose of the mission was to engage the Tsar in the issue of the "Serbian question". Gagović specifically suggested to the Russian monarch that the freeing of the Ottoman Serbs be accomplished with the help of the Russian army.²² Jovan Jovanović, the Serbian bishop from Bačka, as well as arhimandrit Gagović and Metropolitan Stratimirović, belonged to the group of Serbian intellectuals who saw imperial Russia

²⁰ Д. Поповић, "Сава Текелија према првом српском устанку", *Проблеми Војводине* (Нови Сад, 1965), 101.

²¹ Е. Г. Маретић, *Историја српске револуције 1804–1813* (Београд, 1987), 96–109 (Original in German language written immediately after the uprising according to the author's diary); А. Ивић (уредник), *Списи Бечких архива о првом српском устанку, I, 1804* (Београд, 1935); Р. Перовић (уредник), *Прилози за историју првог српског устанка. Необјављена грађа* (Београд, 1954).

²² Ст. Т. Димитријевић, *Стевана Стратимировића, Митрополита Карловачког План за ослобођење српског народа* (Београд, 1926), 4.

as a natural protector of the Serbs.²³ Jovanović's political ideas were expressed in the letter sent to the Russian Metropolitan of St. Petersburg (on January 14th, 1804) in which the bishop of Bačka proposed that the brother of the Russian Tsar, Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich, be crowned as the Serbian Emperor after Serbia's liberation from the Ottoman rule.²⁴

All of those proposals point to the fact that the unification of the entire Serbian nation, independent of both Austria and Turkey into a single national state was not yet being considered. According to the proposals, liberated Serbia would become a vassal state either within the Habsburg Monarchy or the Ottoman Empire under Austrian or Russian political and military protectorate. The only difference between the Serbian austrophiles and russophiles was on the question of on which empire the Serbs should depend. The first group relied on the Habsburgs since Austria was closer to Serbia than Russia and could intervene more



rapidly, militarily.²⁵ The economic reasons also played a considerable role in their political plans because the Austrian Serbs and the Ottoman Serbs were in close economic relations. For them it was economically much more beneficial if all Serbs were to live inside Austria. In contrast, Serbian russophiles relied on the Romanovs as they were the rulers of the Orthodox faith. For them Serbian Orthodoxy, as a crucial indicator of national determination, could be protected only by support of the Russian Orthodox ruling dynasty. The Roman-Catholic Habsburgs were perceived as the “unnatural” allies. The majority of the pro-Austrian Serbs belonged to the social strata of merchants, craftsmen and secular intelligentsia who

²³ М. Екмечић, *Дуго кретање између клања и орања. Историја Срба у Новом веку (1492–1992)* (Нови Сад: Евро Ђунти, 2010), 149.

²⁴ М. Вукићевић, *Карађорђе*, I (Београд, 1907), 234–239.

²⁵ И. Пржић, *Спољашња политика Србије (1804–1914)*, (Београд: Политика А. Д., 1939), 14–15.

were focused primarily on the economic benefits of the Austrian protectorate over all Serbs. Their pro-Russian opponents, however, were composed essentially of the Serbian Orthodox clergy either from the Habsburg Monarchy or the Ottoman Empire who tried at first to emancipate the Serbian religious-national identity.²⁶

The essential role of the Balkans in international politics at the turn of the 19th century was as the focus of the Austrian and Russian competition and struggle for control over the region. After the liberation of Hungary in 1686/1699, and in the course of driving back the Turks towards the Aegean Sea and the Black Sea, the Habsburg Monarchy secured supremacy in the north-western Balkans. After freeing some Balkan territories from the Ottoman control, Austria organized the defense of the frontier areas against Turkey. They introduced a special system which turned out to be a keystone of its political and military strategy in Southeastern Europe. This Austrian defensive military frontier zone ("Militärgrenze") was originally organized in 1576 as a bulwark against the Ottoman assaults but also as a bridgehead for its own attacks on Turkish territories (in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia). This military zone was settled by large number of Serbian emigrants from Turkey who became professional soldiers, i.e., the frontiersmen.²⁷ One of the turning points of the Austro-Turkish War from 1788 to 1791 was the establishment of a Serbian free fighting corps and the emergence of a Serbian political leadership that formulated Serbia's national goals more energetically than had been the case previously.²⁸

The Russo-Turkish War 1768–1774 ended with the peace of Kuchuk-Kainarji in 1774. It gave Russia Azov and secured Russian political influence in tributary Principalities of Moldavia and Walachia. However, the Ottoman authorities gave Austria the northern part of Moldavia, which was named Bukovina, in 1775 in return for the diplomatic support of Austria gave in the settling of problems with Russia. According to the Treaty of Jassy signed in January 1792, Russia received

²⁶ About this problem see more in: E. Picot, *Les Serbes de Hongrie* (Paris, 1873); Г. Јакшић, *Борба за слободу Србије од 1788 до 1813* (Београд, 1991/1937).

²⁷ About the Austrian "Military Border" see more in: R. Günther, *The Military Border in Croatia 1740–1881* (Chicago, 1966).

²⁸ About this question see more in: J. Bérengar, *A History of the Habsburg Empire: 1700–1918* (London, 2000); Д. Павловић, *Србија за време последњег аустријско-турског рата (1788–1791)* (Београд, 1910).

from Turkey the former Crimean Khanate. The Russo-Turkish border was established on the Dniester River. The Serbs within the *Beogradski pašaluk* received political autonomy which became the foundation for Stratimirović's plan of Serbia's political semi-independence in the Ottoman Empire. With the Peace of Jassy, the Russo-Austrian rivalry over the Balkans was resolved in favour of Russia.²⁹ In addition, Russia's gradual forcing of the Ottoman Empire out of the Crimea and Moldavia in the 18th century resulted in limitation on the Polish-Lithuanian (i.e., the Roman-Catholic) sphere of influence in the region of southeast Ukraine and the north Black Sea littoral and in strengthening of Russian (i.e., the Orthodox) influence and prestige in the same area.

With Russia's drawing nearer to the Danube and to Constantinople the popularity of imperial Russia gradually grew among the Serbs. The 18th -century Russian-Ottoman conflict reinforced among the Serbs the idea of Romanov Russia as the principal bulwark of Orthodox Christendom. It can be concluded that in the year of Stratimirović's *Memorandum* Russian influence had already pushed back that of Austria among the Balkan Orthodox subjects of the Sultan. This Russian approach towards Serbian lands directly influenced Stratimirović to write his document in which he supported the idea of the Russian protectorate over the Balkan Orthodox population drafted in the "Greek Project" by the Russian Empress Catherine II (the "Great"). In 1782 the Empress proposed to the Austrian Emperor Joseph II that Bessarabia, Moldavia and Walachia be united into the independent state of "Dacia" under the Russian protectorate. In addition, the Greek (i.e., Byzantine) Empire with Constantinople as a capital was to be re-established on the eastern portion of the Balkans and placed under the Russian patronage. Consequently, the real aim of Stratimirović's *Memorandum* was to convince the Russian Tsar to extend Russian patronage over an autonomous Serbia as well. Similarly, he believed that the recent example of the establishment of the Russian protectorate over the autonomous territory of the Ottoman Christian Orthodox subjects of the Ionian Islands (Leucas, Cephalonia, Ithaca,

²⁹ В. Поповић, *Источно питање* (Београд, 1928).

Zante, Cythera) in 1799 could be replicated in the case of the Serbs and Serbia as well.

Diplomatic activities of Metropolitan Stratimirović

The role of Metropolitan Stratimirović in the First Serbian Uprising has not yet been effectively explained in Serbian historiography. Stratimirović was surely very well informed in regard to the political situation in Serbia and political wishes of the Serbs within the Ottoman Empire. Prota Mateja Nenadović, one of the most outstanding leaders of the Uprising and military commander of western Serbia, submitted to Stratimirović the first written statement on the political concerns and goals of Serbia's military leadership. The proposal was drafted by the most eminent leaders of the Uprising at the end of February 1804. Stratimirović's answer with personal comments on the statement reached Prota Mateja Nenadović on March 29th of the same year. Nenadović delivered Stratimirović's answer directly to the leader of the Uprising, Đorđe Petrović-Karađorđe.³⁰ This prompts two conclusions:

- it clearly confirms that the Karlovci Metropolitan established and maintained uninterrupted political relations with the supreme military headquarters of the Serbian insurgents already at the very beginning of the Uprising, and
- it documents that he was very well informed on the political wishes, plans and ideology of Serbia's supreme military authority.

Stratimirović, inspired and reinforced by the first written statement about the political wishes of Serbia's military leadership, started to work to obtain political and military support for Serbian insurgents by the Habsburg's court. In the same year he wrote three letters to the Austrian Archduke Carl, on May 31st, June 29th and August 16th.³¹ In these letters

³⁰ About Karađorđe's role in the First Serbian Uprising against the Ottoman authorities see: К. Ненадовић, *Живот и дела великог Ђорђа Петровића Кара-ђорђа. Врховног Војводе, ослободиоца и Владара Србије и живот његови Војвода и јунака. Као градиво за Србску Историју од године 1804 до 1813 и на даље* (књига Прва, Беч, 1883; књига Друга, Беч, 1884).

³¹ Ђ. М. Слијепчевић, *Стеван Стратимировић, Митрополит Карловачки као поглавар цркве, просветни и национално-политички радник* (Београд, 1936), 189.

Stratimirović presented himself as the principal political ambassador of the Serbs from both the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire to the imperial court in Vienna. He strongly believed that a peace in rebellious Serbia would be re-established only if Serbia's military authorities' political demands were accepted by the Ottoman government. Stratimirović at the same time advocated the idea of establishing tolerable Turkish system of government in Serbia which would replace the anarchy and violence of the local Turkish authorities. Finally, at this point the Karlovci Metropolitan saw the house of Habsburgs as a key guarantor of peace in Serbia. In the other words, Serbia needed to be put under the Habsburg's protectorate.



Stratimirović, the head of Serbian church in the Habsburg Monarchy, however, simultaneously suggested to Serbia's military leaders they send a political deputation to the Russian imperial court to convey their political wishes and requirements. His ultimate aim in fact was to convince the Russian Emperor to become the real protector of the Ottoman and Austrian Serbs and the peace-keeper in a united Serbia. Consequently, Stratimirović established the road to St. Petersburg for the first

Serbian deputation sent to the Russian Emperor during the Uprising. The deputation, joined by Prota Mateja Nenadović, Petar Novaković Čardaklija and Jovan Protić, departed for Russia on September 13th, 1804. They submitted on November 15th, 1804 to the Russian Emperor Alexander I the Serbian petition "for safekeeping and salvation" asking him to take Serbia under the Russian protectorate.³² The petition was

³² С. И. Достян, "Планы основания славяно-сербского государства с помощью России в начале XX в.", *Советское славяноведение*, 5 (Москва, 1970), 1005–1007; *Первое сербское восстание и Россия*, 1 (Москва, 1980), 58–62; П. В. Грачев, *Балканские владения Османской империи на рубеже XVIII–XIX*

certainly based on Stratimirović's political ideas contained in his *Memorandum*. It turned out that the Serbian deputation in St. Petersburg reiterated exactly what Stratimirović had proposed in his *Memorandum*: the re-establishment of a Serbian state (Сербское правление) and official expression of Serbia's loyalty to the Turkish Sultan. The Russian imperial court accepted Stratimirović's idea of an autonomous Serbian state within the Ottoman Empire but under Russian political-military protectorate, similar to the status of the Danube principalities of Moldavia and Walachia in the Ottoman Empire.³³

Stratimirović had already formed his idea of Serbian liberation from Austrian and Ottoman control before the beginning of the First Serbian Uprising. His political ideas about Serbian and all South-Slavic liberation and the re-establishment of Serbian and South-Slavic mediaeval statehood were expressed by Stratimirović's deputy, arhimandrit Arsenije Gagović, to the Russian Emperor in St. Petersburg on November 2nd, 1803. Gagović, following the instructions of the Karlovci Metropolitan, proposed to Alexander I that Russia support the liberation and political unification of South-Slavic peoples into the *Slavonic-Serbian Empire*. Gagović also recommended that one Russian Grand Duke be appointed by the Russian monarch as Emperor of this Empire.³⁴

The crucial question with respect to the diplomatic activities of the Karlovci Metropolitan that arises is: why did Stratimirović look upon Russia as the only ingenuous liberator and political-military protector of the Serbs and, moreover, the rest of the South-Slavs? Stratimirović obviously thought that Russia was the only European country with genuine affinity towards the South-Slavs especially the Serbs. The main fosterer of such an opinion among the Serbs was the Serbian Orthodox clergy headed by Stratimirović. Imperial Russia as an Orthodox country and the country with the largest Slavic population gradually inspired the spiritual-political leader of

ов. (Москва, 1990), 120–138. See more about the deputation in: *Мемоари Проте Матије Ненадовића* (Београд, 1867); Р. Љушић, *Вук Караџић о Српској револуцији* (Београд, 1990).

³³ М. Вукићевић, *Карађорђе*, II (Београд, 1907), 180–199.

³⁴ М. Екмечић, *Дуго кретање између клања и орања. Историја Срба у Новом веку (1492–1992)* (Нови Сад: Евро Ђунти, 2010), 149; Ђ. М. Слијепчевић, *Стеван Стратимировић, Митрополит Карловачки као поглавар цркве, просветни и национално-политички радник* (Београд, 1936), 176–179.

the Serbian nation during the Habsburg and Ottoman lordships, (i.e. the Serbian Orthodox church, since the end of 17th century) to believe that only the Romanovs could be real liberators and protectors of the Serbs and the rest of the South-Slavs, especially the Orthodox ones.³⁵ The Serbian Orthodox clergy welcomed the Romanovs' *Panslavism* - the official course of the Russian foreign policy in Europe.

The Serbian Orthodox Church moved more closely towards Russia during the 18th century when, as a consequence of the Habsburgs' military victories over the Turks, Roman-Catholic influence in the Balkans significantly increased.³⁶ The Serbian priests, in order to prevent Roman-Catholic dominance in the region, urged Russia to put all South-Slavic populations under its political protection. As a consequence of the Serbian Orthodox Church's propaganda in favor of the Russians, the reputation of the Russian Emperor in Serbian eyes significantly increased at the end of the 18th century. Subsequently, Sava Tekelija, a Serbian nobleman from Arad, advised that in the case of the new Russo-Ottoman war the Serbs, as well the Bulgarians, would welcome Russia as their liberator.³⁷ In return, the Serbian clergy always reminded the Serbs of the connections which linked them to the Russians: "divine, natural and eternal bonds of the blood, language and faith" ("Божанска, природна и вечна веза крви, језика и вере").³⁸ The historical role of shared Orthodoxy and language were especially emphasised in this pro-Russian propaganda. Clearly, Orthodoxy became for the majority of ethnolinguistic Serbs a main symbol of the national struggle against the Ottoman authorities. At the turn of the 19th century the myth of Orthodoxy became the foremost instrument in the hands of the Serbian clergy in their combat against Austrian (i.e., Roman-Catholic) political supremacy in the Balkans. They at the same time supported the Russian concept of united Orthodox nations as the crucial step towards realization of the Russian policy of *Panslavism*. The Serbian spiritual leaders came to view Orthodox-Slavic Russia as the only sincere liberator and protector of both the Southeast

³⁵ More about this question see in: Б. Ђурђевић, "Улога српске цркве у борби против османске власти", *Преглед*, 1 (Сарајево, 1953).

³⁶ Г. Витковић, "Извештај Максима Ратковића, егзарха београдског митрополита, 1733", *Гласник*, LVI (Београд), 121.

³⁷ С. Текелија, *Описаније живота* (Београд, 1966), 176.

³⁸ Р. Љушић, *Вожд Карађорђе*, I (Смедеревска Паланка, 1993), 119.

European Orthodox population (Romanians, Serbs, Macedonian Slavs, Montenegrins, Bulgarians and Greeks) and the South-Slavs (Yugoslavs and Bulgarians).³⁹

Finally, for the Orthodox Serbs and Russians anything that was bad for the Turks and the Ottoman Empire was good for them. Many Serbs unequivocally welcomed Russian military victory over the Turks in 1774, especially the article of the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji which established a Russian protectorate over Moldavia and Walachia with the Russian right of guardianship of all Balkan Orthodox populations in the Ottoman Empire. Stratimirović, unconditionally culturally and politically oriented toward Russia, saw in this article of the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji a very timely and appropriate legal opportunity for extension of a Russian protection over both Austrian and Ottoman Serbs.

Stratimirović's concept of the religion-language based Slavonic-Serbian state under the Russian protectorate

Stratimirović's *Memorandum* represents one of the earliest political programs of Serbian liberation and unification in modern Serbian history of political thought. He recognized that the Ottoman Serbs were not able to free themselves fighting alone against the Turks. In this respect, they needed to rely on one powerful European country which would give military and diplomatic support to the Serbian rebels. Consequently, the issue of a Serbian uprising had to be included in the broader context of European policy of Great Powers and international relations.⁴⁰ He was deeply and sincerely convinced that the Orthodox Russian Empire was a natural Serbian ally. As a result, the Russian Empire needed to become Serbia's patron in her struggle for freedom and national unification. With this in mind, the Karlovci Metropolitan sent his *Memorandum* to Tsar Alexander I. The vision of a unified Serbia under the Russian patronage but inside the Ottoman Empire animated Stratimirović's plan. In the other words, he favoured creation of an autonomous

³⁹ About Panslavism in the Russian foreign policy see in: Ф. А. Миллер, *Мустафа-паша Байрактар* (Москва, 1947), 58–65.

⁴⁰ About the problem of the policy by the European Great Powers towards the "Serbian Question" from 1804 to 1914 see in: В. Поповић, *Европа и српско питање* (Београд, 1940).

Serbia under Ottoman suzerainty but governed by the Russian Grand Duke or Viceroy. Stratimirović's *Memorandum*, or the so-called the "Plan for Serbian liberation", was submitted in June 1804 to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Duke Adam Czartoryski, by Serbian arhimandrit Arsenije Gagovic who was the Orthodox chaplain in the Russian embassy in Vienna.⁴¹

The actual political situation in Europe was elaborated in the first part of the *Memorandum*. Stratimirović concluded that only Russia was a real independent and powerful Orthodox country in the world. However, according to him, the European peoples viewed Russia as an Asiatic country as, for instance, in the case of the Poles, even though the Russians were the members of the Slavic community. The Karlovci Metropolitan explained the negative attitude of the Poles towards Orthodoxy and Russia as the product of propaganda activities of the Jesuit Order of the Roman-Catholic church in Poland whose main goal was to fight Orthodoxy throughout Europe.

In the second part of his plan Stratimirović considered the question of the liberation of the Balkans from the Ottoman rule. Here, he rejected the *Plan for the re-establishing of the Greek Empire*, i.e. the plan for liberation of the Balkan Orthodox population drafted by the Russian Empress Catherine II in 1782. According to this plan, all Balkan Orthodox peoples would be included in the new Byzantine Empire with the its capital in Constantinople. They would be governed by one Russian Duke, designated as their Emperor.⁴² But, Stratimirovic was of the opinion that Russian influence in this Empire would be decreased because of the anti-Russian



⁴¹ About the history of submission of the *Memorandum* to the Russian officials see: Ст. Т. Димитријевић, Стевана Стратимировића, Митрополита Карловачког План за ослобођење српског народа (Београд, 1926), 12–16.

⁴² E. Driault, *La politique orientale de Napoléon* (Paris, 1904), 30–31.

activities of the Greeks who had never been sincere admirers of Russia. The Karlovci Metropolitan concluded that the Russian alliance with the Greeks would be catastrophic from the onset.⁴³ Stratimirović suggested to the Russian authorities that only the Serbs in the Balkans were bona fide allies of the Russian Empire. For that reason, according to Stratimirović, Russia would have more benefits from the re-establishment of the Serbian state in the Balkans rather than a Greek state. In conclusion, in order to attract the Russian Emperor for his plan, Stratimirović launched the idea that the establishment of a Serbian state in the Balkans under Russian patronage was to be the primary precondition for the realization of the Russian goal of gaining control over the Black Sea littoral and Thrace since a Serbian state would serve as a natural barrier against Austrian penetration into the Russian political sphere of interest.

The third part of the *Memorandum* dealt with the problem of the internal dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The Karlovci Metropolitan noted that Ottoman European possessions were already in the process of total and incurable disintegration and destruction, as for example every Turkish provincial governor, the Pasha, had become independent of the central government which was unable to prevent the Empire from its internal political break up and regional separation. As a consequence of this situation, the beginning of the 19th century offered the best opportunities to create a semi-independent Serbian state in the Balkans but which was possible only with Russian diplomatic support of the Serbs.

In the fourth part of his plan Stratimirović proposed the creation of a Serbian tributary state in the Balkans under the Sultan's nominal suzerainty. State-political relationships between the newly established Serbian state and the Ottoman Empire would be similar to the state-political relations between the Republic of Dubrovnik and the Republic of the Ionian Islands with the Ottoman Empire. Like the Republic of the Ionian Islands, a semi-independent Serbia would be put under the Russian political-military protectorate. Finally, after the creation of the Serbian tributary state, the Turkish Sultan would get some territorial compensations in Asia from the Russian Emperor.

⁴³ Ђ. М. Слијепчевић, *Стеван Стратимировић, Митрополит Карловачки као поглавар цркве, просветни и национално-политички радник* (Београд, 1936), 180.

The concept of a revived Serbian national state drafted in the *Memorandum* was essentially based on the idea that both the Serbs from the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy would join it. Subsequently, the following territories of the Habsburg Monarchy populated by the Serbs would be incorporated into the tributary autonomous national state of the Serbs which Stratimirović designated as *Slavonic-Serbian* (Славено-Сербско государство) encompassing:

- the Gulf of Boka Kotorska with the city of Kotor,
- the parts of Dalmatia and Croatia eastward from the Una River, the Krka River and the city of Šibenik,
- the territory between the Danube River, the Sava River and the Vuka River, and
- the main portion of Slavonia.⁴⁴

The lands that were historically and ethnically Serbian under the Ottoman Empire were to be consolidated into liberated Serbia also. It would be composed of:

- the *Beogradski pašaluk* (from the Sava River and the Danube River to the Western Morava River, and from the Drina River to the Timok River),
- Bosnia-Herzegovina,
- Montenegro,
- Kosovo-Metohija (with the cities of Peć, Đakovica, Banja, Priština, Prizren, Vučitrn, Mitrovica and Zvečan), and
- north-western Bulgaria with the city of Vidin and its hinterland and the Lom River.

However, in addition, Stratimirović in his works also identified other territories which, by virtue of ethnicity, would subsequently be components of the area of a Serbian nation:

- part of the western Walachia between the Danube River and the Jiu River,
- present-day southern Serbia with the cities of Niš, Leskovac, Kruševac, Vranje and Bujanovac, and
- the present-day northern Albania with the city of Scutari.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ The text of *Memorandum* in: Ст. Т. Димитријевић, *Стевана Стратимировића, Митрополита Карловачког План за ослобођење српског народа* (Београд, 1926), 17–24.

⁴⁵ Д. Руварац, *Географске белешке о Турској Митрополита Стевана Стратимировића из године 1803 и 1804* (Београд, 1903).

In dealing with the problem of fixing the borders of the Slavonic–Serbian state the Karlovci Metropolitan applied both historical and ethnic principles:

- firstly, according to the historical principle, the territory of mediaeval Serbia would compose Stratimirović's Slavonic–Serbian state, and
- secondly, in accordance with the ethnic principle, all Balkan territories settled by the Orthodox South Slavic population who spoke Shtokavian (штокавски)⁴⁶ dialect were considered to belong to the Serbian ethnic space and saw as the part of the Slavonic–Serbian state.

With respect to the determination of the ethnic space of the Serbs Stratimirović was strongly influenced by the theory of the concept of ethnic-linguistic space of Serbdom developed at the time by Sava Tekelija. His ethnic-linguistic concept of Serbdom was presented in his short essay *Описаније живота* (*Description of life*). He posited that all South Slavic population who spoke the Shtokavian, Kajkavian and Chakavian dialects, regardless of religion, belonged to the Serbian nation. Tekelija designated the following territories as ethnic-linguistic Serbian ones: Serbia proper, Kosovo-Metohija, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Macedonia, Republic of Dubrovnik, Carniola (Kranjska), Styria (Štajerska), Carinthia (Koruška), Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, southern Hungary (present-day Vojvodina) and the northern Albania. He suggested that all of these “Serbian” territories should compose one single Serbian national state which would have borders on the Adriatic and the Black Sea. In his view, this state would be mainly populated by Orthodox Serbs and by a minority of Roman-Catholics. Tekelija called these territories as *Illyricum*. The name reflects a wide spread theory of the time that all South Slavs originated from the ancient Balkan Illyrians who in Tekelija's eyes were the ethnic-language-based Serbs, i.e., the speakers of Kajkavian, Shtokavian and Chakavian dialects.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ The former “Serbo-Croatian” language is spoken in three dialects: the Kajkavian, Shtokavian, and Chakavian. The majority of present-day Croats speak the Shtokavian dialect. All Serbs were and are speaking only the Shtokavian. The Kajkavian dialect has a Croatian and Slovenian version. The Chakavian was and is spoken only by Croats.

⁴⁷ About the claims that ancient Balkan Illyrians were only the ethnic Serbs see: J. Бајић, *Блажени Јероним, Солинска црква и Србо-Далмати* (Шабац: Бели анђео, 2003); Б. Земљанички, *Староседеоци Срби и Римљани* (Београд: Стручна књига, 1999); Ј. И. Деретић, Д. П. Антић, С. М. Јарчевић, *Измишљено досељавање Срба* (Београд: Сардонија, 2009).

Nevertheless, Stratimirović did not accept as a whole Tekelija's concept of the Kajkavian-Shtokavian-Chakavian language-based Serbian nation. The Karlovci Metropolitan thought that only the Orthodox Christian population of the South Slavs who spoke only the Shtokavian dialect belonged to the genuine ethnic-language-based Serbdom. As a result, the Slovenes (the Roman-Catholic and Kajkavian speaking population from Carinthia, Carniola and Styria), the Bulgarians (Bulgarian speaking population from the eastern Balkans) and the Croats (the Roman-Catholic and Kajkavian and Chakavian speaking population from Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia) were excluded from the community of Stratimirović's religion-language-based Serbian nation and subsequently from his Slavonic-Serbian state.⁴⁸

As territorial compensation from the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburg Monarchy was to receive the following:

- the western part of the so-called "Turkish Croatia", i.e., the lands between the Una River and Petrova Gora, and
- the lands between Transilvania, the Danube River and the Olta River.⁴⁹

In other words, for ceding Srem and southern Dalmatia to the Serbian tributary state which would be *de iure* within the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburg Monarchy would obtain from Turkey north-western Bosnia and the south westernmost part of Walachia. According to Stratimirović, the territories which would be ceded to the Habsburg Monarchy by the

⁴⁸ About the 19th century ideas of ethnic/national identification of the South Slavs according to the dialects of the South Slavic languages see in: Д. Обрадовић, "Писмо Харалампију", *Живот и прикљученија* (Нови Сад, 1783/1975), 147; Д. Обрадовић, "Јест ли полезно у простом дијалекту на штампугу што издавати", *Изабрани списи* (Нови Сад, 1969), 363–364; P. J. Šafařík, *Geschichte der slawischen Sprache und Literatur* (Buda, 1926); P. J. Šafařík, *Slowansky národopis* (Prague, 1842/1955), 146–147; B. C. Караџић, "Срби сви и свуда", *Ковчежић за историју и обичаје Срба сва три закона* (Беч, 1849), 1–27; J. Kopitar, "Patriotske fantazije jednog Slovena", *Vaterländische Blätter* (1810); J. Kopitar, *Serbica* (Београд, 1984); J. Dobrovský, *Geschichte der böhmische Sprache und Literatur* (Wien, 1792/1818); J. Kollár, "О књижевној зајмности међу народи и наречјима словенским", *Сербски народни лист* (1835); F. Miklošič, "Serbisch und chorvatisch", *Vergleichende Gramatik der slawischen Sprachen* (Wien, 1852/1879); Д. Теодоровић, *О књижевној узајамности између различити племена и неречја славјанског народа од Јована Колара* (Београд, 1845); П. Милосављевић, *Срби и њихов језик. Хрестоматија* (Приштина, 1997); А. Starčević, *Politički spisi* (Zagreb, 1971); I. Derkos, *Genius patriae super dormientibus suis filiis* (Zagreb, 1832); J. Drašković, *Disertacija iliti razgovor, darovan gospodi poklisarom zakonskim i budućem zakonotvorcem kraljevinah naših* (Karlovac, 1932); V. B. Sotirović, *Srpski komonvelt* (Vilnius: privatno izdanje, 2011).

⁴⁹ Ст. Т. Димитријевић, *Стевана Стратимировића, Митрополита Карловачког План за ослобођење српског народа* (Београд, 1926), 17–24; М. Ђорђевић, *Политичка историја Србије, I, 1804–1813* (Београд, 1956), 19–20.

Ottoman Empire were triple the area of the territories which the Habsburg Monarchy would cede to unified Serbian national state. For the Karlovci Metropolitan, inclusion of the territory of Srem into united Serbia was of importance to the Serbs since 80% of its population consisted of the “Greco-Orthodox believers”, i.e. the Serbs, and 20% the “Roman-Catholics”, i.e. present-day the Croats, and also because the seat of the Serbian church was in Srem in the city of Sremski Karlovci.

In drafting his plan of the Serbian state, Stratimirović took into consideration possible negative international reactions to the re-creation of a national state of the Serbs. He knew very well that there were in contemporary Europe several states, such as France, Great Britain and the Habsburg



Monarchy, whose anticipated Balkan policy was one of thwarting the Ottoman Empire's disintegration. For instance, Austrian Minister-Premier Kaunitz openly announced that the survival of the Ottoman Empire was absolutely consistent with Austrian foreign policy in Southeastern Europe⁵⁰ Knowing that, and in order to keep the contemporary European balance of power and

European diplomatic house of cards unchanged, Stratimirović envisaged a liberated and unified Serbia as the part of the Ottoman Empire.

According to the author of the *Memorandum*, taking into account the lower level of general education of the Ottoman Serbs, the national state of the Serbs had to have a monarchical and not a republican constitution. In the other words, he thought that the Serbs were not yet sufficiently mature to operate under a republican constitution.

⁵⁰ N. Jorga, *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches* (V. Gotha, 1913), 3.

Stratimirović knew that at that time the Serbs had neither the representatives of a national dynasty or a political aristocracy. In contemplating a future head of a Serbian monarchical state he concluded that the best solution was the elevation of one of the Russian Grand Dukes to such a position. In the other words, Serbia's ruler had to be a member of the Russian imperial dynasty of the Romanovs primarily since the Russian imperial dynasty was of the same Christian-Orthodox religion as the Serbs. The Russian Grand Duke then would be appointed directly by the Tsar Alexander I Romanov as Serbia's ruler. This Grand Duke would come to Serbia with a Russian military contingent of 4000 soldiers. They would be the principal guarantee of Serbian liberty. Subsequently, a unified Serbian national state would become the tributary, autonomous, semi-independent, Orthodox Grand Duchy under Russian patronage and only formally recognize the Sultan's suzerainty. The Moslem population within the religion-language-based Serbian Grand Duchy would have the right of free expression of their faith.

Further, in the event that the Russian Emperor declined to nominate one of the Russian imperial Grand Dukes to be the sovereign of Serbia, according to the *Memorandum*, the Serbian ruler would then be chosen from the German Protestant Dukes, instead of the Russian pretender to the Serbian throne. Evidently, Stratimirović's firm requirement with respect to Serbia's monarch was that the person who governed Serbia could not be of the Roman-Catholic religion! Stratimirović presumed that a Roman-Catholic Duke would not want to convert to the Orthodox faith in order to assume the Serbian throne. In this respect, the author of the *Memorandum* believed that a Protestant Duke would be more likely to become the member of the Orthodox church than a Roman-Catholic. Nevertheless, Stratimirović sincerely believed that there would be interested noblemen of the Russian imperial court who would like to be appointed by the Russian Emperor as Serbia's monarch. His belief was based on the case of Russian Count Waldemar Schmetau who in 1774 had put himself forth as such a candidate and even tried to prove that he was an actual descendent of the Serbian mediaeval Duke

Lazar Hrebeljanović (killed during the Kosovo Battle on June 28th, 1389).⁵¹

In his *Memorandum* the proposed Serbian national state which was to be established with Russian support and function under the Russian protectorate the Karlovci Metropolitan called it the *СЛАВЕНО-СЕРБСКО ГОСУДАРСТВО*. This *Slavonic-Serbian state* was to be a monarchical one, autonomous and Orthodox with the Grand Duke as the head of it. Consequently, his proposed national state of the Serbs was an autonomous Orthodox Slavonic-Serbian Grand Duchy under the Russian protectorate within the Ottoman Empire. In conclusion, Stratimirović's religion-language-based *Славено-Сербско государство* would include the entire South Slavic population whose mother tongue was Shtokavian dialect and the national religion, Christian Orthodoxy.

When the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Duke Adam Czartoryski (who was a Roman-Catholic Pole), read Stratimirović's plan on the creation of a Slavonic-Serbian Grand Duchy he rejected the main idea. Instead of Stratimirović's proposal, Czartoryski favoured the earlier plan which called for the creation of the Greek Empire on the Balkans whose main ideological protagonist was the Russian Empress Catherine II. In fact, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs had a plan to cede to the Habsburg Monarchy Croatia, Slavonia, Dubrovnik, Belgrade and parts of Walachia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁵² However, Catherine II with respect to the earlier plan on the division of the Ottoman territories between the Russian Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy did not support the principle of national determination of the Balkan peoples as, for example, the Serbs would be split between the Habsburg Monarchy and the Greek Empire. In this respect, Stratimirović's *Memorandum* had the aim of persuading the Russian authorities to finally reject the idea of the creation of the Greek Empire and to accept his idea of the establishment of a united Serbian state. From the Empress' plan the Karlovci Metropolitan only accepted the idea of Russian political-military protectorate over the Balkan Christian Orthodox nations.

⁵¹ А. Соловјев, "Непознати кандидат на српски престо год. 1774", *Споменик*, ХСІ (Београд), 120.

⁵² М. Ђорђевић, *Политичка историја Србије, I, 1804–1813* (Београд, 1956), 20.



Two flags used by Serbian rebels during the First Serbian Uprising against the Ottoman authorities, 1804–1813

Finally, Stratimirović's idea about creation of the autonomous religion-language-based Orthodox Shtokavian Slavonic-Serbian Grand Duchy under the Russian protectorate and only *de iure* within the Ottoman Empire significantly influenced Serbian political thought in the very near future:

- The Stratimirović's central idea in the *Memorandum* was accepted by the official deputation which was sent by the Serbian rebels from the *Beogradski pašaluk* to the Turkish Sultan in Istanbul on July 13th, 1806 to negotiate the peace agreement with the Ottoman authorities. The Ottoman government also accepted the main proposals in the *Memorandum* in response to these Serbian requirements on August 15th, 1806. However, at that time the peace agreement between the Serbian insurgents and the Ottoman Empire was not signed primarily because the Russian diplomats did not support the main idea contained in the *Memorandum* since they held a different concept of the political arrangement of the Balkans than that of Stratimirović.⁵³
- Another Serbian deputation from the *Beogradski pašaluk* went to Istanbul in January 1813 to negotiate the peace treaty with requirements which were also based on Stratimirović's idea of the creation of autonomous Serbian state within the Ottoman Empire. The Serbian requirements of 1813 were based fundamentally on Stratimirović's idea of the Russian protectorate over autonomous Serbia. This idea was already incorporated into the *Article № Eight* of the Russian-Ottoman *Peace Treaty of Bucharest*, signed on May 28th, 1812.⁵⁴
- Stratimirović's concept of the determination of the Serbian nation according to the Shtokavian dialect was accepted by the leading Serbian ideologue of the

⁵³ Е. Г. Маретић, *Историја српске револуције 1804–1813* (Београд, 1987), 124; С. Новаковић, “Ичков мир. Покушај непосредног измирења Србије и Турске, 1806–1807”, *Глас СКА*, LXVI (Београд, 1903); М. Гавриловић, *Из нове српске историје* (Београд, 1926), 93–96; М. Вукићевић, *Карађорђе*, II (Београд, 1907), 385–387; Р. Љушић, *Вожд Карађорђе*, I (Смедеревска Паланка, 1993), 191–194.

⁵⁴ Р. Љушић, *Кнежевина Србија (1830–1839)* (Београд, 1986), 2–3; М. Ђорђевић, *Политичка историја Србије, I, 1804–1813* (Београд, 1956), 313–314; *Внешиная политика России XIX и начала XX века*, VI (Москва, 1967). About the Russian-Ottoman *Peace Treaty of Bucharest* in 1812 and Serbia see in: М. Ђорђевић, *Србија у устанку 1804–1813* (Београд: Рад, 1979), 317–328.

“language-based Serbian nation” model - Vuk Stefanović Karadžić in his ideological article “Serbs All and Everywhere” (“Срби сви и свуда”), written in 1836 and published in 1849. However, in contrast to the Karlovci Metropolitan’s idea that only South Slavic Orthodox Shtokavian speaking population belonged to the Serbdom, Karadžić was convinced that the entire South Slavic population who spoke the Shtokavian dialect, regardless of their Roman-Catholic, Muslim or Orthodox religious affiliations, composed the genuine ethnic Serbian nation.⁵⁵

- Stratimirović’s notion of a politically united Serbian nation created from the territories of both the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire within the single borders of a national state inspired the pivotal Serbian 19th-century politician Ilija Garašanin who in 1844 launched the idea of a politically united “language-based Serbian nation” of the Shtokavian dialect in his political-ideological work *Načertanije* (*Начертаније-Draft*).⁵⁶

Conclusion

The Karlovci Metropolitan Stevan Stratimirović created the idea of autonomous tributary religion-language-based Orthodox Shtokavian Slavonic-Serbian state in 1804. The state was to be governed by the Russian Grand Duke, under the Russian political-military protectorate, as well as to be only nominally included into the Ottoman Empire and to pay an annual fixed tribute to the Turkish Sultan as its suzerain. Stratimirović’s concept of a politically united religion-language-based Serbian nation within the borders of a single national state anticipated unification of the historical and ethnic Serbian territories from both the Ottoman Empire and the

⁵⁵ В. С. Караџић, “Срби сви и свуда“, *Ковчежић за историју и обичаје Срба сва три закона* (Беч, 1849), 1–27; V. B. Sotirović, *Srpski komonvelt* (Vilnius: privatno izdanje, 2011), 35–71.

⁵⁶ V. B. Sotirović, *Srpski komonvelt* (Vilnius: privatno izdanje, 2011), 72–86. About *Načertanije* see in: P. Љушић, *Књига о Начертанију. Национални и државни програм Кнежевине Србије (1844)* (Београд: БИГЗ, 1993). About Ilija Garašanin as a statesman and diplomat see in: D. Mackenzie, *Ilija Garašanin: Balkan Bismarck* (New York: East European Monographs Boulder, Distributed Columbia University Press, 1985).

Habsburg Monarchy. His notion of national identification of the Serbs was innovative at that time. In other words, he created the idea of a Serbian nation combining the criteria of language and religious principle. As a result, according to Stratimirović, the Serbian nation was identified as the entire Christian Orthodox South Slavic population who spoke the Shtokavian (штокавски) dialect. Subsequently, all Balkan territories settled by the Orthodox-Shtokavian South Slavs had to be included into a unified Serbian national state. Stratimirović's ideas were expressed in the *Memorandum* submitted to the Russian Emperor Alexander I Romanov. Produced at a pivotal time, the *Memorandum* was one of the major contributions to the history of Serbian modern political doctrines and ideologies. One of the most important national state projects, it was created at a critical time during the turning point in Serbian history: at the time of the First Serbian Uprising (1804–1813).

There were many plans during the uprising connected with the question of Serbian liberation and national political unification. The *Memorandum* was one of the most important of them.

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A map of the territory of the Ottoman Empire and its neighbours at the very beginning of the 19th century



A map of the Balkans after the Berlin Congress Treaty in 1878

2. NINETEENTH-CENTURY IDEAS OF SERBIAN LANGUAGE-BASED NATIONHOOD AND STATEHOOD

Introduction

This text presents both a language-based model for Serbian national identity and a language-based model for Serbian statehood created by Vuk Stefanović Karadžić and Ilija Garašanin in the first half of the 19th century. The most significant problem concerning Karadžić's "Srbi svi i svuda" (original title is "Срби сви и свуда", while official translation into English is "Serbs All and Everywhere" [Beljo, Bosnar, Bing, Ercegovac Jambrović, Škrlin 1992, 17] and Garašanin's *Načertanije* (original title is *Начертаније*, while official translation into English is *Outline*) [Banac 1984, 83; Lampe 1996, 52] is their interpretation and understanding in the historiographical traditions of different nations, especially among Serbian and Croatian historians. It provoked discussion and intellectual friction within the political ideology of the Balkan nations till the dissolution of Yugoslavia (1991–1995) and after it.

A divided nation: Serbian people in the first half of the 19th century (general overview)

In the first part of the 19th century, the historical and ethnical Serbian territories were divided among two states, the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish possessions on the Balkan Peninsula consisted of several *pašaluks*, the largest administrative-territorial units in the Ottoman Empire; the most important for future Serbian history was the *Beogradski pašaluk* which was administratively subdivided into twelve *nahijas*, or districts. The central and principal part of the Beogradski pašaluk was the region of *Šumadija* "Woodland", where two insurrections against the Turks took place in the years 1804–1815; in the subsequent decades this pašaluk became the core of independent Serbia and later on of Yugoslavia.

The Beogradski Pašaluk was surrounded by the Niški, Leskovački, Novopazarski, Sjenički and Zvornički pašaluks, where the Serbs (defined below) comprised a majority. The Serbs lived also in the Hercegovački, Bosanski and Skadarski pašaluks which did not border directly on the Beogradski pašaluk. The Orthodox Christians of *de facto* independent (from 1688) Montenegro (Црна Гора) declared themselves to be a part of the Serbian nation as well. Montenegro was only nominally incorporated into the Turkish administrative system with the governor or paša, appointed by an Imperial Council, or *Divan* [Petrovich 1976, see the map on p. 20; Ranke 1973, see the map on p. 8].

It is important to note that the Serbian population was exclusively Orthodox Slavic in the Beogradski pašaluk only, whilst in all other pašaluks the Orthodox Slavs lived together with the South Slavic Muslims, Roman Catholic Croats, and Orthodox Bulgarians, as well as with both Roman Catholic and Muslim Albanians.

Because of this distribution of Serbs, some historians have considered *Serbia proper* to consist only of the territory of Beogradski pašaluk. Free Serbia during the First Insurrection (1804–1813) had about 500,000 inhabitants. It is suggested that in the mid-19th century there were, in the aggregate, approximately 2,000,000 Serbs under Ottoman administration [see the table “Stanovništvo u jugoslovenskim zemljama XIX veka” in Božić, Ćirković, Ekmečić, Dedijer 1973, 289].

Like the other subordinated Christians within the Ottoman Empire, the Serbs (according to the Serbian church, the South Slavic Orthodox Christian population who spoke štokavian speech [Velimirović 1915] lived mainly in villages and were occupied with farming and cattle breeding. The Croats (according to the Croatian church, the South Slavic Roman Catholic population who spoke Serbo-Croatian language [Ćirković 1994] from Bosnia-Herzegovina held the same social status as the Serbs. Both the Serbs and the Croats within Turkey belonged to the subordinated social strata named the *raja* (the serfs).

During the Ottoman period, Bosnia-Herzegovina became a symbol of ethnic and religious mixture and co-existence of peoples in Southeastern Europe. At the beginning of the 19th century, the Muslims slightly outnumbered the Christian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the Serbs

substantially outnumbered the Croats in the same province. According to French records from 1809, around 700,000 Christians lived in Bosnia-Herzegovina: the Orthodox were in a majority in western Bosnia and eastern Herzegovina, whilst the Catholics predominated in western Herzegovina [Историја српског народа 1981–1986 V (1), 10–12]. However, the Yugoslav historians estimated that the total population of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1865 numbered 1,278,850; the Orthodox 593,548, the Catholics 257,920, and the Muslims 419,628 [Božić, Ćirković, Ekmečić, Dedijer 1973, 293].

The privileged administrative, legal and social status of the Muslims in contrast to the Christians became, apart from their religious diversity, the main source of conflicts and animosities among these three national (religious) groups. According to the Ottoman law, only the Muslims as the “Mohamed’s people” could get a state office. In addition, the Muslims, contrary to the Christians, did not pay an extra state-tax, the *harač*.

In the mid-19th century, a smaller number of Serbs lived under the Habsburg Monarchy (Austria-Hungary from 1867). They were settled in the area of civil part of Hungary and Croatia and the military border region. This region was established on the Habsburg Monarchy’s border with Turkey in the mid-16th century and divided into eleven military regiments. When the Habsburg Monarchy gained the former Venetian lands of Dalmatia and Boka Kotorska at the Vienna Congress of 1815, the number of Serbian residents within the Habsburg Monarchy increased significantly [Николајевић 1850]: in 1792 there were 667,247 Serbs in the Habsburg Monarchy, while in 1847 the Serbian population in both civil Hungary and Croatia and the military border region reached of 896,902. The Serbs in the Habsburg Monarchy enjoyed their historical rights based on the privileges given to them by several Habsburg emperors. These privileges permitted them ecclesiastic autonomy and educational autonomy. The exact obligations of the Serbs in the military border region were fixed in 1807.

Within the Habsburg Monarchy, the cultural center for the Serbs before the mid-18th century was Vienna. It then shifted to Budapest because of intensified censorship in Vienna, and, in the end, it was transferred to Novi Sad in the early 19th century.

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The religious life of the Serbs in the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy was concentrated in ancient monasteries and churches. The Serbian Orthodox church became a leading national institution preserving the national legend and historical memory of Serbian mediaeval statehood and a national language and letters.



Political division of the South-East Europe between the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy between 1815 and 1859 (at the time of writing Karadžić's and Garašanin's works „Srbi svi i svuda“ and „Načertanije“)

This was of particular importance in such ethnically mixed areas as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia.

Faith was a crucial point of political ideology and national determination under the Ottoman Empire [Itzkowitz 1972; Inalcik 1973]. It was religion that attached the Balkan Muslims of South Slavic origin to the Turkish government, Turkish political ideology and Turkish state interests. It was because of their new religion that the South Slavic Muslims were given the disparaging name *Turks* by their Christian compatriots. Undoubtedly, the Islamization of certain part of South Slavic population was one of the most remarkable achievements of the Ottoman administration (for instance, national affiliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina according to the Yugoslav census of 1991: 43,7% Muslims, 31,3% Serbs, 17,3% Croats, 7,0% “Yugoslavs” and others [Judah 1997, 317]. About national composition of other Yugoslav provinces from 1918 to 1991 see also in [Judah 1997, 311–317]).

The Serbs were a divided nation not only politically but also from the point of view of church jurisdiction: the *Ottoman Serbs* belonged to the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople, having lost their autonomous church organization, the *Pećka Patrijaršija* in 1766. Meanwhile, the *Austrian Serbs* developed their own national autonomous church organization, the *Karlovačka Mitropolija*, which was supervised by the government of Habsburg Monarchy.

The main task of the Serbian Orthodox clergy in both Turkey and the Habsburg Monarchy was to keep the nation from being converted to either Islam or Roman Catholicism. For this purpose, they created a theory according to which only the Orthodox members of the South Slavic community belonged to the Serbian nation. At the same time, the Serbian clergy proclaimed the Church Slavonic language and Old Cyrillic writing system as symbols of Serbian nationality. The Serbian variant of the Church Slavonic language had been the literary language in mediaeval Serbia. However, this language had undergone significant changes from the 12th to the 18th century. Liturgical services were performed in such language, which was renamed as *Church Slavonic* by the Church during the 18th century [Albin 1970, 483–549].

Serbian Church Slavonic was influenced in the early 18th century by the Russian version of Church Slavonic as a

result of the impact of Russian liturgical books which were used by Serbian Orthodox clergy. The process of bringing together the two Church Slavonic types was initiated in 1727, when the Moscow Holy Synod sent up a mission to Karlovci in Srem, the location of the headquarters of the Serbian Orthodox church in the Habsburg Monarchy. The mission's main achievement appears to have been the adoption of a Russified version of Serbian Church Slavonic as the literary language of the Austrian Serbs.

When the mission completed its service in 1737 and went back to Moscow, the Serbian clergy maintained the attachment to Russian cultural and church traditions, as the only apparent way to keep the Austrian Serbs from Germanization, Magyarization, and conversion to Roman Catholicism.

The Cyrillic alphabet was of crucial importance to Serbs in the ethnically mixed areas. These letters became a remarkable symbol of their national identification, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slavonia, Dalmatia and Croatia.

From the period of the Ottoman occupation of the Serbian people and lands in the 15th century, the essence of Serbian political ideology was national liberation and revival of national statehood. The national dream of a free and united Serbian state started to be realized at the beginning of the 19th century, with two Serbian insurrections against the Turks in 1804–1813 and 1815. The first political plan for revival of the mediaeval Serbian state was drafted by Stevan Stratimirović, the Metropolitan of Karlovci, in 1805 [Ђорђевић 1956, 11–20]. This was followed by a plan in 1808 by Russia's Deputy in Serbia, K. K. Rodofinikin, and the Serbia's Secretary of the state Council, Ivan Jugović [Историја српског народа 1981–1986 (V). 1, map p. 91; Љушић 1993b, 284–285; Љушић 1995, 7–16; Lawrence 1977, 187–205].

The Serbian state was re-established in 1815 and adopted its first modern constitution in 1835. The author of the constitution, the Austrian Serb Dimitrije Davidović, used as a model the modern liberal-democratic constitutions of Belgium and Switzerland. For this reason, Davidović's constitution was referred to in Russia by the minister of Foreign Affairs as “a French garden in the Serbian forest” [Стојанчевић 1991, 270–280; Гавриловић 1926].

Prince Miloš Obrenović I (1815–1839) continued to develop a national ideology of reviving Serbian statehood, designing a plan to enlarge the ancient state by incorporating into the united Serbia all the lands of the Ottoman Empire that were inhabited by a Serbian majority at that time, particularly Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sandžak and Kosovo-Metohija (for details, see in [Стојанчевић 1969; Вучковић 1957]).

In search of national identity: Vuk Stefanović Karadžić's concept of language-based nationhood

While Prince Miloš's schemes were primarily based on the historical rights of the Serbs, during his reign, a new dimension was introduced into Serbian political thought, with Vuk Stefanović Karadžić's (1787–1864) concept of language-based nationhood.

In his work "Serbs All and Everywhere" ("Срби сви и свуда"), Karadžić established certain criteria for determining Serbian national self-identity and reformulation of the whole concept of nation and nationality ([Караџић 1849, 1–27; Judah 1997, 55, 61–62. About theories of national identity see in Smith 1986; 1991; Miller 1995]). Up to 1836, Serbs were self-identified mainly as the Balkan community of Orthodox Christianity that both used the Cyrillic alphabet and maintained a national legend of the Kosovo tragedy of the defeat of Serbs by Turks in year 1389 and heroic legends about it [Ćirković 1994, Tomashevich 1991, 210–215; Đorđević 1991, 312–316; Mihaljčić 1989, 207–233]. This traditional and conservative religion-based approach to national identity did not satisfy the Serbian intelligentsia which was heavily influenced in the time of Karadžić by the 19th-century German definition of the self-national identity (i.e., all German-speaking population belongs to the German nation) (for details, see in [Mandelkow 1982; Schenk 1969; Porter, Teich, 1988; Walzel 1966; Beiser 1996]).

Karadžić was inspired to apply the German language-based approach to the issue of what constituted Serbian identity [Милосављевић 1997, 22–25]. He chose the Štokavian dialect (штокавски дијалект) as the cardinal indicator of

Serbian national identity, and called all South Slavs who spoke this dialect Serbs. In accordance with the German model, he did not consider religious affiliation in creating his national identity model, although he recognized that Serbs belonged to three different confessions. He considered all Bosnians and Herzegovinians to be ethnical Serbs because they spoke Štokavian, but he distinguished three groups of Bosnians and Herzegovinians, taking religion into consideration: Serbs of “Greek-creed” (Eastern Orthodox), “Roman-creed” (Roman Catholic) and “Turkish-creed” (Muslim) [Караџић 1849, 6–7. Similar opinion had Цвијић 1906; 1922, 202–233]. It should be said that the former Serbo-Croatian language was divided into three basic dialects according to the form of the interrogative pronoun *what*: Kajkavian (what = kaj), Čakavian (what = ča), and Štokavian (what = što). At the time of Karadžić’s writing, Kajkavian dialect was spoken in northwestern parts of Croatia proper, Čakavian in the northern coast area and islands of eastern Adriatic shore and Štokavian within the area from Austrian military border in the northwest to Šara Mountain in the southeast. The Štokavian dialect is divided into three sub-dialects according to the pronunciation of the original Slavic vowel represented by the letter *jat* [Dedijer 1975, 103; Jelavich 1983, 304–308].

There is considerable controversy among historians and linguistics regarding exactly how Karadžić treated at that time Štokavian-speaking Roman Catholic South Slavs (present-day the Croats). It is not clear whether he viewed them as Croats, or as Serbs. It appears, however, that Karadžić considered them as Serbs since they spoke Štokavian dialect. All Roman-creed Štokavians will gradually have to call themselves by the name “Serbs”; if they do not want to do so, they will end up with no national name (“Сви паметни људи и од Грчкијех и од Римскијех Срба признају да су један народ и труде се да би мрзост због закона или са свијем искоренили или барем умалили што се више може, само је онима Римскога закона још тешко *Србима* назвати се, али ће се по свој прилици и томе мало по мало навикнути; јер ако не ће да су *Срби*, они немају никаквога народнога имена“ [Karadžić 1849, 6; 1814, 105; Милосављевић 1997, 128]). Clearly Karadžić was treating Štokavian-speaking Roman Catholics as Roman Catholic Serbs.



Vuk Stefanović Karadžić (Tršić, Serbia, October 26th/November 6th,
1787–Vienna, Austria, February 7th, 1864)

This conclusion is suggested by American historian of Croatian origin Ivo Banac who writes: “As early as 1814, for example, [Karadžić] held that one of the Štokavian subdialects was characteristic of ‘Roman Catholic Serbs’” [Banac, 1984, 80]. Some Croatian authors are of the opinion that “[Karadžić] also tries to negate the existence of any significant number of Croats, distorting historic and linguistic factors to prove his arguments. At this time, the Croats, along with the Bulgarians, were seen as the biggest obstacle to Serbian dominance in the

Balkans” [Beljo, Bosnar, Bing, Ercegovac Jambrović, Škrilin 1992, 17–18].

Karadžić was unable, however, to fix precisely the southeastern ethnic borders of Serbian nation within the framework of his model, as he did not know how many Serbs (i.e., Štokavian speakers) lived in Albania and Macedonia. In 1834, he was informed by some merchants of the existence of around 300 so-called “Serbian” villages in western Macedonia. He had doubts about the correctness of this information, however, when he heard that the people from these villages spoke the “Slavic language”, since this could have meant either Bulgarian or Serbian: “Ја сам на Цетињу у Црној Гори разговарао с двојицом људи из Дибре, који су ми казивали да онамо има много ‘Српскијех’ села, по којима се говори Српски онако као и они што су говорили, тј. између Српскога и Бугарскога, али опет ближе Српскоме него правоме Бугарскоме” [Караџић 1849, 1; Милосављевић 1997, 125; Стојанчевић 1974, 74, 77]. He acknowledged the existence of transitional zones between the Štokavian dialect and the Bulgarian language in western Bulgaria (Torlak and Zagorje regions) but he excluded most of Macedonia and Albania from his Štokavian-speaking zone [Караџић 1909, 648]. In the end, he was only able to conclude that the Štokavian dialect was definitely spoken on the territory between the Timok River (on the present-day border between Serbia and Bulgaria) and the Šara Mountain (on the present-days state border between Serbia and Macedonia).

It must be emphasized that Karadžić’s ideas were influenced by the theory developed by the leading 19th-century Slavonic philologists Dositej Obradović, Pavel Josef Šafařík, Jan Kollár, Josef Dobrovský, Jernej Kopitar and Franc Miklošič, who claimed that the genuine Slovene dialect was Kajkavian, the native Croatian dialect was Čakavian (and to a certain extent Kajkavian) and that the true Serbian dialect was Štokavian [Обрадовић 1783/1975, 147; 1969, 363–364; Šafařík 1826; 1933; 1842/1955, 146–147; Kopitar 1810; 1984; Dobrovský 1792/1818; Kollár 1835; Miklošič 1852/1879; Теодоровић 1845; Милосављевић 1997].

Karadžić’s concept of language-based Serbian nationhood had a significant impact on 19th - and 20th - century scholars, both Serbs and others. First, it gave impetus to the revision of the traditional picture of Serbian ethnic

territories in the Balkans. Second, as a result of Karadžić's theory, the claim to a large Serbian population in western Bulgaria and most of Macedonia and Albania was abandoned. Later, the literary and cultural legacy of Dubrovnik was asserted to be exclusively Serbian [Цвијић 1906, 43–44; 1922; Gravier 1919, 29–32; Радојчић 1927; Бакотић 1938/1991, 64–81, 110–121; Николајевић 1840; 1850].

United Nation: Ilija Garašanin's concept of language-based statehood

The ideology of Serbian national statehood reached its final stage as Ilija Garašanin (1812–1874) combined historical and national rights of the Serbs, by drafting a plan for consolidation of all Serbian lands and people within a single national state. His *Načertanije* (*Outline*) became one of the most significant and influential works in the history of South Slavic political thought, greatly influencing the development of the Serbian national program and foreign policy in the 19th and 20th centuries. Written in 1844 as a top-secret paper submitted only to Prince Aleksandar Karađorđević I (1842–1858), it became known in Austro-Hungarian diplomatic circles in 1888, and a wider audience became familiar with the text in 1906 when a Belgrade journal published it [Lampe 1996, 52]. The original is not attested, and the text can be only reconstructed from several copies [Љушић 1993a, 1–5]. Varying interpretations of Garašanin's ultimate idea of statehood arise because he did not succeed to in completing the original *Načertanije* that was delivered to Prince Aleksandar [MacKenzie 1985].

To a large extent, Garašanin was inspired by three works written in 1843 and 1844 and translated into Serbian: *Савету* (*The Advise*) by Polish Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski (1770–1861), a leader of the Polish émigrés in Paris; *Фрагмент из српске историје* (*A Fragment from the History of Serbia*) by the Englishman David Urkwart, and *План* (*The Plan*) by Francisco Zach, a Czech. These authors championed the idea of creating a united South Slavic state under the leadership of Serbia, intended as a barrier to Russian and Austrian political influence in the Balkans (about political

activities by Urkwart, Czartoryski and Zach see in [Handelsman 1929; 1934; Pavlowitch 1961; Попов 1870; Batowsky, 1937; 1939, 20–22]). This united South Slavic state would be placed under French and British protection [Aleksić 1954, 68–71]. However, Garašanin did not accept the plan to unite Serbia and all South Slavic territories of the Habsburg Monarchy into a single, federal state; on the contrary, he advocated the creation of a single centralized Serbian national state whose boundaries would embrace a complete Serbian national entity, as well as some of the historical Serbian lands (for discussion of this issue, see in [Jelenić 1918; Јеленић 1923; Šišić 1937; Поповић 1940; Страњаковић 1932, 268–274; Јовановић 1990, 343–375; 1933, 327; 1932, 101–104; Митровић 1937, 297–300]). “The Načertanije itself uses the language of romantic nationalism to propose a Serbian state...” [Lampe 1996, 52].

There appear to be two reasons why Garašanin designed a united Serbian national state, and not a South Slavic or Yugoslavian (without Bulgaria) one: he favored the idea of an ethnically uniform state, as advocated by the German Romanticists [Lampe 1996, 52]; and apparently he believed that a multinational South Slavic state would easily disintegrate as a result of frequent struggles between the different nations. In short, he believed that only an ethnically uniform state organization could be inherently stable.

Garašanin designed his plans in expectation that both the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy would be dismantled in the immediate future. In his view, in the event of Austrian and Ottoman dismemberment the principal duty of Serbia would be to gather all ethnic Serbs, and a certain number of Serbian historical lands, into a single national state organization. The core of a united Serbian state would be the Principality of Serbia, which had at that time the status of an autonomous tributary inside the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁷

Garašanin must have foreseen two stages to rallying the Serbs toward a united state. In the first stage, Serbia would annex all the Serbian ethnic and a few of the historical territories within the Ottoman Empire: i.e., Bosnia-

⁵⁷ “Garašanin did not suggest retaking the far borders of Tsar Dušan’s Serbia, much less moving the capital to Macedonia. Belgrade and an enlarged Serbia would instead be the center of a still larger entity that would include Bulgarian and Croatian lands but not the large Greek territory that Dušan conquered” [Lampe 1996, 52].

Herzegovina, part of western Bulgaria, Montenegro, Sandžak, part of northern Albania and, finally, Kosovo-Metohija. The lands of the Habsburg Monarchy that were inhabited by Serbs — Croatia, Slavonia, Srem, Bačka, Banat and Dalmatia — would witness the same destiny in the second phase of Serbian reunification (about the exact territories of united Serbia in the view of Garašanin see reconstructed original version of the text of *Načertanije* in [Љушић 1993a]). This timetable would correspond to Garašanin's prediction that the Ottoman Empire would collapse first, followed by the Habsburg Monarchy.

In Serbian, Croatian and international historiography, there is heated dispute regarding the principles on which Garašanin based his idea. First group of them believe that Garašanin, at the time of writing *Načertanije* the Serbian Minister of Internal Affairs, sought to create a Serbian national state on the principle of historical state rights alone. They argue that Garašanin took as a model state the glorious Serbian mediaeval empire, which lasted from 1346 to 1371, and hence that he did not consider the territories settled by Serbs in the Habsburg Monarchy since they have not been included into Serbian mediaeval empire, but focused only on those within the Ottoman state because they composed Serbian mediaeval empire. In their view, Garašanin always referred to the Serbian Empire during the reign of Stefan Dušan (1331–1355, proclaimed emperor in 1346), the borders of which reached the Drina River on the west, the Sava and Danube Rivers on the north, the Chalkidiki Peninsula on the east, and the Albanian seacoast and Gulf of Corinth on the south: i.e., the territories of Croatia, Slavonia, Srem, Bačka, Banat and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which were not included in the medieval Serbian empire, were not treated by him as historically Serbian [Љушић 1993a, 94–100, 153; Šimunjić 1940/1992; Šidak 1973; 1988; Перовић 1955; Bilandžić 1999, 29–30; Ђорђевић 1979, 87–89; Záček, 1963].

In contrast, the second group claims that Garašanin advocated the creation of a national state on the basis of both Serbian ethnic and historical state rights. This view relies on the last chapter of *Načertanije*, in which Garašanin urged Serbian nationalist propaganda in the territories settled by the Serbs in the Habsburg Monarchy, as well as in western Bulgaria [Кесмановић 1962, 251–291; Ловчевић 1931]. Hence,

according to this second group, Garašanin clearly regarded these territories as part of a united Serbian state [Banac 1984, 83–84; Beljo, Bosnar, Bing, Ercegovac Jambrović, Škrilin 1992, 9–13; Petrovitch 1976, 231–233; Agičić 1994, 25–26; MacKenzie 1985, 62–78].



Ilija Garašanin (Garaši, Serbia, January 16th/28th, 1812–Grocka, Serbia, June 10th/22nd, 1874)

In order to settle this problem, one should take into consideration primarily the whole text of *Načertanije*. It is clear that Garašanin did not call for Macedonia to be included in the Serbian national state and that he favored annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The first group correctly interprets Garašanin's idea that 19th c. Serbia might continue evolve into a great Serbian state — a process which was started by the mediaeval Serbian rulers and interrupted by the Ottoman destruction of the Serbian state in 1459. They do not, however, properly understand Garašanin's notion of "Greater Serbia." He did not want to direct Serbia's foreign policy toward the Aegean and Ionian seas, as was the case in the Middle Ages. Clearly, Lampe's opinion that Garašanin intended to include Macedonia and a part of southern Adriatic littoral into unified Serbia was wrong [Lampe 1996, 52]. In fact, to champion Serbian territorial expansion toward the southern portion of the Balkan Peninsula, Garašanin turned his eyes toward the western part of the Balkan Peninsula.

This was because his ultimate aim was to unite all Serbs in Southeastern Europe, not to unite all South Slavs. In practice, this meant that the nineteenth-century Principality of Serbia should be expanded to include the western Balkan territories, where Serbs had settled, but not the southern ones, where the language-based Serbs either had disappeared or were a minority. Garašanin could not have supported the policy of medieval Serbian state expansion southward, because he advocated the German Romanticist principle of establishing a single national state organization. If Garašanin's united Serbian national state organization is compared with Karadžić's picture of Serbian language-based national expansion, it is clear that both of them were speaking about the same territories. Hence it can be concluded that the central ideological principle behind Garašanin's design of a united Serbian state was Karadžić's language-based model of national identity.

Thus the "Greater Serbia" in Garašanin's *Načertanije* was nothing other than a united language-based Serbs within a single state.

Clearly Garašanin adopted Karadžić's language-based concept of nation and hence identified Serbs with the Štokavian-speaking South Slavic population. A similar opinion has been put forth by Banac, but he does not agree that

Garašanin's program urged annexation of Austrian territories that had been settled by the Serbs.⁵⁸ Garašanin excluded Macedonia from his concept of language-based Serbian statehood because he had adopted Karadžić's opinion that there were no Štokavian-speakers in most part of Macedonia and Albania [Венелини, 1829–1841,. 1–5; Хитрово 1963, 241–242]. He also, however, had adopted Karadžić's claim that the entire population of Bosnia-Herzegovina belonged to the language-based Serbian nationality, and hence he included Bosnia-Herzegovina within the language-based Serbian national state organization [Lampe 1996, 52]. Moreover, he understood Karadžić's transitional zones in western Bulgaria to be territories inhabited by Štokavian speakers. According to the same principle, the territories of Croatia, Dalmatia, Slavonia, Bačka, Srem and Banat would also be included in Garašanin's language-based Serbian state.⁵⁹ Such a state could be called more accurately *Štokavia* ("Штокавија").

The idea that Garašanin supported only the historical rights of the Serbs in the creation of Serbian national state should be rejected by historians. The cases of Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina provide the strongest evidence in support of this conclusion. The territory of Macedonia was a political center during Stefan Dušan's empire. The largest Macedonian city, Skopje, was selected as the capital of the Serbian Empire, and it was where Dušan was crowned and held the imperial court. Yet this historical Serbian land did not find its way into the state projected by Garašanin. In contrast, Bosnia-Herzegovina, a province that never had been part of the Serbian medieval state, was incorporated into Garašanin's united Serbia. Garašanin's intention to include the whole Bosnia-Herzegovina into unified Serbia became the main apple of discord between Serbs and Croats during the 19th century (see [Чубриловић 1958]), and later on. Garašanin did support the principle of historical state rights for the Serbs as well, but only in his attitude toward those territories where Štokavian

⁵⁸ "Though the outputs of propaganda and the intelligence agency he built to foster Serb national sentiment among the non-Orthodox 'linguistic' Serbs who were in the Habsburg South Slavic possessions, Garašanin ruled out expansion at Habsburg expense. He left this thrust in abeyance, again for reasons of practicality, and fixed Serbia's ambition upon Ottoman patrimony, notably Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which he saw only the Serb populace" [Banac 1984, 84].

⁵⁹ The Serbian historian Miroslav Đorđević agrees that Garašanin's program of a united Serbia was founded on Serbian historical (state) rights, and that these rights were merely a pretext to unite all Serbs. Đorđević was on the right path to conclude that Garašanin in fact drafted a model of a united Serbia according to the Karadžić's linguistic model of Serbdom [Ђорђевић 1979].

speakers already were the majority at the time when he wrote *Načertanije*: i.e., Serbia proper, Montenegro, Sandžak, and Kosovo-Metohija. For these four regions, Serbian historical and ethnic rights overlapped in Garašanin's mind, because all four had been part of the medieval Serbian state and populated by Štokavian speakers (ШТОКАВЦИ).

With respect to the Croats, here too Garašanin followed Karadžić's model of linguistic-based Serbian nationality, incorporating into the Serbian language-based state all western Balkan territories settled by Štokavian-speaking Catholics – i.e., by a majority consisting of today self-identified Croats, while present-day ethno-linguistic Serbs were in the minority. This solution allowed Franjo Tuđman, a Croatian historian (and President of Croatia from 1990 to 2000), to argue that Karadžić had set an ideological foundation for Serbian hegemony in the Balkan Peninsula, while Garašanin's foundation was political.⁶⁰ However, Garašanin did not include into a future Serbian state the territories inhabited by both Čakavian (ЧАКАВЦИ) and Kajkavian (КАЈКАВЦИ) speakers. It is the real reason why Slovenia, Istria, a majority of east Adriatic Islands and north-western Croatia (i.e., around Zagreb) were not mentioned by him as potential parts of this state.

Garašanin's language-based statehood was designed as an empire under the Serbian ruling dynasty. For him, the geographical position of the country, the natural and military resources and, above all, a single ethnic origin and language shared by its citizens, guaranteed a long existence for this empire [Љушић 1993a, 76–87].

Like Tuđman, the majority of modern Croatian scholars have seen in *Načertanije* a Serbian national-state program ultimately designed to create a Greater Serbia which would establish political-economic hegemony in the Balkan Peninsula (see, for instance [Valentić 1961]). Their concern has been that a powerful Serbia would be extremely intolerant of its non-Serbian citizens. In support of this view, they allude to the fact that Garašanin chose annexation and inclusion but not unification as the method for the expansion of the Serbian state expansion. These authors believe that Garašanin was an

⁶⁰ Tuđman did, however, believe that Serbian foreign policy in the 19th century had as its main target the re-establishment of the Byzantine Empire under Serbia's leadership [Tuđman 1993, 22]. This Tuđman's opinion is refuted by Lampe [Lampe 1996, 52].

ideological inspirer for the Serbian policy of state imperialism and national oppression in the Balkan Peninsula in the 20th century [Valentić 1961; Šimunjić 1940/1992; Grmek, Gjidara, Šimac 1993; Bilandžić 1999; Agičić 1992; Beljo, Bosnar, Bing, Ercegovac Jambrović, Škrlin 1992]. For one of them, Garašanin's principal aim was to gain an access to the Adriatic Sea for Serbia by through annexation of the western Balkans [Agičić 1994, 26].

In the end, Garašanin advocated annexation of all Balkan territories settled by language-based Serbs, rather than unification of these lands with the Principality of Serbia. Undoubtedly he favored a centralized inner state organization similar to that of the Principality of Serbia, but he did not have in mind a federation or confederation [Jelavich 1968, 131–147]. But this certainly did not mean that he was contemplating ethnic cleansing and even genocide upon the non-Serbian population in order to create an ethnically homogeneous Serbia [Serbian historian Љушић 1993a, 160–161; Bulgarian historian Трајков 1978, 144–149] as it is opinion by the Croatian historians Čović and Agičić [Čović 1993; Agičić 1994, 24–25]. This could not be the case, because Garašanin's Greater Serbia was to be composed of a Serbian ethnic entity identified solely with the Štokavian-speaking subgroup of the South Slavs; hence the (Kajkavian) Slovenes, and (Čakavian) Croats would not have any place in it.⁶¹

Conclusion

The issue of national self-determination, the idea and goals of nationhood, and the methods and means for attainment of such goals, were foremost in the thinking of 19th–century Serbian intellectuals and politicians. As shown above, Vuk Stefanović Karadžić's model of Serbian identification and Ilija Garašanin's model for Serbian unification were based on ideological constructs intended to unite all Serbs (within the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy) and to create a single Serbian state.

⁶¹ Lampe advocated that Garašanin's unified Serbia would be composed by both etnical Serbs and ethnical non-Serbs. He concluded that in this state "separate ethnic identities were to be respected, and the Croats were promised full religious freedom" [Lampe 1996, 52].

The language-based model of a unified Serbian state after Serbian liberation from the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy, combined to some extent with the principle of historical state rights, is the keystone in Garašanin's arguments.

Karadžić's new model of language-based Serbian nationhood, drafted in his article "Srbi svi i svuda" ("Срби сви и свуда"), and Garašanin's new model of language-based Serbian statehood, drafted in *Načertanije* (Начертаније), are of extreme importance for history of Yugoslav political thought. The real meaning of both models is differently explained by Serbian and Croatian historians: i.e., majority of the prior understand these models as a good way to politically and culturally unify Serbian nation, while, in contrast to them, majority of the latter saw in these models an ideological foundations for Serbian national expansion and political domination in the Balkan Peninsula.

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Map of ethno-linguistic dispersion of the Serbs published in 1862 in Paris. The exact title of the map is: "Map of the Serb population of Turkish Europe and of Southern Austria with the borders of the Serbian Empire of Dushan the Great (14th century)". With a dark green colour is marked at that time a territory of the Principality of Serbia.

With yellow colour is marked territory populated by the "Greco-Serbs". Territory populated by the Albanians is coloured in white. The biggest territory of the map is in a light green colour marking ethno-linguistic and ethnographic territory settled by the Serbs outside the Principality of Serbia. The map is published in the book: H. Thiers, *Serbie, son passé et son avenir*, Paris, 1862

3. SERBIA'S DIPLOMATIC PREPARATIONS FOR THE CREATION OF THE FIRST BALKAN ALLIANCE, 1861– 1864

Introduction

My aim in this article is to investigate the case of the diplomatic preparations for the creation of the First Balkan Alliance (1866–1868) against the Ottoman Empire by the Principality of Serbia in its initial stage which covers the years of 1861–1864 in the light of territorial requirements of the Balkan states and nations at the expense of the decreasing military and political power of the Ottoman authorities and the territorial integration of the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire. One of the main focuses is on the question of the territorial division of Albanian inhabited lands by Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and Bulgaria. Therefore, crucial attention is directed on the territories of Albania proper, Epirus, Macedonia and Kosovo-Metohija. Methodologically, the investigation is based primarily on the use of the primary archival-historical material from different Serbian and international archives coming from the official state institutions involved in the process of diplomatic preparations for the creation of the First Balkan Alliance.

“Outline of Serbian-Greek Convention from 1861”

The sources indicate that the pivotal impetus for the establishment of the First Balkan Alliance came from Serbia's prince Mihailo I Obrenović whose predominate political task in Serbian foreign policy was to create a united South Slavic state under Serbian leadership, which would be composed of all South Slavic territories within the Ottoman Empire. For this purpose he needed close cooperation with other Balkan Christian states and people as Serbia was not strong enough to alone defeat the Ottoman Empire on the battlefield. Consequently, the most reasonable solution was to create a joint Balkan military-political defensive-offensive coalition, which would militarily defeat Turkey and expel Ottoman authorities from the Balkans as a fundamental precondition

for the creation of the united South Slavic state in the Balkans.

It has to be said that the Second Balkan Alliance (1912–1913), which was put into effect during the First Balkan War 1912–1913 against the Ottoman Empire, was actually to a great extent a revitalization of the First Balkan Alliance (1866–1868).

The nucleus of both of these Balkan Alliances for the general Balkan war against the Ottoman Empire can be found in the 1861 project of the Serbian prime minister and minister of foreign affairs from 1861 to 1867, Ilija Garašanin (1812–1874) – the author of *Načertanije* 1844 (a secret program of Serbian political unification into a single national state) – to make a political-military pact with the Kingdom of Greece. To be more precise, Ilija Garašanin submitted in early March of 1861 a secret memo to Serbia's Prince Mihailo Obrenović (1825–1868, prince from 1839 to 1842 and from 1860 to 1868) in which the author urged the prince that Serbian national interest called for a pact with Greece⁶² that would be a foundation for a wider Balkan pact against the Ottoman authority. This memo was based on Garašanin's previous proposal on the Balkan coalition in which he dealt with the Albanian question and relations with the Habsburg Monarchy.⁶³ The memo provided detailed instruction to the Serbian deputy to the Greek court to negotiate with Athens about the creation of bilateral Serbian-Greek military-political alliance that was directed against the Ottoman Empire. The deputy was obliged to investigate the inner political and military situation of Greece with special attention on the questions of: 1) what was the main task of Greek national policy, and 2) which foreign power had the predominant role in Greek foreign policy. The deputy was authorized to inform the Greek king that the Serbian prince hoped that Greece was willing to conclude a pact with Serbia for the common Christian interest in the Balkans.

According to the memo, there were crucial reasons for the alliance, firstly between Serbia and Greece and later on

⁶², "Agreement with the Greeks" in Garašanin's manuscript without date. *Diplomatic Archives of Serbia*, Archives of Ilija Garašanin, Belgrade. The author wrote on the margin "submitted to the Prince Mihailo in 1861".

⁶³ *Diplomatic Archives of Serbia*, Archives of Ilija Garašanin, Belgrade.

among all other Balkan Christians interested in the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire:

- 1) the common Christian faith of the Serbs and Greeks;
- 2) the common necessity and desire for freedom;
- 3) the creation of united national independent states of the Serbs and Greeks;
- 4) as a good example for the rest of the Balkan Christian nations for their own national liberation from the Ottoman yoke;
- 5) the fact that if Greece and Serbia did not liberate their brothers who still lived in Turkey both Greece and Serbia would disappear as independent states;
- 6) both of these countries could lose their independence, which could be prevented by their alliance, otherwise the great European powers could conclude that the Greeks and Serbs were not mature enough to enjoy their own independent national states for the reason that at the time of the memo only a minority of the Serbs and Greeks lived within the borders of their own national states;
- 7) the creation of a Greek-Serb pact would disrupt the belief and practice that the destiny of the Serbs and Greeks mainly depended on the decisions of the great European powers in their diplomatic cabinets; and
- 8) the “Eastern Question” had to be resolved by the Balkan peoples themselves not by the great European powers.

The initial aim of the Greek-Serb pact was to form a joint cooperation, which would be recognized by Europe as a justifiable political-military alliance for the purpose of realization of their national requirements based on Serbian and Greek ethno-historic rights at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. However, the fundamental aim of this pact was territorial dismemberment of the Ottoman European possessions, which would be divided by the signatories of the pact. The signatories had to prevent European support of Ottoman territorial integrity or partition of the lands of Turkey among the great European powers without the participation of the regional Balkan Christian states whose compatriots lived in the Ottoman Empire. Finally, both Serbia and Greece had to assist their brothers from Turkey to rise in arms against the Ottoman yoke. Serbia's prince Mihailo accepted the ideas from the memo and from that time the

main task of Serbia's foreign policy was to create the Balkan political-military alliance.



Map of United Greece according to the ideology of „Megali Idea“, c. 1900

In the same year (1861) Garašanin was appointed by the Serbian government as a deputy to the Sublime Porte in Istanbul to discuss a delicate problem of the position of the Muslims in the Principality of Serbia.⁶⁴ Garašanin used this diplomatic mission in Istanbul to become more familiar with the inner political conditions within the Ottoman Empire and to establish many contacts with the foreign ambassadors in the Ottoman capital. Surely, the biggest achievements of Garašanin's diplomatic activity in Istanbul were the very successful negotiations between him and Marco Renieris – the

⁶⁴ *Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères*, Paris, vol. Turquie, Belgrade, the report "Mission de M. Garachanine", 1861", by Luis Doson (1822–1890), French vice-consul in Belgrade, to Eduard Thouvenel (1818–1866), French ambassador in Istanbul from 1855 to 1860 and minister of foreign affairs from 1860 to 1863, April 2nd and 5th 1861, № 13 and 14; *Archives diplomatiques*, vol. IV, Paris, 1861, 148; *Diplomatic Archives of Serbia*, Archives of Ilija Garašanin, "Ilija Garašanin to Filip Hristić", Istanbul, April 3rd, 5th, 9th, 26th, 1861, № 1, 2, 3, 7, concepts; *Ibid*, May 1st, 1861; "Ilija Garašanin to Ali-Pasha", concept upon Russian influence in Serbia. Filip Hristić (1819–1905) was the prime minister and minister of foreign affairs of Serbia from 1860 to 1861 and the state councillor from 1861 to 1870. Ali-Mehmed Pasha (1815–1871) was five time grand vizier and several times Ottoman minister of foreign affairs from 1856 to 1871.

Greek representative in Istanbul (1861–1863) on the creation of the Serbian-Greek alliance.⁶⁵

The Greek motive for these negotiations was the desire to reestablish the Byzantine Empire (lost to the Turks in 1453 but always considered by the Greeks as the Greek national state), while the Serbian vision was the remaking of the Serbian Empire of the mid-14th century and state unification of all Serbs who had been living within the Ottoman Empire. The Greek diplomatic contacts with the Serbs in regard to the creation of the anti-Ottoman political-military alliance dated back to the beginning of the 19th century, i.e. from the time of the existence of the Greek national secret society – *Philiki Hetairia* (“Friendly Society”).⁶⁶ However, the main dispute in Greek-Serbian relations and negotiations have been the questions of Macedonia and Albania for the reason that both sides pretended to include major parts of these two Ottoman provinces into their own united national states according to their ethnic and historical rights.⁶⁷ For instance, the whole portion of geographical Macedonia (from Mt. Olympus to Mt. Šara and from Ohrid Lake to Mt. Rhodope), southern Bulgaria (south from the Balkan Mountain), southern Albania and all of Thrace were claimed by the Greek champions of “Megali Idea” who fought for reconstruction of the Byzantine (Greek) Empire.

For the purpose of resolving both the “Macedonian Question” and the “Albanian Question” Garašanin proposed to Renieris that the geographical territory of Macedonia and Albania be divided into Serb and Greek spheres of influence:

1) the Serbian influence was to be established in the districts of the Albanian cities of Durrës and Elbasan and the

⁶⁵ Atanasije Nikolić, “Description of the work about general agreement for uprising and unification”, *Diplomatic Archives of Yugoslavia*, Archives of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (before 1941), manuscript, Belgrade, April 20th, 1876. Atanasije Nikolić (1803–1882) was a member and secretary of Serbia’s Council from 1861 to 1868; *Diplomatic Archives of Serbia*, Archives of Ilija Garašanin, “Ilija Garašanin to Filip Hristić”, May 1st, 1861, Istanbul, and “Ilija Garašanin to Jovan Ristić”, March 16th, 1867, Belgrade. Jovan Ristić (1831–1899) was a head of Serbia’s ministry of foreign affairs from 1858 to 1861 and Serbia’s representative in Istanbul from 1861 to 1867.

⁶⁶ Castellan G., *History of the Balkans. From Mohammed the Conqueror to Stalin*, East European Monographs, Boulder, distributed by Columbia University Press, New York, 1992, pp. 253–255; Јакшић Г., Вучковић Ј. В., *Спољна политика Србије за владе кнеза Михаила. Први балкански савез*, Историјски институт, Београд, 1963, р. 72; Стојанчевић В., *Милош Обреновић и његово доба*, Београд, 1990, pp. 67–71. About Serbia’s struggle for national unification in the 1830s see: Љушић Р., *Кнежевина Србија (1830–1839)*, Српска академија наука и уметности, посебна издања, књига DLXX, одељење историјских наука, књига 12, Београд, 1986, pp. 381–394.

⁶⁷ *Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères*, Paris, vol. Grèce, “Montero to Walewsky”, March 4th, 1859, Athens, 78. Count Alexander Walewsky (1810–1868) was a French minister of foreign affairs from 1855 to 1860.

districts of Macedonian cities of Ohrid, Prilep, Veles, Štip, Kratovo and Kyustendil, and

2) the Greek influence would dominate in the Albanian districts of Berat and Korçë and in the Macedonian districts of Bitola, Demir Kapija, Radović and Razlog.

Therefore, according to this proposal, the territories of Albania and Macedonia would be shared into two spheres of influence – northern Serbian and southern Greek. This Garašanin's proposal was accepted in the same year by the Greek diplomacy and it became a key point of two documents: the "Outline of Serbian-Greek Convention from 1861" and the "Outline of Contract between Greece, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro from 1861". Both of them later became the basis for the creation of the First Balkan Alliance in 1866–1868.



The Ottoman part of the South-East Europe from 1856 to 1878

According to Article V of the “Outline of Serbian-Greek Convention from 1861”, the Principality of Serbia assumed obligations to:

1) increase its regular (standing) army to 12,000 soldiers;

2) organize in the best way its people’s (territorial) army; and

3) supply with arms and ammunition the peoples from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria for the purpose of armed struggle (“revolution”) against the Ottoman Empire.

The precise territorial division of the Ottoman Balkan possessions between the Balkan states and reconstruction of Balkan political outlook was fixed in the “Supplement to the Article III” of the same document which states that:

1) the Kingdom of Greece will annex Thessaly, Epirus (including and the northern Epirus what is today southern Albania), Macedonia, Thrace and the Aegean Islands;

2) the Kingdom of Serbia will be established by unification of (at that time) the Principality of Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Upper (present day northern) Albania and Montenegro (only if the Montenegrin authorities accepted unification with Serbia; if not, Montenegro would be a separate and independent state);

3) the Kingdom of Bulgaria will be established and its borders fixed later; and

4) the Principality of Walachia and the Principality of Moldavia will become united into a single Kingdom of Dacia.

Garašanin’s proposal on the division of Serbian-Greek spheres of influence in Albania and Macedonia became a part of the “Supplement to the Article III” of the “Outline of Serbian-Greek Convention from 1861” as well. However, in the same convention it was anticipated that if Bulgaria did not join the Balkan alliance and Greece did not occupy Thrace with Constantinople (Istanbul), the central portion of Albania would become part of the Greek sphere of influence as territorial compensation for the loss of Thrace and Istanbul, but at the same time Serbia would annex north-western Bulgaria (from Timok River to Isker River) in order to keep the balance of power in the region. Finally, the convention ended with the belief that this Serbian-Greek-Bulgarian-Albanian alliance would prevent partition of the Balkans by Russia and the

Habsburg Monarchy.⁶⁸ Therefore, the “Outline of Serbian-Greek Convention from 1861” became the foundation for the “Outline of Contract between Greece, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro from 1861”.⁶⁹ The ultimate purpose of both documents was to create the Balkan political-military “alliance on the basis of the ancient historical rights of the Balkan nations and principles of justice and ethnic rights for the ultimate goal to bring happiness and security to the Balkan peoples”.⁷⁰

The “Outline of Serbian-Greek Convention from 1861” was a kind of Balkan declaration of national rights drafted on the principles of:

- 1) making single and free nationally homogenous states of Balkan peoples instead of the multi-national, multi-religious and multi-linguistic heterogenous and oppressive Ottoman Empire;
- 2) “the Balkans to the Balkan peoples”;
- 3) self-determination of small nations who lived in multi-national states;
- 4) independent self-administration of each nation; and
- 5) non-interference of the great European powers in Balkan affairs.

However, both Serbia and Greece excluded the peoples from Macedonia and the ethnic Albanians from these rights and principles because of two crucial reasons:

- 1) for both of them a separate Macedonian ethno-nationality did not exist (like for Bulgarians as well) and consequently an independent state of Macedonia as a national state of the “Macedonians” could not be established, and
- 2) while Serbia and Greece recognized the existence of a separate Albanian ethno-linguistic nationality they came to the conclusion that an independent state of Albania, as a national state of Albanians, also could not be created for the simple reason: the Albanians were not “mature enough” to be given responsibility of self-government of their own independent state. Therefore, “the best solution” was to divide the territory

⁶⁸ *Diplomatic Archives of Serbia*, Archives of Jovan Ristić, “Outline of Serbian-Greek Convention from 1861”.

⁶⁹ *Diplomatic Archives of Serbia*, Archives of Jovan Ristić, “Outline of Contract between Greece, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro from 1861”.

⁷⁰ *Diplomatic Archives of Serbia*, Archives of Jovan Ristić, “Konduriotis to Renieris”, November 20th, 1861, Athens. At that time Konduriotis was Greek minister of foreign affairs. About the Greek-Serbian alliance from the 1860s see: Lascaris S. Th., “La première Alliance entre la Grèce et la Serbie”, *Le Monde slave*, Paris, 1926, no. 9.

of Macedonia and Albania between Serbia and Greece: Serbia would rule northern Albania and northern Macedonia, while Greece would do the same with the southern portions of these two Balkan provinces. A demarcation line between Serbian and Greek-administered portions of Albania and Macedonia would run from Durrës on Albanian littoral, south from Albania's Elbasan, between Macedonia's Prilep and Bitola and Razlog and Kyustendil to the western slopes of Mt. Balkan.⁷¹ It has to be stressed that the Balkan allied states of Montenegro, Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria adopted the same attitude in regard to the Albanian and Macedonian questions during the creation of the Balkan Alliance in 1912. On the other hand, at that time neither the Albanians nor the Macedonian Slavs had any ideas and plans for the creation of their own national states. The Albanians did it for the first time only in 1878.⁷²


Soon after reaching an agreement with Greece about a joint action against the Ottoman Empire Serbia started to arm its military forces and to reform the army. For that purpose the Serbian authorities obtained several loans, but the main problem was with the transportation of armaments and ammunition to Serbia through the territories of the Habsburg Monarchy (from France) or the Ottoman vassal principalities of Walachia and Moldavia (from Russia).⁷³ In mid-August of 1861 Serbia's People's Assembly (the national parliament) passed a new law establishing the people's army of 50,000 soldiers. However, this decision was strongly opposed by both the Ottoman Sublime Porte and Austria as a violation of the sultan's decrees (*Hatti Sheriffs*) from 1829, 1830 and 1833 regarding Serbia's autonomy within the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁴

⁷¹ *Diplomatic Archives of Serbia*, Archives of Ilija Garašanin, "Ilija Garašanin to Filip Hristić", March 16th, 1867, Belgrade.

⁷² On the Albanian case see: Peter Bartl, *Albanien: Vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart*, Regensburg, 1995.

⁷³ *Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères*, Paris, vol. Turquie, Belgrade, "Tastu to Thouvenel", August 13th, 1861, Belgrade, № 32, 13; *Ibid.*, "Thouvenel to Tastu", August 21st, 1861, Paris; *Ibid.*, "Tastu to Thouvenel", November 16th, 1861, Belgrade, № 54. Tastu was a French general consul in Belgrade 1861–1862. Eduard Thouvenel (1818–1866) was a French ambassador in Istanbul from 1855 to 1860. See also: Ристић Ј., *Спољашњи одношаји Србије новијега времена*, II, Београд, 1887, p. 177.

⁷⁴ *Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv*, Wien, Raports von Konstantinopel, "Ludolf to Rechberg", September 27th, 1861, № 81; *Ibid.*, "Oral protest by Austrian consulate in Belgrade", January 24th, 1862, Belgrade, № 4. Count Ludolf was an officer in Austrian embassy in Istanbul. Count Johan von Rechberg-Rothenlöwen (1806–1899) was an Austrian foreign minister from 1859 to 1864.



A

Administrative territories of four Ottoman villayets (in 1878) which, according to Albanian national workers, have been settled by ethno-linguistic Albanian majority and had to form either united autonomous Albanian province within the Ottoman Empire or an united independent state of the Albanians

Bombing Belgrade, the crisis of 1862 and the Italian Question

The Ottoman authorities prepared a counter-attack on Montenegro and Serbia in the event of their proclamation of the war against Turkey. The deterioration of bilateral Serbian-Ottoman political relations at that time is evidenced by the following case. In May 1862 the French consul in Belgrade reported to his government that the Turks were ready to bomb the Serbian capital from Belgrade's citadel (Kalemegdan), which was still under Turkish control according to the *Hatti Sheriffs*.⁷⁵ Unfortunately, the Turkish threat to bomb the lower (civil) districts of Belgrade was accomplished on June 17th, 1862 when the Turkish artillery for almost five hours continuously and heavily bombed the Serbian capital from the citadel (Upper Town or Upper Belgrade) regardless of the fact that at the time Serbia was not at war with the Ottoman Empire. All foreign consuls in Belgrade, except for the Austrian one, placed responsibility for this incident on the personality of Belgrade's pasha – a commander of Belgrade's citadel (located on the confluence of the Sava and Danube Rivers) and representative of the Ottoman sultan in Serbia as Serbia's suzerain.⁷⁶ For instance, the British consul reported to his foreign minister: "...Pasha has behaved very wrong and in consequence no alternative but to join my colleagues in refusing to treat with him again. The conduct of my Austrian Colleague has left a most painful impression. Admits he was two hours in the Fortress during the Time of Bombardment and yet as he informed...the Consular Body, Pasha desisted from Bombardment as soon as he requested him".⁷⁷ This incident was used by prince Mihailo of Serbia to require all Turks to leave the territory of Serbia. In other words, he internationalized the problem of the presence of both the Ottoman authorities and Muslim inhabitants of the territory of the Principality of Serbia and launched the question of the destruction of Ottoman military fortresses in Serbia.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ *Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères*, Paris, vol. Turquie, Belgrade, "Tastu to Thouvenel", May 3rd, 1862, Belgrade, no. 79, 14.

⁷⁶ *Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères*, Paris, vol. Turquie, Belgrade, "Tastu to Thouvenel", telegram, June 18th, 1862, № 83, 14.

⁷⁷ *Public Record Office, Foreign Office Records*, F O 78 – Turkey, London, "Longworth to John Russell", June 18th, 1862, Belgrade, telegram, 1672.

⁷⁸ Стојанчевић В. (ed.), *Историја српског народа. Од Првог устанка до Берлинског конгреса 1804–1878*, V/1, Beograd, 1981, p. 295.

Serbia's prince officialy raised this question in several appeals to the Russian and French emperors on June 28th, 1862.⁷⁹ The answer of the Russian and French diplomats came positive. In their "Memorandum from July 8th, 1862" they agreed that:

- 1) the Serbian military had to be improved;
- 2) the number of Serbia's soldiers increased;
- 3) the Ottoman military fortresses in the inner Serbia had to be destroyed; and
- 4) the Turkish military presence in Belgrade has to be restricted.⁸⁰

Nevertheless, the Turkish bombardment of the lower districts of Belgrade, when two thirds of Belgrade's citizens left the city, became justification for Serbian military preparation and agitation among Balkan Christians against the Ottoman government.⁸¹

To the foreign diplomats it was obvious that Serbia was preparing for the final struggle against Turkey even before June 1862. For instance, in the spring of 1862 the British foreign minister Earl John Russel informed the Austrian foreign minister Count Johan von Rechberg-Rothenlöwen that the principal aim of Serbian military reform was the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and division of its territorial possessions in the Balkans.⁸² These military preparations and

⁷⁹ *Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères*, Paris, "Prince Michael to Napoleon", June 28th, 1862, Belgrade, appendix no. 1 to Tastu's report № 88, 14; The British "blue book" *Correspondence relating to the Bombardment of Belgrade, in June 1862* submitted in 1863 to the House of Commons and House of Lords of the British Parliament, no. 23. The printed version of this document is: *Correspondence respecting Affairs in Servia, Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty*, London, 1867.

⁸⁰ Никитин С. А. (and others), "Европейская дипломатия и Сербия в начале 60-х годов XIX века", *Вопросы истории*, no. 9, Москва, 1962, pp. 80, 92, 95; *Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères*, Paris, vol. Constantinople, "Thouvenel to de Moustier", July 4th, 1862, Paris, № 56, and July 18th, 1862, 354. About this problem see more in: Поповић В., *Политика Француске и Аустрије на Балкану у време Наполеона III*, Београд, 1925; Попов Н., *Србија и Турска од 1861. до 1867. године*, Београд, 1879; Алексић Љ., *Став Француске према Србији за време друге владе Милоша и Михајла (1858–1868)*, Београд, 1957.

⁸¹ *Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères*, Paris, "Thouvenel to de Moustier", June 20th, 1862, Paris, vol. Constantinople, 354; *Ibid.*, "Tastu to Thouvenel", June 21st, 1862, vol. Turquie, Belgrade, no. 84, 14; Riker T. W., "Michael of Serbia and the Turkish Occupation", *The Slavonic and East European Review*, vol. XII, no. 34; *Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv*, Wien, "Rechberg-Rothenlöwen to Prokesch-Osten", June 22nd, 1862, vol. Konstantinopel, varia; Ристић Ј. (anonymous), *Бомбардовање Београда (1862. год.)*, Београд, 1872 in R. Perović's collection; The British "blue book" *Correspondence relating to the Bombardment of Belgrade, in June 1862* submitted in 1863 to the House of Commons and House of Lords of the British Parliament, no. 22.

⁸² *Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv*, Wien, "Rechberg-Rothenlöwen to Vasić", April 17th, 1862, Wien/Vienna, no. 9; *Ibid.*, "Prokesch-Osten to Vasić", April 23rd, 1862, Istanbul, vol. Konstantinopel XII/75; *Public Record Office, Foreign Office Records*, F O 78 – Turkey, London, "John Russell to Longworth", April 8th, 1862, London, no. 1671. Vasić was Austrian vice-consul in Belgrade from 1862 to 1864. Baron A. Prokesch-Osten was Austrian representative in Istanbul from 1855 to 1871.

political agitation became even more intensive after the bombardment when Serbia continued to work on establishing the Balkan coalition against Turkey. The turning point in this action was when France sided with the Balkan states and revolutionary Balkan movements.

The French policy towards the “Eastern Question” underwent significant changes in the Fall of 1861. In previous years the French had opposed any revolutionary action of the Balkan states or peoples against the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. However, in October and November of 1861 Eduard Thouvenel, the French minister of foreign affairs in 1860, for the first time expressed French sympathies towards the idea of joint activities of Serbia, Walachia, Moldavia, Montenegro and Greece against the Sublime Porte.⁸³ The real cause of such change in French Balkan policy was the decision of the French emperor Napoleon III (also known as Charles Louis Napoléon Bonaparte 1808–1873; emperor 1852–1870) “to resolve the Italian Question in the East”.⁸⁴ Napoleon’s plan was to support revolution of the Christians against the Ottoman authorities in Southeastern Europe. The revolution was to help Napoleon realize his political ambitions in this part of Europe. In the course of the anti-Ottoman revolution in the Balkans Napoleon III supported the idea that Bosnia-Herzegovina would be ceded to the Habsburg Monarchy as territorial compensation for the Austrian dominated province of Venice (Venezia) which would be united with Italy.⁸⁵ Thus, both Italian nationalists and Austrian imperialists would be satisfied, while Napoleon III would play the leading role in European politics. But above all, the French emperor was convinced that the Italian nationalists, who demanded the integration into Italy of the whole territory of the Papal State (*Patrimonium Petri* or *Stato della Chiesa*, established in 754/756), including and the Vatican City,⁸⁶ and the French

⁸³ *Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères*, Paris, vol. Constantinople, “Thouvenel to Lallemand”, October 4th, 1861, no. 91, 352; Ibid., “Thouvenel to Tastsu”, November 13th, 1861, Paris, telegram, 13; Ibid., “Tastu to Thouvenel”, November 16th, 1861, Belgrade, no. 53.

⁸⁴ Bourgeois E., *Manuel Historique de Politique Étrangère*, III, Paris, 1924, p. 638.

⁸⁵ Христић М. Ф., *Србија и Енглеска пре пола века*, Београд, 1910, p. 126.

⁸⁶ The period from 1859 to 1870 is known in Italian history as “Il risorgimento e l’unità d’Italia”. About Italian unification see: Rene A. C., *Italy from Napoleon to Mussolini*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1962; Smith D. M., *Mazzini*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1994; Lucy R., *The Italian Risorgimento. State, Society and National Unification*, Routledge, London and New York, 1994; Lucy R., *Cavour and Garibaldi, 1860: A Study in Political Conflict*, Cambridge, 1985; Beales D., *The Risorgimento and the Unification of Italy*, London, 1981; Hearder H., *Italy in the Age of the Risorgimento, 1790-1870*,

Catholic rightists who fought for political independence of the Papal State would be reconciled by the realization of this plan.



Apennine Peninsula and the Italian states before a pan-Italian state unification in 1861/1866/1871

Several French diplomatic reports indicate that Napoleon's new Balkan policy with its ultimate aim of solving the Italian problem of national unification was beginning to be realized at the end of September 1861. For instance, Montenegrin prince Nikola I Petrović-Njegoš (1844–1921, prince 1860–1910 and king 1910–1918) with French diplomatic support decided in September–October 1861 to give military support to the Orthodox Christian rebels in eastern Herzegovina who rose in arms against the Ottoman

London, 1983; Coppa F., *The Origins of the Italian Wars of Independence*, London, 1992; Delzell C. F. (ed.), *The Unification of Italy, 1859-1861. Cavour, Mazzini or Garibaldi?*, New York, 1965.

government fighting for separation from the Ottoman state. At the same time prince Nikola I demanded that French authorities along with other great powers recognize:

- 1) the *de jure* Montenegrin independence from Turkey;
- 2) Montenegrin occupation of part of the Adriatic seashore; and
- 3) the correction of the Montenegrin-Ottoman border.⁸⁷

At the same time as a part of Napoleon's plan, in which Italian volunteers led by Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807–1882) and Hungarian revolutionaries would participate as well, one Italian vessel tried unsuccessfully to reach Albanian littoral carrying 3,000 rifles and 4 cannons in November 1861. Simultaneously, the Italian government prepared diversionary actions in Albania and Dalmatia against both the Ottoman and Habsburg authorities.⁸⁸

The French government was at that time directly involved in the process of arming the Balkan states. In mid-September 1861 Greece received 20,000 rifles from France, while the Serbian government was promised by Paris armament from France either through the Ottoman territory or via the Russian sea port of Odessa.⁸⁹ At the same time, the Balkan states had been receiving arms from the other European Great Powers. For example, the Serbian deputy in Bucharest, Kosta Magazinović, reported to his government on March 20th, 1862 that the Romanian prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza (1820–1873, Romanian prince from 1859 to 1866) would permit free passage via Romania of the Russian arms being sent to Serbia.⁹⁰ Further, the Serbian government in April 1862 was negotiating with one British company for transport

⁸⁷ *Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères*, Paris, "Lallemand to Thouvenel", October 2nd, 1861, Pera, telegram, vol. Constantinople, № 91, p. 352.; Ibid., "Prince Nicholas to the members of the European Commission in Dubrovnik", without date, as appendix to the "Report by Lallemand to Thouvenel", October 16th, 1861, Pera, no. 145; Ibid., "Lallemand to Thouvenel", October 29th, 1861, Pera, no. 151.

⁸⁸ *Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères*, Paris, vol. Grèce, "Bourée to Thouvenel", November 26th, 1861, Athens, no. 57, 82; *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, Prima serie 1861–1870, vol. 1 (8 gennaio–31 dicembre 1861), Roma, 1952, no. 50, 271, 363, 450. N. Bourée (1811–1886) was French ambassador in Athens from 1859 to 1866, and ambassador in Istanbul from 1866 to 1879.

⁸⁹ *Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères*, Paris, vol. Grèce, "Bourée to Thouvenel", September 13th, 1861, Athens, № 41, p. 82; Ibid. "Tastu to Thouvenel", December 5th, 1861, Belgrade, vol. Turquie, Belgrade, № 59; *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, Prima serie 1861–1870, vol. 1 (8 gennaio–31 dicembre 1861), Roma, 1952, no. 369.

⁹⁰ *Diplomatic Archives of Serbia*, Archives of Ilija Garašanin, Belgrade, Garašanin's "Instructions to the deputy to prince Cuza", concept, February 1862, Belgrade; Ibid. "Kosta Magazinović to Ilija Garašanin", concept, March 8th, 1862, Đurđevo; *Archives of Jovan Ristić*, in family possession, Belgrade, "Ilija Garašanin to Jovan Ristić", May 28th, 1862, Belgrade.

of armaments to the Serbian border.⁹¹ French major Hippolite Mondain was from 1861 to 1865 Serbia's minister of military affairs helping in the reorganisation and modernisation of Serbia's new people's-territorial army. In the spring of 1862 the Greek government received from the French diplomats a strong confirmation that Paris would pursue a policy of neutrality in the upcoming Balkan war which was a clear sign to Athens that France supported the Balkan action against the Turks.⁹² The Serbian government signed a contract with Russia for a loan to Serbia for military purposes on March 29th, 1862 in St. Petersburg.⁹³ On this occasion Serbia's deputy in Russia, who signed this contract – Milan Petronijević, an assistant to Serbia's minister of justice, revealed to the Russian authorities the Serbian plan to bring Bosnia-Herzegovina and northern Albania into Serbia's sphere of influence.

At that time the Greek king Otto I (1815–1867, king from 1832 to 1862) secretly negotiated with Giuseppe Garibaldi for a joint Greco-Italian action in the Balkans and the organisation of an uprising of Ottoman Christian subjects. The mediator in these negotiations was the Committee of the Ionian Islands. In the spring of 1862 Garibaldi was preparing one military detachment of his volunteers in Naples for the diversion in the Balkans. According to his plan, this detachment would start military action in the area of Preveza in southern Epirus nearby the Ionian Sea. The other option for the place of military invasion was northern Albania or Herzegovina. Nevertheless, Garibaldi's volunteers would after landing on Balkan territory as soon as possible get in touch with the Montenegrins while the Greek irregular troops would cross the border into Turkey waging guerilla warfare.⁹⁴

However, Garibaldi's military preparations were not realized because Napoleon cancelled his Balkan plan in mid-1862 for the following reasons:

1) financial, diplomatic and military lack of preparation of the Balkan states for war against the Ottoman empire;

⁹¹ *Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères*, Paris, vol. Turquie, Belgrade, "Tustu to Thouvenel", May 3rd, 1862, Belgrade, no. 79, 14.

⁹² *Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères*, Paris, vol. Grèce, "Bourée to Thouvenel", April 10th, 1862, Athens, 83.

⁹³ Јовановић В., *Ера страних зајмова у Србији*, Београд, 1906, р. 4; Цвијетић Л., "Први зајам Кнежевине Србије", *Финансија*, vol. 4, Београд, 1957, pp. 130–134.

⁹⁴ *Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères*, Paris, vol. Grèce, "Bourée to Thouvenel", March 10th, and April 10th, 1862, Athens, 83.

2) disputes among the leaders of Herzegovinian rebels;

3) British support of the Ottoman authorities against Montenegro and London's protest to Belgrade and Athens because of their preparations for the action.⁹⁵

Because of these three reasons Napoleon III was compelled to reject the plan of Sardinian-Italian king Vittorio Emanuele II (1820–1878, king of Sardinia and Italy from 1849 to 1878) that simultaneously with the Balkan uprising, Hungarian revolutionaries would rise against the Habsburg Monarchy and that the Italian army would invade the Austrian province of Venice.⁹⁶ More precisely, according to the plan of Vittorio Emanuele II, Italian and Hungarian revolutionaries, led by Hungarian dissident and emigrant general István Türr (1825–1908), who was in the service of the Italian king as his adjutant officer, would invade Turkey with 8,000 soldiers in May 1862 followed by Garibaldi's invasion of the Austrian Adriatic littoral nearby Senj or Bakar in northern Dalmatia with four divisions of the Italian volunteers. Simultaneously, when general Türr was to invade Turkey either nearby Bar on the present day Montenegrin littoral or Durrës on the Albanian littoral, Montenegrin troops were to attack the city of Scodra (old Montenegrin capital) in northern Albania.⁹⁷

The Italian king and Giuseppe Garibaldi especially championed the so-called "Adriatic plan" of joint Italian, South Slavic, Greek and Albanian military action in the Balkans against Austria. During their conversation in Turin in May of 1866 Vittorio Emanuele II and Garibaldi developed a plan for the participation of 30,000 Italian volunteers in a joint action with the South Slavic frontiersmen from the Austrian Military Border. After the conversation Garibaldi reestablished

⁹⁵ Thouvenel L., "Thouvenel to Benedetti", January 25th, 1862 in *Pages de l'Histoire du Second Empire*, Paris, 1903, p. 342; *Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères*, Paris, vol. Constantinople, "Thouvenel to de Moustier", February 14th, 1862, no. 11, 353; *Public Record Office, Foreign Office Records*, F O 78 – Turkey, London, "John Russell to Longworth", December 10th, 1861, no. 1585. Marquise Lionel de Moustier (1817–1869) was French ambassador in Istanbul from 1861 to 1866 and minister of foreign affairs from 1866 to 1868. Earl John Russell (1792–1878) was British minister of foreign affairs from 1859 to 1865 and the Prime Minister from 1865 to 1867. Longworth was British general consul in Belgrade from 1860 to 1873.

⁹⁶ Thouvenel L., *Pages de l'Histoire du Second Empire*, Paris, 1903, p. 342; *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, Prima serie 1861–1870, vol. 1 (8 gennaio–31 dicembre 1861), Roma, 1952, no. 271, 363, 450, 468.

⁹⁷ "István Türr to prince Nikola", December 31st, 1861, Turin/Torino, and "Major Adam Vranešević to prince Nikola", January 24th, 1862, Kotor/Cattaro published by Dr. Milan Predlog in *Riječ*, Zagreb, April 4th, 1931, no. 13.

neglected relations with the peoples on the eastern Adriatic seashore.⁹⁸

According to general Türr, the Montenegrin prince Nikola I reached an agreement with Giuseppe Garibaldi for military action against Turkey⁹⁹ that would also include the Greek king Otto I. However, the Serbian government refused to participate in the Italian plan of “liberation of the Balkan Christians” drafted in 1861–1862.

By supporting the Balkan uprising against the Ottomans as Serbia’s prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, Ilija Garašanin saw as the main goal of Italian diplomacy in the Balkans:

1) to make use of Balkan rebels to complete Italian unification by annexation of Venice; and

2) as compensation to Vienna, to allow Austria to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina (settled primarily by the ethno-linguistic Serbs of Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim faith).

Both of these two points (especially the second) were in his view directed against Serbian national interest, i.e. to prevent unification of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Serbia. Finally, he predicted that the Balkan Christians would be the main losers in case the plan was realized. Russian diplomacy also played a great role in the Serbian decision not to establish relations with “Garibaldi, Hungarians and Poles”.¹⁰⁰ Thus, the mission of Garibaldi’s deputy, Marco Antonio Canini, failed in Belgrade for the reason that Serbian government refused to negotiate with the Italian representative regarding the Serbian-Italian joint cooperation in the Balkan uprising.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ Garibaldi G., “Pro-memoria al generale Cialdini”, June 2nd, 1866, Caprera, according to Clemobroto, “Il piano di guerra nel ’66 tra Vittorio Emanuele II e Garibaldi”, *Il Tempo*, Rome, April 3rd, 1918.

⁹⁹ “Report by general Türr” published in article: Cleombroto “Una missione segreta del generale Türr durante la guerra de 1866”, *Il Tempo*, April 3rd, 1918, Roma; *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, Prima serie 1861–1870, vol. 1 (8 gennaio–31 dicembre 1861), Roma, 1952, № 9, 33, 227, 271, 363.

¹⁰⁰ *Diplomatic Archives of Serbia*, Archives of Ilija Garašanin, Belgrade, “Milan Petronijević to Ilija Garašanin”, April 1862, Belgrade.

¹⁰¹ *Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv*, Wien, “Vasić to Rechberg-Rothenlöwen”, August 4th, 1862, № 44; *Archives of Jovan Ristić*, in family possession, Belgrade, “Ilija Garašanin to Jovan Ristić”, July 27th, 1862, Belgrade; *Diplomatic Archives of Serbia*, Archives of Ilija Garašanin, “Miloje Lešjanin to Ilija Garašanin”, August 29th, Paris, concept; *Ibid.*, “Marco Antonio Cannini to Ilija Garašanin”, August 29th, 1862. Miloje Lešjanin (1830–1867) was at that time the head of Serbia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The French Balkan policy in the years of 1863–1864

The Polish uprising against the Russian authorities in 1863 influenced Napoleon III to create a new plan for redrawing European national borders which would have great consequences for Balkan affairs in the case of its implementation. More precisely, in March of 1863 the French emperor informed the Austrian ambassador in Paris, count Metternich, regarding his idea of a new political map of Europe:

1) the historical Kingdom of Poland would be reestablished within the borders which Poland had before its First partition in 1772;

2) the reestablished united Kingdom of Poland (including and Grand Duchy of Lithuania) would be governed by one Habsburg archduke;

3) Italy would gain the province of Venice from Austria;

4) Austria would be territorially compensated by annexation of Silesia and Serbia;

5) France would annex the region of the Rhine;

6) Prussia would, as territorial compensation, annex the Kingdom of Saxony and the Kingdom of Hanover; and finally

7) the European possessions of the Ottoman Empire would be divided between the Balkan states.

However, Franz Joseph I (1830–1916, the emperor of Austria and the king of Hungary from 1848 to 1916) rejected this plan because the British diplomats saw in this plan Napoleon's intention to reestablish French supremacy in Europe.¹⁰² At the same time, the Serbian government became acquainted with Napoleon's new plan to cede Serbia to Austria in July 1863 through Italian deputy in parliament, Vegezzi-Ruscal.¹⁰³ As a consequence of these events Serbia lost all confidence in France's Balkan policy.

As a kind of political answer Belgrade intensified its own propaganda among the South Slavs and developed a network of agencies for the preparation of an anti-Ottoman revolution, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The fundamental task for intensification of the Serbian national work in the Ottoman

¹⁰² Seton-Watson R. W., "Les relations de l'Autriche-Hongrie et de la Serbie entre 1868. et 1874", *Le Monde Slave*, no. 2, Paris, 1926, p. 433; Bourgeois E., *Manuel Historique de Politique Étrangère*, III, Paris, 1924, p. 369.

¹⁰³ *Diplomatic Archives of Serbia*, Archives of Ilija Garašanin, "Ilija Garašanin to Vegezzi-Ruscal", concept, August 27th, 1863, Belgrade.

province of Bosnia-Herzegovina (the so-called Pashalik of Bosnia that also included the territory of Rashka/Sanjak) at the time of the Polish uprising of 1863–1864 was Garašanin's intention to impede the realization of Napoleon's idea of ceding this Turkish province to Austria as compensation for Austrian evacuation of Venezia Giulia – an idea that was contrary to Serbian national interests. For this reason, Serbian national propaganda and other activities in the Pashalik of Bosnia were developed to such extent that in February 1864 the governor of this province, Osman-pasha, warned the Sublime Porte in Istanbul that Belgrade had already completed preparing the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Serbs for the uprising:

- 1) Serbia had armed them with weapons and ammunition produced in Serbia;
- 2) Serbia had established a revolutionary network within the whole territory of the province; and
- 3) Serbia had concentrated its own military forces along its border with Bosnia-Herzegovina.

By the spring of 1864 the Ottoman authorities were so convinced that the Balkan revolution would soon break that they started concentrating their forces along the Serbian and Romanian borders in Bulgaria, Rumelia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a part of military preparations against Serbia and Romania the Porte instituted obligatory military service in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania. According to Russian diplomatic reports from Albania, the Ottoman policy towards the Albanian tribal aristocracy became softer and many Albanian feudal lords (beys) returned to state offices.¹⁰⁴ A new number of the Muslim Tatars and the Cherkezs were settled in Bulgaria along the Serbian border as a protective measure against Serbian aggression on Turkey in addition to 150,000 Tatars and Muslim Circassians living in Bulgarian territory after the Crimean War (1853–1856).¹⁰⁵ The Ottoman military plan was to have these Muslim settlers, expelled by the Russian authorities from the Caucasus area, serve as frontiersmen along the Ottoman military frontier in the Balkans. Nevertheless, the Turkish military intervention

¹⁰⁴ *Diplomatic Archives of Serbia*, Archives of Ilija Garašanin, Belgrade, "A copy of report of Russian consul in Rumelia and central Albania to the director of the Asiatic Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs", Bitola (Monastir), March 15th/27th, 1864, no. 77 (translated from Russian).

¹⁰⁵ Poulton H., *The Balkans. Minorities and States in Conflict*, London, 1994, p. 117.

against Serbia and Romania was finally thwarted only because of the French diplomatic intervention in Istanbul in 1864.¹⁰⁶



Eastern Balkans according to the decisions by the Great European Powers (except Russia) at the Berlin Congress in June-July 1878. Such political division of the Eastern Balkans lasted until the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 when this part of Europe was once again remapped

¹⁰⁶ *Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères*, Paris, vol. Turquie, Belgrade, "Botmillian to de Lhuys", August 23rd, 1864, Belgrade, no. 85.

Conclusion

A political role of the Principality of Serbia during the process of diplomatic negotiations for the creation of the military-political Balkan Alliance against the Ottoman Empire during the years of 1861–1864 was of crucial importance for its final realization between 1866 and 1868. Serbia was not only the initiator of the alliance but the most interested participant in the complex negotiations to create it with the final political aim of annexing all Serb settled provinces of the Ottoman Empire after the war and subsequent Turkish defeat. However, for reasons of internal and external negative impact on Balkan affairs this plan was not realized until 1912/1913, but the way was prepared through diplomatic efforts from 1861 to 1864.¹⁰⁷



**A flag of Tributary Principality of Serbia
to the Ottoman Empire from 1869 to 1872**

¹⁰⁷ This article is written as a part of the COST Action IS0803: „Remaking Eastern Borders in Europe: A Network Exploring Social, Moral and Material Relocations of Europe's Eastern Peripheries“. The research on the topic and writing the text are financed by the COST Action.



Members of the Second Balkan Alliance in 1912: Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro

4. MACEDONIA BETWEEN GREEK, BULGARIAN, ALBANIAN AND SERBIAN NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS, 1870–1912

Introduction

During the second half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century Macedonia was one of the most disputed territories and an “apple of discord” on the Balkan Peninsula. All of Macedonia’s neighbors and their national states set their territorial aspirations upon Macedonia as a way to solve their own national questions in this part of the Balkans. They based their claims on both ethno-linguistic and historic rights of their own nations. Historic-geographic Macedonia was the most important and in fact the crucial moot point in the Balkans, where Serbian, Albanian, Bulgarian, and Greek nationalism was interweaving and struggling against each other.¹⁰⁸ Particularly during the period from the end of the 19th century to the beginning of the First World War within the framework of the territorial aspirations of the states and nations that emerged in the Balkans following the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. The so-called “Macedonian Question” was in fact the most urgent, hot and significant point of their disagreements and frictions. In other words, the territory of Macedonia was the “cross-road” where territorial claims and nationalism of east Balkan nations became interweaved and directed against each other. National aspirations and disagreements with regard to Macedonia were the crucial reasons for the final political split among the east Balkan states and nations and their participation on opposite sides during the Great War of 1914–1918.

The main research topics addressed in this article are:

- *National ideas of the Serbs, Albanians, Bulgarians and Greeks with regard to the territory of Macedonia and its inhabitants,*
- *Bulgarian Exarchate (1870), “San Stefano Bulgaria” (1878) and the “Macedonian Question”, and*

¹⁰⁸ “Nationalism is political principle according to which political unity (i.e. state) should be overlapped with national unity (i.e. nation)”, Gellner E., *Nations et nationalisme*, Paris: Editions Payot, 1989, p.13.

- *The “Macedonian Question” from the Berlin Congress (1878) to the outbreak of the Balkan Wars (1912).*

Problems with regard to the question of Macedonia in terms of Serbian, Albanian, Bulgarian and Greek national aspirations and diplomatic activities in this article cover the period from the time of the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870 (the name of the national Bulgarian autocephalous church) created by the highest authorities of the Ottoman Empire to the beginning of the Balkan Wars (1912).

Territory and people

The term Macedonia has had different understandings throughout history. During the time of Alexander the Great (Alexander III of Macedon, 356–323, reign 336–323 B.C.), the Kingdom of Macedonia was considered to be an area encompassing present-day territories of Vardar, Aegean and Pirin Macedonia, western Thrace, southern Serbia's province of Kosovo-Metohija and parts of Albania and Epirus. According to Nicolaos K. Martis, in narrow geographical terms, ancient Macedonia occupied the lands of southern parts of present-day Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (without Skopje/Scupi) and northern Greece up to Mt. Olympus and just before the Maritza River.¹⁰⁹ The Romans used the term Macedonia for their province in the central Balkans which incorporated present-day Albania, and in early Byzantine times Macedonia was a separate *theme*, one of the Byzantine administrative provinces, but it was located in today's Thrace. Finally, when the Ottomans conquered the biggest portion of the Balkan Peninsula in the 14th century Thrace was generally known as Macedonia. However, in a broader geographical sense the term Macedonia refers mainly to the territory that extends from Mt. Shara and Skopje's Crna Gora on the north-west, through Osogovo and Mt. Rila on the north, to Mt. Rhodope on the north-east, to the Aegean Sea and the River Aliakmon (Bistritsa) on the south and finally to beyond the Lakes of Prespa and Ochrida on the south-west. In this case the area of Macedonia covers a large portion of the east-central parts of the Balkan Peninsula including the valley of the

¹⁰⁹ Martis K. N., *The Falsification of Macedonian History*, Athens, 1984, p. 41.

Vardar (Axios) River, the Aegean littoral from the mouth of the Aliakmon River to the mouth of the Mesta River to the Aegean Sea, whole parts of the Ochrida and Prespa Lakes, and the city of Salonica/Thessaloniki as an administrative, economic and cultural centre of the area.¹¹⁰

Macedonia is associated with the names of Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great (Alexander III of Macedon). However, Macedonia from 1371 to 1912 was a part of the Ottoman Empire without its own administrative-provincial name (pashalik or vilayet). Once a central part of the Ottoman Empire (in the 15th century), during the peak of the glory of Ottoman history (1521–1683) Macedonia was in fact located on the empire's periphery. However, with the decline of the Ottoman state in the 19th century the territory of Macedonia emerged again as one of the crucial and central parts of the Ottoman Empire. The political importance of Macedonia during the last years of Ottoman period and the initial period of the Republic of Turkey can be understood because of two facts: 1. the centre of the Young Turk revolution (1908) was located in this area in the city of Bitola/ Monastir, and 2. the father of the modern Turkish state – Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, was born in the Macedonian capital – Thessaloniki (1881).¹¹¹ As a result of the national-political awakening of the Serbs (in 1804), Greeks (in 1821) and Bulgarians (in 1878) in the 19th century they finally re-established their own national states at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, irredentist claims by Serbs, Albanians, Greeks and Bulgarians to the territories outside of their national states or Ottoman administrative-provincial borders (in the case of the Albanians) spawned a rivalry among them for the possession of geographical-historic Macedonia whole or in parts. By the late 19th century the competition between the Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians and Albanians for a dominance over the east-central portions of the Balkans based on ethnic and historic rights took central place in their national struggles. The “Macedonian Question” soon became the crucial standpoint of

¹¹⁰ MacDermott M., *Freedom or Death. The Life of Gotsé Delchev*, London & West Nyack. It is clear that a significant portion of Albanian claimed ethnic space of present-day west FYR Macedonia is in fact historical part of geographic Macedonia.

¹¹¹ About this period of Ottoman/Turkish history see: Hammer von J., *Historija Turskog/Osmanskog/Carstva*, vol. 3, Zagreb: Ognjen Prica, 1979, pp. 500–568. The (constitutional) revolution of July 1908 was the result of the military actions of the Ottoman officers belonged to the Unionist movement of the Third (Macedonian) and Second (Thracian) Army (Zürcher J. E., *Turkey. A Modern History*, London-New York: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1994, p. 97).

their national aspirations and multiethnic Macedonia turned out to be a territory of the “apple of discord”.¹¹²



„Greater“ Macedonia based on historical and ethnic rights of „Macedonians“ according to the Macedonian nationalists

As with respect to the term and territory of Macedonia a similar confused situation exists regarding Macedonia's inhabitants. Ottoman ruled Macedonia had a mixed population where different ethnic groups, languages and religions coexisted side by side even in the same villages and towns. It was a typical agricultural region with more than 80% of its population being peasants. It is estimated that in 1895

¹¹² The “Macedonian Question” was composed by three sub-questions: 1. What territory constituted Macedonia? To which state or states it should belong? and 3. What was a national affiliation of the peoples from Macedonia? (Perry D. M., *The Politics of Terror. The Macedonian Liberation Movements 1893–1903*, Durham and London, 1988, p. 2; Adanir F., *Die Makedonische Frage: Ihre Entstehung und Entwicklung bis 1908*, Wiesbaden, 1979).

the area of geographic-historical Macedonia had a population of some 2,505,503. The figure increased to 2,911,700 by 1904.¹¹³ According to Yugoslav historiography, around the year of 1900 in Vardar Macedonia there were some 908,904 inhabitants: 175,000 Turks, 88,000 Albanians and the rest Christians.¹¹⁴ It is known that not all Muslims in Macedonia were ethnolinguistic Turks. Many of them actually were ethnic Albanians who were living chiefly around the city of Skopje, along the marshes bordering the Albanian highlands and across the plain around Bitola. Genuine ethnolinguistic Turks, interspersed with some Circassians and other Turkic groups (resettled from Central Asia in order to dilute the local Balkan Christian population) lived in the cities as well as along the river valleys. The Muslim population was augmented in the late 19th century by displaced coreligionists from the former Ottoman possessions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Bulgaria. This new population lived primarily in Muslim, but sometimes also in religiously mixed villages along the Rivers Vardar and Struma and in extreme southeastern Macedonia. The Macedonian Slavic population who adopted Islam lived in villages in the extreme eastern and western areas of Macedonia. The Orthodox Greeks were inhabitants of the major trading centers. In the course of the 19th century the majority of the Balkan merchants were the Greeks, who also were sailors, fishermen and peasants. The Vlachs or Aromani lived mostly in the Pindus area and in several trading centers. Vlachs were linguistically as well as historically very tied to the Romanians. This fact actually gave a reason to the Romanians to claim parts of Macedonia. However, many of the Vlachs were quite Hellenised and often presented themselves as Greeks at least because of linguistic reason.¹¹⁵ The Jews inhabited the urban areas, particularly the city of Thessaloniki/Salonica. Around 1900 in Salonica alone there were approximately 80,000 Jews, making them the dominant community of the city. In addition to Salonica, they could be found also in Macedonia's towns of Bitola/Monastir, Shtip, Kostur, etc.¹¹⁶

¹¹³ Shaw S. J. and Shaw E. K., *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. II, Cambridge, 1976–1977, p. 208.

¹¹⁴ Božić I., Čirković S., Ekmečić M., Dedijer V., *Istorija Jugoslavije*, Beograd: Prosveta, 1973, p. 289.

¹¹⁵ According to Hugh Poulton, "Studies in the 1930s recorded 3000 to 4000 Vlachs in Bitola, 2000 to 3000 in Skopje and 1500 in Kruševo which was predominantly Vlah at the time" (Poulton H., *The Balkans. Minorities and States in Conflict*, London, 1994, p. 96).

¹¹⁶ Мезан С., „Евреството в Македонија“, *Македонски преглед*, 6, 1930, p. 78.

The Gypsies constituted a small minority in the 19th century in Macedonia and lived largely on the outskirts of the cities and towns (especially Skopje) because Ottoman law forbade them from living in urban settlements. They were living in fact on the periphery of society and were in general tolerated by all.

Christian Orthodox Slavic speaking population constituted the majority of Macedonia's population. They were primarily illiterate peasants and lived in most parts of geographic-historic Macedonia, either in completely Slavic or in mixed ethnic and religious communities. A proper national identity of Orthodox Slavic speakers of Macedonia became the main reason for national struggles between Serbs, Bulgarians and Greeks. Along with the question of the historical heritage of the ancient Macedonian Kingdom, the national identity of Orthodox Slavic speaking population in Macedonia, from the mid 19th century became a crucial source and basis for territorial aspirations with respect to Macedonia by Serbs, Bulgarians and Greeks. At the turn of the 20th century the Slavs who populated the fringe areas of Macedonia, along the Ottoman border with Serbia and scattered villages in western Macedonia as far south as Struga, Ochrida (Ohrid) and Bitola claimed to be the Serbs. In 1834 Serbian philologist Vuk Stefanović-Karadžić, for example, heard from some merchants that around Debar and Kičevo in Macedonia there were 300 Serbian villages, but the language of those people was a "*Slavic language*".¹¹⁷ Vuk set up a theses in 1834 that the boundaries of the Serbian population in Albania and Macedonia (in Arnautska and Mačedonia),¹¹⁸ were still not known, and, additionally, that in the southeastern regions of Macedonia the boundaries between Serbian and Bulgarian language are not exactly defined. However, in reality, many Christian Orthodox Slavs who lived in Macedonia near the border with Bulgaria tended to identify themselves as ethnolinguistic Bulgarians.¹¹⁹ Some of them who inhabited the Greek frontier with the Ottoman Empire considered themselves to be the Greeks. We have to emphasize that a religious affiliation for many of inhabitants of Macedonia became in fact a real basis of their

¹¹⁷ Стојанчевић В., „Једна неиспуњена жеља Вукова“, *Ковчежић*, 12, Београд, 1974, pp. 74–77.

¹¹⁸ Vuk understood under the term "Arnautska" and Kosovo-Metohija.

¹¹⁹ Bulgarian collection of documents upon ethnolinguistic identity of Macedonian Slavs is presented in: *Macedonia. Documents and Material*, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of History, Bulgarian Language Institute (ed.), Sofia, 1978.

ethnic identity (for instance, Muslims can't be Greeks, Serbs or Bulgarians).

Foreign diplomats, travelers and scholars who visited or lived in Macedonia during the 19th century and in the early 20th century usually designated the Slavic speaking population of Macedonia as a Bulgarian one.¹²⁰ Sami-bey Frashëri, an Albanian geographer, referred to the Slavs of Macedonia as Bulgarians, as did various Bulgarian scholars and travelers. He at the same time, in his famous book: *Albania: What She Has Been, What She Is, What She Shall Be?* (original in German, 1899), bitterly protested against the identification of Albanian Muslims, either in Macedonia or Albania, Kosovo-Metohija, as Turks and the Albanian Christian Orthodox population as the Roums. He also resented Greek attempts to Hellenize and thus separate the Albanian Orthodox population from the rest of the Albanians and Albania in order for Greece to annex Toskëria (Southern Albania).¹²¹ However, the Serbs, like M. J. Andonović and Tihomir Đorđević, considered them to be originally e Serbs, while the Greeks like Cleanthes Nicolaides called them Greeks.¹²² There were also a few people who shared the opinion that Macedonia's Slavs were from a national-identity point of view an "amorphous mass of people" - neither Bulgarian nor Greek nor Serbian.¹²³

The ethnolinguistic and ethnic minority situation in Ottoman Macedonia was one of the most complex within the whole region of the Balkan Peninsula. Macedonia was the last Balkan region to be liberated from Ottoman authority and to be incorporated into Balkan successor states after the Ottomans lost almost all their European/Balkan territorial possessions at the beginning of the 20th century (1912–1913). Finally, according to the censuses of Ottoman citizens¹²⁴ done during the realm of the Grand sultan and caliph Abdul Hamid II (1876–1909), there was an equal number of Muslim and

¹²⁰ Smith A. H., *Fighting the Turk in the Balkans: An American's Adventures with the Macedonian Revolutionists*, New York, 1908, p. 3; Grogan L., *The Life of J. D. Bouchier*, London, 1926, p. 117, and others.

¹²¹ Frasher S. B., *Was war Albanien, was ist es, was wird es werden?*, Wien, Leipzig, 1913, pp. 29–30.

¹²² Sami-bey Frasher, *Dictionnaire universelle d'histoire et geographie*, I–IV, 1889–1898; Андоновић М. Ј., *Македонски су Словени Срби*, Београд, 1913; Georgewitch T., *Macedonia*, London, 1918.

¹²³ Cvijić J., *Remarks on the Ethnography of the Macedonian Slavs*, London, 1906; Hron K., *Das Volkstum der Slawen Makedoniens*, 1890, reprint Skopje, 1966.

¹²⁴ We have to stress that the Ottoman statistics of populations in Ottoman provinces or in general of the Ottoman Empire are of dubious validity and could only provide some basic indicators of the ethnic composition on the territory.

Christian population in Macedonia as evidenced in the next table:

Macedonian population, 1882–1906

	1882	1895	1904	1906
Muslims	1,083.130	1,137.315	1,508.507	1,145.849
Greeks (Orthodox)	534.396	603.249	307.000	623.197
Bulgarians (Orthodox)	704.574	692.742	796.479	626.715
Greek Catholics	2.311	3.315	No data	2.928
Vlachs (Orthodox)	No data	No data	99.000	26.042
Serbs (Orthodox)	No data	No data	100.717	No data
Jews and others	151.730	68.432	99.997	30.594
Total	2,476.141	2,505.503	2,911.700	2,455.325

The Ottoman census of 1906 regarding the main part of Macedonia provides an exaggerated number for the Muslim population including and ethnolinguistic (Muslim) Albanians, but it can be useful to estimate the relative number of Greeks, Serbs and Bulgarians, reckoned on the religious bases but not on the linguistic one:

Macedonian Christian population in 1906

Orthodox Greeks	648,962
Orthodox Bulgarians	557,734
Orthodox Serbs	167,601

According to Elisabeth Barker, 50% of the estimated number of “Orthodox Greeks” were in fact ethnic Slavs but who lived under the jurisdiction of the Greek Patriarchate in Constantinople. Nevertheless, the dominance of Bulgarians over Serbs is clearly visible.¹²⁵

We have to stress that from the time of the Ottoman authority there are no reliable statistics with regard to Macedonia’s population. Substantial changes in numbers of Macedonia’s inhabitants were caused by the Balkan Wars 1912–1913. According to the British *Foreign Office’s* (London) papers and documents (including and reports from Macedonia) from 1918 it can be concluded that just before the First Balkan War started (October 1912) the estimated numbers of Macedonia’s populations were as following:

Macedonia’s total population in autumn of 1912

Slavs	1,150.000
Turks	400,000
Greeks	300,000
Vlachs	200,000
Albanians	120,000
Jews	100,000
Gypsies	10,000

Among all nations living in Macedonia (and the Balkans) only the Albanians held to the claim of being autochthonous people in this region, however scientifically wrong and politicized.¹²⁶ The southern Albanian tribes – the Tosks – are believed to be the lineal descendants of the ancient region of Epirus. However, their northern compatriots – the Ghegs – wrongly claimed to be descendants of the ancient Illyrians who

¹²⁵ Pettifer J., *The New Macedonian Question*, New York: Palgrave, 2001, p. 6.

¹²⁶ According to several reliable Byzantine and other mediaeval sources, Balkan Albanians came to Europe - island of Sicily - from the Caucasus’ Albania in the 9th c. In the year of 1043 they emigrated from Sicily to present-day central Albania (ex. Ataliota M., *Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae*, Weber, Bonn, 1853, p. 18). This fact is recognized and by Albanian historians Stefang Pollo and Arben Puto (Pollo S., Puto A., *The History of Albania*, London, Boston, Hebley: Routledge & Kegan, 1981, p. 37).

in fact were probably the Slavic Serbs and the only aboriginal Balkan inhabitants.¹²⁷

Macedonia and the national aspirations of the Greeks, Bulgarians, Albanians and Serbs

National aspirations towards the territory of geographic-historic Macedonia and Macedonia's inhabitants by the Serbs, Albanians, Bulgarians and Greeks from 1878 to 1912 were based on two crucial rights: historic and ethnic ones. All of them claimed that from a historical point of view Macedonia in whole, or some of her regions, had been parts of their own national states in the past - in the Middle Ages before the Ottoman occupation of the Balkans. They also declared that from an ethnic point of view the inhabitants of Macedonia were actually their ethnic and cultural compatriots who spoke a special dialect of their own national language. Finally, all of Macedonia's neighbors were constantly pretending to prove and convince the great European powers that their historical and ethnolinguistic rights were deeper, stronger and more justifiable in comparison to the same rights claimed by the others.¹²⁸

The Greek case

The Greeks were the strongest legitimists (in other words, having the strongest legitimate claims) upon the territory and peoples of Macedonia. The Bulgarians asserted that the Macedonians were Slavs speaking a west-Bulgarian dialect and for that reason they were ethnic Bulgarians. However, Greek propaganda was more developed at the beginning of the agitation. Actually, Greek propaganda went into abstractions because it operated with the term

¹²⁷ Деретић И. Ј., Антић П. Д., Јарчевић М. С., *Измишљено досељавање Срба*, Београд: Сардонија, 2009.

¹²⁸ Probably, the best example of this "fight of rights" is Bulgarian-Serbian case from 1913 when both sides sent to Paris separate ethnographical maps of Macedonia done by respected academicians. Bulgarian point of view was presented by Vasil Kanchov's map (all Macedonia's Slavs are ethnic Bulgarians) while Serbian point was represented by Jovan Cvijić's map (Macedonia's Slavs are composed by "Serbo-Croats", Bulgarians and "Slavs of Macedonia"). Both maps are printed as appendices in: International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, *The other Balkan wars: 1914 Carnegie Endowment Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars/introduction with reflections on the present conflict by George F. Kennan*, Carnegie Endowment for international peace, Washington, 1993.

“Hellenism”.¹²⁹ The Greek thesis was that during the time of Alexander the Great Macedonia already belonged to the Hellenistic cultural-linguistic sphere of influence.¹³⁰ The reason why Hellenism was chosen instead of the Greek basis is understandable since we know that in classical times the Greeks, like Demosthenes (384–322 B.C.), considered the Macedonians as barbarians and not as Greeks. In addition, the Greeks of antiquity had only a few isolated colonies on the Macedonian coast. Aristotle (384–322 B.C.) became a crucial connection link between Greekdom and Hellenism, as the chosen form of propaganda – a philosopher who won the Kingdom of Macedonia for Hellenism when he gave lessons to Philip’s son, Alexander (later “the Great”). The Greek theory in dealing with the period of Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great included both of them into Greekdom as a consequence of two historical facts: 1. the royal family of Macedon perceived itself as Greek in culture, and 2. the Macedonian nobility was from intellectual and cultural points of view completely Hellenized. In short, the matter of spiritual life was taken into consideration as a crucial point of determination of Greek nationhood.

The next step in formulation of Greek claims over Macedonia was to link Hellenism, which actually had an Athenian cultural background, with the Byzantine Empire (330–1453) – a medieval universal empire proclaimed by Greek historians to be a Greek national state in the Middle Ages. Regardless of the fact that during ten centuries of Byzantine history Macedonia was ruled not exclusively by Constantinople but also by foreigners such as Serbian and Bulgarian kings and emperors and even by Frankish (Latin) kings (during some periods of the Latin Empire, 1204–1261). However, according to Greek propaganda, the only legitimate overlord of Macedonia was Byzantium, and Byzantium had been claimed as a Greek national state as its official language was Greek and its cultural life was based on Hellenism.¹³¹ A whole period

¹²⁹ Brailsford H. N., *Macedonia. Its Races and their Future*, New York, 1971, p. 194.

¹³⁰ See, for instance, the book *The Falsification of Macedonian History*, Athens, 1984, written by Nicolaos K. Martis, especially pp. 20–53.

¹³¹ The fact is that although the Latin West recognized the Byzantine claim to the ancient Roman legacy for several centuries, after Roman-Catholic Pope Leo III (795–816) crowned Charles the Great, king of the Franks, as the “Roman Emperor” on December 25th, 800, an act which eventually led to the formation of the Holy Roman Empire (962–1806), the Latin West started to favour the Franks and began to refer to the Byzantium or the “Eastern Roman Empire” largely as the *Empire of the Greeks* (*Imperium Graecorum*) (Royal Historical Society, *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society: Sixth Series*. Cambridge University

of Byzantine history was always considered as part of Greek national history. A chief propagator of Hellenistic culture during the Byzantine period and even later became the Greek Orthodox Church (with a headquarters in Constantinople). This institution Hellenized and de facto civilized the people under its own administrative jurisdiction and influence such as some of the Macedonian Slavs, Albanians from Western Macedonia, Southern Albania and Northern Epirus and Vlachs who became in the course of time “Hellenized” Greeks. The Greek Orthodox Church actually became a principal link between ancient and medieval Greek history and culture in which Hellenism was a most significant and remarkable “national” point. While the first Turkish sultans destroyed the Byzantine Empire and its administrative and social system (after 1453) they gladly tolerated the Greek Orthodox Church¹³² until 1821 and the start of the “Greek Revolution and War of Independence”.

A center of the Greek Patriarchate was a Phanar, a “Greek” quarter in Constantinople/Istanbul, where a new Greek aristocracy emerged. The so-called “Phanariots” (Phanar’s Greeks) were always chosen to govern Moldavia and Wallachia from the beginning of the 18th century until 1821¹³³, and they had the position of “dragomans” of the Sublime Porte and Ottoman fleet.¹³⁴ A higher ecclesiastical clergy in Macedonia, particularly in the central part of this region, were Phanariot-Greeks who in fact conducted the affairs of the Orthodox Church in the area as Macedonia exclusively belonged to the Greek Orthodox Church in Constantinople until 1870. They finally extinguished the Serbian Patriarchate of Peć (in Turkish Ipek – a town in Metohija) in 1766 and the Bulgarian Patriarchate of Ochrida in 1767 and completely replaced the higher Orthodox clergy with Phanariot-Greek speaking priests. Subsequently, from 1766/1767 until 1870 the Greek language was the language of the church within the entire territory of historic-geographic Macedonia. However, even before 1766/1767 many of the most significant

Press, Cambridge, 2001, p. 75). However, Byzantium was overwhelmingly multinational with ethnic Greeks as a minority.

¹³² Stavrianos L. S., *The Balkans since 1443*, New York, 1958, pp. 59–62.

¹³³ Treptow W. K. (ed.), *A History of Romania*, The Center for Romanian Studies, The Romanian Cultural Foundation, Iași, 1996, pp. 203–211.

¹³⁴ Popović V., *Istočno pitanje*, Beograd: Izdavačka knjižarnica Gece Kona, 1928, see chapter „Unutrašnje propadanje Turske i buđenje Hrišćana krajem XVI i početkom XVII veka”, pp. 61–67; Castellan G., *History of the Balkans From Mohammed the Conqueror to Stalin*, New York, 1992, pp. 145–155, 248–263.

hierarchical posts in the Orthodox Church in Macedonia and the Eastern Balkans had been given to the Greeks, and their power was unquestioned by the Sublime Porte until the early decades of the 19th century when the “Greek Revolution and War of Independence” (1821–1829) took place and caused the Ottoman central authority to suspect the loyalty of their Phanariot-Greek civil servants. Nevertheless, during the main period of Ottoman rule Macedonia and her Christian believers¹³⁵ were placed under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction and control by the Phanariot-Greeks and their Patriarchate in Constantinople (until 1870). When the Slavic (Serbian and Bulgarian) church organizations disappeared from Macedonia “everywhere the Greek Bishops, as intolerant as they were corrupt crushed out the national consciousness, the language and the intellectual life of their Slav flocks”.¹³⁶ Under the Phanariot’s control of church affairs the official church language became the Greek one, i.e. a language in which church services were held. Slavic letters were forbidden, and even Slavic libraries in the old monasteries were burned by the Greek bishops. As a result, the process of Hellenization in Macedonia which was continuing and at the same time became the most significant argument for the Greek claims to Macedonia, her culture and people.¹³⁷ The Greeks also claimed that the Eastern Christian (Orthodox) Church was a Greek one and for three centuries in fact they monopolized the culture of the Eastern Balkans. All in all, the Greek ecclesiastical hierarchy, supported by Greek national propaganda, claimed that all Macedonia’s Orthodox populations were Greek because the Orthodox believers in Macedonia belonged to the Greek Patriarchate in Constantinople.

The framework of Greek nationalism and “rights” to Macedonia was finally shaped when Greek intellectuals adopted Giuseppe Mazzini’s (“Soul of Italy”, 1805–1872) idealistic concept of nationalism that claims that nationality is a spiritual but not an ethnological fact. Accordingly, all Macedonian populations who used the Greek language, at

¹³⁵ It is no matter what their native language or ethnic background are: all of them are classified by the Ottoman authorities as the “Greeks” since the Ottomans divided their subjects according to the confession (*millet* system).

¹³⁶ Brailsford H. N., *Macedonia. Its Races and their Future*, New York, 1971, p. 196.

¹³⁷ See, for instance: *Haus-Hof-und Staatsarchiv*, Politisches Archiv, Wien, “Circular letter in Greek language, addressed by Greek Archbishop Philaretos to the priests and the population of Vakouphokhōria, Koritsa”, September 20th, 1892, XIV/21, Albanien XIII/18.

least for scientific or cultural purposes, and who were under Greek cultural influence, belonged intellectually-spiritually to Greekdom.¹³⁸ In other words, all of Macedonia's Hellenized population was claimed as Greek. Thus, in Greek eyes Hellenism played a crucial cultural role in the Balkans. Generally, the Greek "Megali Idea", a concept of the re-creation of the Byzantine Empire as "Megala Hellada", claimed Macedonia as part of Greekdom on the basis of history (historical rights) as well as on the basis of culture (spiritual life and language), in one word on the basis of Hellenism.¹³⁹



The Byzantine Empire in 1265. A whole portion of historical-geographic Macedonia is included into the state territory of the Byzantine Empire

¹³⁸ Using this model of spiritual-cultural nationdom the Italians claimed after the Italian unification in 1861 all Italian-speaking population of Istria, Dalmatia and Adriatic islands as "Italians" including and their Italian-language written culture as "Italian".

¹³⁹ See more about "Megali Idea" in 3rd chapter under the headline "Nation building, the 'Great Idea' and National Schism 1831–1922" in Clogg R., *A Concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, pp. 47–99.

A definition of the territory of Macedonia for Greek propaganda meant in a majority of cases two Ottoman vilayets: Vilayet of Salonika (Salonica/Thessaloniki) and Vilayet of Monastir (Bitolj/ Bitola). The later included purely Albanian districts of Elbasan and Koritza (Korçë), where many Christians, although they attended Greek Orthodox schools, were actually ethnic Albanians. However, the modern Greek vision of Macedonia excludes the Vilayet of Skopje because only few Greek families lived there. With the exception of Albanian- and Serb-language speakers in the west of the vilayet, it was entirely populated by Macedonia's Slavs whose language was most similar to Bulgarian.¹⁴⁰


The Bulgarian case

Bulgarian propaganda and claims upon Macedonia had two aspects and levels of requirements. The first was historical, in other words one of state rights over Macedonia, while the second one was an ethnolinguistic one that viewed the Slavic people of Macedonia as ethnolinguistic Bulgarians who have been speaking "western" (i.e. Macedonian) dialect of Bulgarian language.

Bulgarian claims of "historical rights" to the area of Macedonia, that also included Albanian populated Western Macedonia, can be traced to 864 when the territory of Macedonia was given to the Bulgarian khan/prince Boris I (852–889) as a gift for his acceptance of Christianity from Constantinople. Macedonia was later put under the jurisdiction of the independent Bulgarian Orthodox Church. However, the Bulgarian theory was going deeper into the past than it was the case with the year 864. Namely, Bulgarian claims to Macedonia according to "historical rights" are also based on some very disputable information given by Byzantine historians with regard to the Slavic attacks on the Balkan Peninsula (the 6th century), their settlement in the Balkans (the 6th century), or settlement of the Proto-Bulgars Maurus and Kouber in the Bitola plain (the 7th c.). In other words, Slavic tribes invading and settling Macedonia in the 6th

¹⁴⁰ This is mainly a result of activities of Bulgarian church and school authorities on systematic Bulgarianization of Macedonia and her people through well coordinated policies of the Bulgarian church (Exarchate), education system and finally different economic privileges extended to local population of Macedonia from 1870 to 1912.

century are seen exclusively as Bulgarian regardless of the fact that the Byzantine sources did not mention ethnic nationality or nationalities of these tribes. In addition, according to Bulgarian scholars, it is important to note that taxes were being paid to “Bulgarian” (i.e., Scythian) people by some inhabitants on the plain of Salonica (the 9th – 10th centuries)¹⁴¹.



Territory of Bulgarian state during the realm of the Emperor Asen II c. 1230. A whole portion of historical-geographical Macedonia is included into the Second Bulgarian Empire

¹⁴¹ “Information from Procopius Caesarienses about a Slav attack on the Balkan Peninsula, in the region of Niš and Thessalonica”, p. 19, “Information from John of Ephesus on the settlement of Slavs in the Balkan Peninsula”, p. 20, “Information about the miracle of St Demetrius of Thessalonica and the settlement of the Proto-Bulgars Maurus and Kouber in the Bitola plain”, p. 21, “Information from the Byzantine writer Ioannes Cameniata about some settlements on the plain of Thessalonica paying taxes to the Bulgarian people”, p. 22 in Bulgarian Academy of Science, *Macedonia. Documents and Material*, Sofia 1978.

We have to remark that dealing with this historical source, however, Bulgarian scholars unjustifiably appropriated ancient Scythians as “Bulgarians”. Further, Bulgarian historiography claims both 1. that the cultural mission in Macedonia of Kliment, Nahum and Angelarius was “Bulgarian” and 2. that the famous Literary School in Ochrida from the early Middle Ages had belonged to the “Bulgarian” national and cultural inheritance. These two claims are based only on the fact that these three pupils of the “Slavic apostles” (the Greeks Cyril and Methodius) were sent to Macedonia by Bulgarian ruler Boris I. In addition, one of the most important monasteries in Macedonia, in Ochrida, was claimed to be a national Bulgarian one since the monastery and church were built in the town of Ochrida on the orders of the Bulgarian prince Boris I (the 10th century).¹⁴² It is extremely important to note that at the turn of the 20th century a wider hinterland of Ochrida (Ohrid) was settled by a significant number of ethnic Albanians and that this area was considered by Albanian nationalists since the time of the First League of Prizren (1878) as exclusively Albanian national land and as a part of Greater (united) Albania. As a result, both the Bulgarians and Albanians, as well as Serbian and Greek nationalists, claimed the area of Ochrida as their own national territory that had to be incorporated into a national state of their own.

The Bulgarian theory on Macedonia’s national identity overwhelmingly accepted and stressed the fact that Macedonia was inside the borders of a Bulgarian state enlarged by the first Bulgarian Emperor, Simeon (893–927). Within a framework of Bulgarian claims with regard to the question of Macedonia’s identity during the Middle Ages the cases of Emperor Samuilo and Ivan Vladislav are the most subject to dispute. According to Bulgarian historiography, “Samuilo’s Uprising”, 976–1014, was a Bulgarian national rebellion.¹⁴³ The theory is founded on the fact that these two emperors were

¹⁴² *ibid*, “Excerpt from the second Life of Nahum concerning the arrival of the disciples of Cyril and Methodius in the Bulgarian lands, and the big monastery and church built by Nahum in Ohrid on the orders of the Bulgarian Tsar Boris”, p. 22; Bulgarian Academy of Science, *Information Bulgaria. A short encyclopedia of the People's Republic of Bulgaria*, Oxford, New York, Toronto, Sydney, Paris, Frankfurt, 1985, p. 153.

¹⁴³ Златарски В., *История на българската държава през Средните векове*. Т.1 Първо българско царство, Ч.2 От славянизацията на държавата до падането на Първото царство (852–1018), 2 изд., София, 1971. Петров П., *Образуване и укрепване на западната Българска държава*, Годишник на Софийския университет (FIF) 53:2 (1959), pp. 135–90.

noblemen of Bulgarian origin.¹⁴⁴ Moreover, their state was considered by Bulgarian scholars as the last Bulgarian independent state after the conquest of the main part of Bulgaria by Byzantium in 971. A newly established Byzantine Archbishopric of Ochrida in 1018, by Byzantine Emperor Basil II ("Killer of Bulgarians", 976–1025), is also considered as the Bulgarian national church and called by Bulgarian nationalists the Archbishopric of Bulgaria.¹⁴⁵ It is a fact that among Bulgarian nationalists and nationalistic propaganda on Macedonia the Archbishopric of Ochrida was always understood as Bulgarian and its Archbishop as the Archbishop of Bulgaria. However, the cases of two "Bulgarian" uprisings against the Byzantine authorities in the 11th century under the leadership of Peter Delyan (1040–1041) and Georgi Voyteh (1072) are also very problematic with regard to Bulgarian claims upon Macedonia and her Slavic inhabitants.¹⁴⁶

Bulgarian territorial-national aspirations upon Macedonia in modern times basically have been derived from two historical events relating to 19th century Bulgarian history:

- the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870 by the Ottoman sultan, and
- the creation of the Great Bulgaria in 1878 according to the "St. Stefano Peace Treaty" by the Russian authorities.

One of the most considerable goals of the Bulgarian struggle for liberation from Ottoman rule was to gain independence for the national church from the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople. In fact, the movement for the creation of the Bulgarian independent Church was enormously strengthened by the resentment caused by the sultan's abolition of the Patriarchate of Ochrida, which covered the dioceses of Macedonia and Western Bulgaria. The Patriarchate or Archbishopric of Ochrida was always understood by Bulgarian political authorities as the Bulgarian national church. Nevertheless, both the establishment of the (Ottoman)

¹⁴⁴ "Information by the Byzantine writer Cecaumenus about the Bulgarians in Macedonia and about the Bulgarian tsars Samuil and Ivan Vladislav", Bulgarian Academy of Science, *Macedonia. Documents and Material*, Sofia, 1978, p. 27.

¹⁴⁵ "Charters granted by the Byzantine Emperor Basil II to the Bulgarian Church after his conquest of Bulgaria", Bulgarian Academy of Science, *Macedonia. Documents and Material*, Sofia, 1978, p. 30.

¹⁴⁶ "The Byzantine historian Scylitzes describes the uprising of the Bulgarians under the leadership of Peter Delyan", p. 49, "The Byzantine historian Scylitzes describes the uprising of the Bulgarians under the leadership of Georgi Voyteh in 1072", p. 53, Bulgarian Academy of Science, *Macedonia. Documents and Material*, Sofia, 1978.

Bulgarian Exarchate and creation of (Russian) Greater Bulgaria directly affected Greek, Serbian and Albanian national aspirations, plans and struggles for united national states of their own.



Territory of Bulgarian Exarchate established in 1870 by the Sultan's decree with major part of Macedonia included into

The Bulgarian struggle for an independent national church was achieved when the Ottoman sultan issued a special *firman* (sultan's decree) on March 11th, 1870. By this *firman*, the Bulgarian independent Exarchate was created, which included Eastern Bulgaria, Dobrudja, Pirot and Niš in the west and one Macedonian diocese (Veles). With regard to Bulgarian aspirations towards Macedonia as well as in general with regard to Bulgarian demands concerning the creation of Greater Bulgaria on the Balkan Peninsula, the creation of the

Bulgarian Exarchate exerted a tremendous impact on the national ideology of the Bulgarian people who initiated strong propaganda followed by political actions intended to put all of historical-geographic Macedonia under the jurisdiction of the Exarchate. According to this propaganda and later political action, the total area of Macedonia was seen as a part of a united Bulgarian national church-Exarchate. Actually, the creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate had a basic impact on Bulgarian nationalistic propaganda on the area of Macedonia, but at the same time it inspired severe disputes between Bulgarian, Albanian, Serbian and Greek national claims over the same area of Macedonia.

The creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate by the Ottoman authorities in 1870 and the attempt of Russian diplomacy to establish a Greater Bulgaria in March 1878 made the strongest impact to Bulgarian politicians to create in the future an united national Bulgarian state based on ethnic and historical rights of Bulgarian people. The Russian-Ottoman War of 1877-1878, ended after the Russian spectacular military successes against the Ottoman army on the Balkan battlefield with the signing of the "St. Stefano Peace Treaty" on February 19th/March 3rd, 1878. The crucial point of this treaty was the establishment of an independent Bulgarian state which was designed by St. Petersburg as a Russian client-state on the Balkan Peninsula. According to this Russian great Bulgarian project, the whole of Macedonia was included into St. Stefano Bulgaria. The borders of this Bulgaria were drawn on the south - west beyond Debar, Ochrida, Kastoria, Korcha with entrance to the Aegean Sea, but without Salonica. The whole course of the Vardar River was to be included into the Bulgarian state and in such a way so that the Bulgarian nationalistic dreams regarding Macedonia based on both historical and ethnolinguistic rights would be realized.

We can conclude that importance of attempt to create St. Stefano Bulgaria and the real creation of Bulgarian Exarchate became crucial and most influential historical events for future Bulgarian nationalistic aspirations regarding Macedonia.

The Albanian case

Historically, Albanian national requirements to include parts of Macedonia into a united national state, or a single Albanian province within the Ottoman Empire, date from the time of the so-called First League of Prizren. A basic requirement of the First League of Prizren, or Albanian League, which existed from 1878 to 1881, and which at the same time became the main political program for subsequent generations of Albanian political-national workers and ideologists, was that the four vilayets of Bitola, Ioanina, Scodra, and Kosovo (with Metohija) were to compose a single united “Albanian vilayet”, or a greater Albania within the borders of the Ottoman Empire. The League’s statute called “Kararname” (“The Book of Decisions”) defined the borders of Albanian national pretensions that included significant (western) parts of geographic and historic Macedonia.¹⁴⁷ However, the ethnolinguistic situation in these four vilayets, according to German scholar Schanderl, was as it is shown in the table (i.e., Albanians did not have an absolute majority):

Population of Ioanina, Bitola, Kosovo and Scutari vilayets from 1877 to 1908 (in percentage):

Albanians	44%
Macedonian Slavs	19,2%
Serbs	11,4%
Greeks	9,2%
Vlachs	6,5%
Turks Osmanli	9,3%
Jews, Armenians and Gypsies	0,4%

The same author claims¹⁴⁸ that Macedonian confessional situation was as follows:

¹⁴⁷ Бартл П., *Албанци. Од средњег века до данас*, Београд: CLIO, 2001, pp. 94–97.

¹⁴⁸ Schanderl provides the so-called “average census”, what means a single average numbers for different categories of population.

Confessional distribution in Ottoman vilayets of Ioanina, Kosovo, Scutari and Bitola, 1877 – 1908 (in percentage):

Orthodox	27,8%
Muslims	52,8%
Roman Catholics	15%



The 20th/21st cc. Albanian nationalistic claims for creation of United/Greater historical and ethnographic Albania

At the same time, Schandler claims that 77% of Albanian Muslims out of the total Albanian population were in these four Ottoman vilayets.¹⁴⁹ Three of them – Scodra, Ioanina and Bitola – were created in 1865 while the fourth – Kosovo – subsequently. Each of these four vilayets had a large population of non-Albanian, nationalities. For instance, according to Peter Kukulj, in 1871 the Serbs were even in the majority in Kosovo-Metohija (63,6%) in comparison to Albanian minority (32,2%).¹⁵⁰ In addition, since the majority of the Albanian population was Muslim, the central Ottoman authorities regarded them as Ottomans.

An extension of Albanian territorial pretensions with respect to Ancient (Old) Serbia and Macedonia in the territories where the Albanian population was not in the majority, was one of the crucial sources for friction and struggle between Albanian political organizations on the one hand and two Serbian independent states, Montenegro and Serbia, on the other. According to the programs of both Albanian leagues, that is of Prizren and Ipek (Peć), a new Albanian either autonomous province within the Ottoman Empire or ultimately independent state had to consist of four principalities: 1. Southern Albania with Epirus and the city of Ioanina, 2. Northern and Central Albania with the areas around Scodra (Scutari), Tirana (Tiranë) and Elbasan, 3. Macedonia with the cities of Debar, Skopje, Gostivar, Prilep, Veles, Bitola and Ohrid, and 4. Ancient Serbia (Kosovo-Metohija, Raška/Sandžak and Vardar Macedonia) with the cities/towns of Prizren, Gnjilane, Peć, Đakovica, Mitrovica, Priština, Kumanovo, Novi Pazar and Sjenica.¹⁵¹ The decisions of the international community (i.e. „Great Powers“) concerning Balkan affairs contributed as well to the interethnic frictions between the Albanians and their neighbours at the turn of the 20th century. Both of the international treaties of 1878, San Stefano and Berlin, handed over certain lands populated by the Albanians at that time to the other states. According to Albanian historiography, the inability of the Ottoman government to protect the interests of the Albanians of whom

¹⁴⁹ Schandler H-D., *Die Albanienpolitik Österreich Ungarns und Italiens 1877–1908*, Wiesbaden, 1971, pp. 9–10.

¹⁵⁰ Kukulj P., *Das Fürstentum Serbien und Türkisch Serbien. Eine militär-geographische Skizze*, Wien, 1871.

¹⁵¹ Stuli B., *Albansko pitanje 1878–1882*, Zagreb: JAZU, 1959, pp. 321–323; Hofbauer H., *Eksperiment Kosovo. Povratak kolonijalizma*, Beograd: Albatros plus, 2009, pp. 40–43.

70% were of Muslim faith and mainly loyal Ottoman subjects,¹⁵² compelled the Albanians from Kosovo-Metohija, Montenegro, Macedonia and Epirus, to organize themselves for national defense and to require the status of autonomous administration of a Albanian province within a total ethnolinguistic space of Albanians. The Albanian feudal aristocracy opposed the sultan's (Abdülmeçid, 1839–1861) program of reforms – *Tanzimat* (meaning „reorganization“), as did the Bosnian-Herzegovinian nobles of Muslim faith.¹⁵³ Both of them resented officials sent to their provinces from Istanbul preferring to be governed by their own administrations composed of local Muslim feudal lords – *begs*. Albanians and Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims as well did not support military reforms based on general recruitment for the purpose of creating a modern and more effective Ottoman army. The Albanians wished to retain traditional procedures of recruitment and to be led into battle by their own military leaders. Finally, when Albanian national-political leadership proclaimed on November 28th, 1912 an independent state of Albania in the city of Valona they required from international community to recognize the borders of new Albania according to the programmes of both Albanian Prizren and Peć leagues.

The Serbian case

Serbian claims upon the destiny of Macedonia and her inhabitants were radically different in comparison to the Bulgarian case because Serbian demands were mainly based on “historical rights”, but not and/or ethnolinguistic ones. Serbian political propaganda did not insist as much upon “ethnic rights” to Macedonia, while at the same time its “historical rights” were based exclusively on medieval Serbian history when the Serbian state reached a climax of its glory during a short period of time known as the time of the Serbian Empire (from 1349 to 1371).¹⁵⁴

Serbian neglect of their „ethnic rights” to the biggest part of Macedonia was based primarily on scientific research done and works published by a leading Serbian 19th century

¹⁵² The sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876–1909) had very high opinion about a loyalty of Muslim Albanians. For that reason, sultan's personal body-guard was made primarily by Muslim Albanians.

¹⁵³ Popović V., *Istočno pitanje*, Beograd: Izdavačka knjižarnica Gece Kona, 1928, pp. 146–149.

¹⁵⁴ See: Стевановић М., *Душаново царство*, Београд: Књига-комерц, 2001.

philologist - Vuk Stefanović Karadžić (1787–1864) who followed the main idea and principal of ethnic identity – language.¹⁵⁵ The fact was that differences between literary Serbian and Bulgarian were not considerable, but they were very definite. The Macedonian dialect (speech) actually is neither one nor the other; “but in certain structural features it agrees rather with Bulgarian than with Serbian”.¹⁵⁶ Obviously the language of the Macedonian Slavs was more similar to Bulgarian than to Serbian; a fact which was stressed by large numbers of travelers, merchants, diplomats, scientists, etc. passing throughout of Macedonia at the turn of the 20th century and left in their memoirs or other observations referring to the land and inhabitants of Macedonia.

If we speak about Serbian “historical rights” to Macedonia we have to stress first one fact in regard to Serbian practical political propaganda activities. Namely, Serbia’s practical political interest in Macedonia was much later than that of Bulgaria. Up to the time of the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in July 1878 the ambitions of the Serbian state and its foreign policy were directed primarily toward these two Ottoman provinces, but not toward Macedonia for the very reason that it was an accepted fact by Belgrade that the majority of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian population was Serbian in both ethnic origin and language regardless of any confessional division (Orthodox, Catholics and Muslims). However, after the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 (July 13th) Belgrade realized that Bosnia-Herzegovina had been for the time being excluded from inclusion in the plan of creating a single Serbian national state.¹⁵⁷ For that reason, Belgrade wished to repair its national failure from the years of Great Eastern Crisis, 1875– 1878, but it was late concerning Macedonia as:

- Bulgarians had already created their national church (from 1870);
- the majority of Macedonian Slavs had already adhered to the Bulgarian Exarchate and thus became Bulgarized; and

¹⁵⁵ Стефановић Караџић В., „Срби сви и свуда“, *Ковчежић за историју, језик и обичаје Срба сва три закона*, том I, Беч, 1849; Sotirović B. V., *Lingvistički model definisanja srpske nacije Vuka Stefanovića Karadžića i projekat Ilije Garašanina o stvaranju lingvistički određene države Srba*, Vilnius: Vilniaus universiteto leidykla, 2006.

¹⁵⁶ Brailsford H. N., *Macedonia. Its Races and their Future*, New York, 1971, p. 101.

¹⁵⁷ About the project see: Љушић Р., *Књига о Начертанију*, Београд: БИГЗ, 1993.

- Bulgarian schools were firmly established and thoroughly popular on the soil of Macedonia.

Finally, Serbia had suffered a disastrous military defeat at the Slivnica River in Western Bulgaria in 1885 at the hands of the Bulgarians,¹⁵⁸ and her prestige in the Balkans was recovered only in 1913 after the Balkan Wars (1912–1913). All in all, Serbia's both official propaganda and secret national work were mainly directed to the areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina (according to "ethnic" rights) before 1878, but after the Congress of Berlin Serbia had a chance to enlarge its territory only towards the south (according to "historic" rights) by annexation of Macedonia or (according to both "ethnic" and "historic" rights) by absorption of Kosovo-Metohija, but surely not any further toward the west (Bosnia-Herzegovina).

Serbian claims on the territory of Macedonia based on "historical rights" (i.e., the state rights) were grounded on several historical facts coming from a national medieval history as well as Bulgarian historical claims. For the first time in Serbian history a large part of Macedonia was included within the state borders of medieval Serbia in 1382 when the Serbian king Milutin (1382–1321) occupied and annexed a northern portion of geographic-historic Macedonia and proclaimed the city of Skopje as the new capital of Serbia. This military acquisition, the largest one in Serbian history at the time, was approved by the Byzantine emperor in 1299 when king Milutin married the Byzantine princess Simonida; a marriage which brought him the annexed portion of Macedonia as dowry. The period of the realm of the Serbian emperor Stefan Dušan (1331–1355) was most important in dealing with the "historical rights" of Serbian nationalistic propaganda and work on Macedonia. Namely, this ruler conquered a large portion of the Byzantine Empire from 1345 to 1348 and established the largest Serbian state in Serbian history, which extended from the Sava and Danube Rivers to the Gulf of Corinth and from the Drina River to the Mesta River. At that time the whole of Macedonia was within the borders of the Serbian state (present day Vardar Macedonia, Pirin Macedonia and Aegean Macedonia). The capital of the state continued to

¹⁵⁸ About the Serbian-Bulgarian War of 1885–1886 see, for instance, Јовановић С., *Српско-бугарски рат. Расправа из дипломатске историје*, Београд, 1901, and Миловановић М., *Пловдивски преврат и српско-бугарски рат*, Дело, 1902, књ. XXIV, Београд, pp. 5–21.

be the city of Skopje where three significant political events occurred with reference to Serbian medieval history.



East Balkans and Asia Minor during the realm of Serbian Emperor Dushan the Mighty. He became crowned Emperor in 1346 and died in 1355. During his realm whole portion of historical-geographic Macedonia was a part of Serbian Empire except the city of Salonika and Athos Peninsula

Namely, in Skopje in 1346 the Serbian Patriarchate was proclaimed, the Serbian ruler was crowned emperor and the most important Serbian law-codex (*Душанов законик/Dushan's Codex*) was proclaimed.¹⁵⁹ These facts were crucial ones for future Serbian nationalistic propaganda: Skopje was the capital of the glorious Serbian Empire where the ruler was crowned as emperor and where the supreme state law-codex was proclaimed. Moreover, the most extreme Serbian nationalistic wishes and intentions were based on

¹⁵⁹ Јовић М., Радић К., *Српске земље и владари*, Крушевац: Друштво за неговање историјских и уметничких вредности, 1990, pp. 68–80.

recovering the medieval Serbian empire in which Macedonia would be the geographic, political and cultural center. The extent of such aspirations was exemplified in Belgrade in 1873 with the printing of a historical-ethnological map of all Serbian territories, drawn by Miloš Milojević, in which Macedonia was appropriated to Serbdom. Moreover, the map was followed by united coats of arms of all Serbian lands consisting of 24 heraldic symbols, each one representing one Serbian historic-ethnolinguistic territory in the Balkans. Among these united coats of arms of all Serbia there were heraldic symbols of Albania and Macedonia, as well. Actually, all Yugoslav lands and peoples were presented as Serbian ones.¹⁶⁰ The same ideological principle of combining of historical and ethnolinguistic rights was applied by Serbian historian, ethnologist and geographer, Vladimir Karić¹⁶¹, in his famous book *Serbia. Description of the land and people*, published in Belgrade in 1887. In this book he presented an ethnolinguistic map of Serbdom which included continental Istria, all of Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, more than half of Vojvodina, Serbia within the borders after the Congress of Berlin in 1878, and a major part of Montenegro, half of Kosovo-Metohija and more than half of the Vardar Macedonia as the lands populated exclusively by the ethnic Serbs. However, outermost western part of Macedonia, easternmost Montenegro, southeast Raška/Sandžak, westernmost Metohija, easternmost Albania and westernmost Kosovo were ethnically mixed areas inhabited by both Serbs and Albanians.¹⁶² While the cities and lands around Ulcinj and Scodra/Skadar/Scutari were ethnically mixed, the city of Ohrid (Ochrida) was populated only by Serbs. Present-day Greek (Aegean) Macedonia and the Vidin region in northwest Bulgaria were, according to the author, ethnically mixed territories, too.¹⁶³ In sum, Karić understood all of Štokavian speaking population in the Balkans to be ethnolinguistic Serbs, but differently from Vuk Stefanović Karadžić and Ilija Garašanin, Vladimir Karić included the main portion of Vardar

¹⁶⁰ Milojević M., *Istorisko-etnografskogeoграфска мапа Срба и Српских (југословенских) земаља у Турској и Аустрији*, Београд, 1873.

¹⁶¹ About Karić's work see, Цвијић Ј., *Владимир Карић, и његов географски и национални рад*, Београд, 1929.

¹⁶² Карић В., *Србија. Опис земље, народа и државе*, Београд: Краљевско-српска државна штампарија, 1887, colored map "Карта распрострањења Срба", pp. 240–241.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 240–241.

Macedonia into Serbian ethnolinguistic space. Karić was surely right to claim that 90% of citizens of the Kingdom of Serbia were ethnic Serbs. He also claimed, based on historical sources, that in the distinct past all Slavs - Czechs, Bulgarians, Russians, Poles, Slovaks and Lusatian Serbs (Croats were not considered as a separate ethnicity) – were called Serbs by ancient historians, i.e. that all modern Slavic nations are only Serbian tribes. Finally, he concluded that 1/13 of all Slavs of his day were Serbs while only ¼ (23.6%) of all Serbs (7.256.000 including and all Croats, Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims and Slavs from Montenegro) were living in the independent Kingdom of Serbia.¹⁶⁴ He pointed out that what concerned Albanians in Serbia was that only a few “Arnauts” lived in the region of Toplica without their own villages but living mixed in with the Serbs. They had come to this region (including and Kosovo-Metohija) only in the 18th century after one part of the Serbs emigrated from Toplica, Kosovo-Metohija into the Habsburg Monarchy.¹⁶⁵ In addition, according to the author, there were 30.000 Serbs living in Albania proper, “westward from the River of Black Drim”, and 200.000 of them in western Bulgaria.¹⁶⁶

The area of Macedonia within Serbian national/nationalistic claims based on “historical rights” was understood and woven into the term, “Ancient (Old) Serbia” (*Cmapa Cpбyja*) together with Kosovo-Metohija and Raška/Sandžak. In fact, originally under the term of “Ancient Serbia”, Kosovo-Metohija were understood as the core of the medieval Serbian state with the capital of Prizren and with the headquarters of the Serbian medieval church in Peć (Ipek). In every Serbian plan concerning the national revival and re-establishment of a Serbian state the historical basis of “Ancient Serbia” was always taken into consideration. However, from the mid 19th century it was understood that the term “Ancient Serbia” included the area of Vardar Macedonia as a part of the Serbian medieval state whose re-establishment was the highest demand of Serbian nationalists and their propaganda.

In the Serbian case, the basis of the national struggle for the establishment of a united national state on either a

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., pp. 91–92, 242–243.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 96.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 243.

historic or ethnic rights, or both, was laid down by Ilija Garašanin, Serbia's minister of the interior who wrote "Načertanije" (Draft) in 1844 which was actually at the beginning the secret plan of Serbian foreign policy in the future. Regardless the fact that the term Macedonia purposely was not mentioned in this work¹⁶⁷, Serbian nationalists and designers of national foreign policy understood that it is very possible to conclude that Macedonia was also taken into consideration by Garašanin. At least, they interpreted this work as the message to later generations of Serbian policy-makers that the Serbs should continue the process of creating a great Serbian united national state: the process which started in the Middle Ages and became temporarily interrupted by the Turks after the Kosovo Battle in 1389.

Conclusion

The so-called "Macedonian Question" has been one of the most difficult questions in the Balkans for the last 150 years. The small, landlocked territory of Macedonia in the southern Balkans has been contested by all its four neighbours – Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians and Albanians during and since the demise of the Ottoman Empire up to today.

The "Macedonian Question" (or better to say the "Question of Macedonia") came on the European agenda when the Russian Empire successfully pressured the Ottoman government in Istanbul (Constantinople) into allowing the creation and functioning of a separate and independent (autocephalous) Bulgarian Exarchate (i.e. national Bulgarian Orthodox Church) with authority extending over the biggest part of the Ottoman geographic province of Macedonia. This political decision very quickly involved Bulgarian state in a direct clash both with Greece and Serbia along with Albanian nationalists. However, this was not the real aim designed by St. Petersburg in 1870 and 1878 as what Russia wanted was only to extend her own political-economic influence in the Eastern Balkans through both the Orthodox Church and

¹⁶⁷ It is a wrong interpretation by many of both Yugoslav and Serbian historians that Ilija Garašanin in his *Načertanije* included and Macedonia into united Serbian national state. Macedonia was excluded from this project because Garašanin accepted Vuk Stefanović Karadžić's model of linguistic national determination of the Serbs and other South Slavs. According to this model, only Štokavian speakers were the Serbs. However, Karadžić could not prove that majority of Macedonia's population were the Štokavians (So tirović B. V., *Lingvistički model definisanja srpske nacije Vuka Stefanovića Karadžića i projekat Ilije Garašanina o stvaranju lingvistički određene države Srba*, Vilnius: Vilniaus universiteto leidykla, 2006).

support of the oppressed or newly liberated Balkan Slav nations. Nevertheless, Russian political favouring of Bulgaria naturally started a bitter rivalry between Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Albanians for a national dominance in Macedonia – a rivalry which directed East Balkan nations to the clash between each other during the Second Balkan War in 1913.¹⁶⁸



A flag of the rebels from Macedonia against the Ottoman authorities in 1903. The colours of the flag are of Bulgarian national and state's flag: white-green-red

¹⁶⁸ This article is written as a part of the COST Action IS0803: “Remaking Eastern Borders in Europe: A Network Exploring Social, Moral and Material Relocations of Europe’s Eastern Peripheries”. The research on the topic and writing the text are financed by the COST Action.



Flag of Macedonian rebels in August 1903 against the Ottoman Rule when they succeeded to establish a short-lived „Krushevo Republic“



Flag of the „Krushevo Republic“ (August 3rd–13th, 1903)

5. SHAPING THE BORDERLANDS OF THE *PAX SOVIETICA* COMMONWEALTH IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE: THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE SOVIET UNION DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Introduction

My aim in this paper is to shed a new light on the question of how the configuration of postwar Central and Southeastern Europe was shaped during the Second World War by the USSR through its relations with the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (the CPY). Relationships between the CPY and the Soviet Union in 1941–1945 depended on the concrete military situation in Europe, and on the diplomatic relationships between the Soviet Union and the other members of the Alliance. For that reason, the Soviet Union and the CPY were cooperating in two directions during the Second World War. The concrete military situation in the battleground of the Soviet Union after the outbreak of the “Barbarossa” in June 1941, and, the Soviet political plans after the end of war in terms of the reorganisation of Europe determined their interconnections.

The complexity of relationships between the Soviet Union and the CPY has to be seen through the diplomatic relations between the USSR and the officially Moscow recognised Yugoslav government-in-exile located in London. Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia was divided into two spheres. The first concerned the CPY and the second involved the Yugoslav government in London. Soviet-Yugoslav relations depended primarily on Moscow’s relations with London and Washington, particularly in regard to the question of the opening of a second military front in Europe. During the course of the war, when the opening of a second front in Europe was being debated, the Balkans were mentioned as a likely place, but the arguments in favour were more political than military. For the Soviets, the opening of a second front was to be the prelude to final military operations, during which the strategy for shaping postwar Europe would have to be decided upon. However, for each member of the Alliance it was clear that any hasty step might have caused new rifts among

the allies, especially between London and Moscow. In view of this fact, one can amply understand the complexity of CPY–Soviet relations during the war years.

The CPY-USSR relationships were carried out by *The Executive Committee* of the Comintern. The direct link between the CPY and the Comintern was the secret radioconnection between Josip Broz Tito (appointed by Stalin as General Secretary of the CPY in 1937), and George Dimitrov, the General Secretary of the Comintern. On the other hand, relations between the USSR and the Yugoslav government-in-exile were officially conducted by legations [Popović 1988, 7; Petranović 1992, 622–632].

Relations between the CPY and the Soviet Union during the Second World War developed gradually. They started with the supply of military and medical materials for the Yugoslav People's Liberation Army, led by the Yugoslav communists, and continued in direct military cooperation in 1944–1945. The main purpose of this Soviet support was to ensure the success of the CPY in taking power and introducing socialism in Yugoslavia. The fundamental aim of Moscow's Yugoslav policy, i.e. its support of Tito's partisans and his CPY, was to bring socialist Yugoslavia into the post-war Central-Southeastern European community of *Pax Sovietica* controlled and governed by the USSR. For that reason, although the other members of the Alliance, the USA and the UK, supported both Tito's partisans (communist forces) and Draža Mihailović's četniks (royal forces), the Soviet Union supported only the Yugoslav communists and their People's Liberation Army, especially during the final stage of the war. Even though a second front was not opened in the Balkans, the final operations could not bypass this part of Europe since the local people, particularly from Yugoslavia, had been fighting there from 1941. The Soviet Red Army made



use of the Yugoslav resistance movement under communist leadership and during the last eight months of the war succeeded through military co-operation to put Yugoslavia under its own political protectorate. It should be said that for Moscow, the Yugoslav resistance movement and armed fighting led by Tito had more political than military significance. In a new guise and in new historical circumstances, Central-Southeastern Europe once more found itself directly in the sphere of the conflicting interests of the Great Powers. Throughout the war, the allies clashed in their Central European and Balkan policies and in their attempts to influence the national liberation struggles within this portion of Europe. The members of the Alliance were convinced that they could resolve matters by striking bargains among themselves. The result of this conviction was the division or “tragedy” of Central and Southeastern Europe designed in Teheran and confirmed in Yalta and Potsdam [Kundera 1984, 33–38].

Relations between the CPY and the Soviet Union from 1941 to 1945 are variously explained in Yugoslav and Soviet historiography. In the first, the chief conclusion is that Tito’s partisan movement was independent, in other words, not under the supervision of Moscow. The CPY and its partisans were not a “prolonged hand” of Stalin and they did not pursue the Soviet policy of spreading the socialist revolution around the world. Besides, Yugoslav historiography pointed out that the military help of the USSR given in autumn 1944 to Tito’s partisans was not the decisive factor which crucially helped the CPY to take political power in Yugoslavia. The main proponent of this view is Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) himself, whose war memoirs, published in his *Sabrana djela*, (*All Works*, Belgrade 1979), has the main aim of showing Tito’s independence from Stalin. The best representatives of such an attitude in Yugoslav historiography are: Branko Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije 1918–1988*, (*History of Yugoslavia 1918–1988*) second volume, Belgrade 1988; Miodrag Zečević, *Jugoslavija 1918–1992. Južnoslovenski državni san i java* (*Yugoslavia 1918–1992. South-Slavic state dream and reality*), Belgrade 1993, and Vladimir Velebit, *Sjećanja* (*Memoars*), Zagreb 1983.

As opposed to Yugoslav historiography the most common Soviet and popular version of those relations hold

that the CPY during the whole war strongly depended on Moscow. The actions of Yugoslav communists were directed by Stalin in order to carry out his policy of “world socialist revolution.” According to this historiography, it was only Soviet military help given to Tito in October 1944 which enabled him to win political power over all of Yugoslavia. One of the main defects in both of these historiographies is that they minimised the role of the Yugoslav Royal government-in-exile, and of US and British diplomacy in relations between Tito and the Soviet Union during the Second World War. This defect was only partially overcome in the book: *Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi u drugom svetskom ratu (1941–1945)*, (*Yugoslav-Soviet Relations during the Second World War (1941–1945)*) Belgrade 1988, written by Nikola B. Popović.

In this essay I will undertake an analysis to explore relations between Yugoslav communists and the Soviet Union in the years 1941–1945 setting out three new hypotheses which are based on Yugoslav and Soviet historical sources from the Second World War:

- Firstly, the communist uprising in Yugoslavia in 1941 was ordered by the Comintern and organised in favour of the Soviet Union. This hypothesis derives from the view that Tito was sent from Moscow in 1937 to Yugoslavia as a new General Secretary of the CPY with the purpose of preparing the party for taking power in Yugoslavia with Soviet help. This was to be carried out under the pretext of resisting the occupiers. The actual goal was to carry out Stalin’s policy of spreading Soviet influence in Central-Southeastern Europe under the pretext of “people” (socialist) revolution. The final result of Stalin’s policy was to be the *Pax Sovietica* within the eastern portion of Europe;
- Secondly, Tito’s partisan movement was in fact independent from Moscow far until 1944 as material and military support is pointed. I came to the conclusion that there were two reasons for this: 1) Stalin could not give real military support to Tito before 1944 because of his relations with the UK and the USA and 2) only in 1944 the appropriate transport conditions for Soviet support delivered to

Tito were established. However, as will become evident, Tito was receiving overwhelming material support from Moscow in 1944 and 1945 in what turned out to be the crucial situation of conquering Belgrade in October 1944 and after that to take political power in all of Yugoslavia; and

- Thirdly, the main character and aim of Tito's partisans' fight was a socialist revolution. What I am in effect arguing is that this aim under instructions given from the Comintern was not so publicly propagated by Tito's partisans in order to avoid upsetting Moscow's western allies.

Origin of the Yugoslav uprising and civil war and the Soviet Union

In occupied Yugoslavia (partitioned by Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria and Italy after twelve days of the April War of 1941) popular resistance to the invading forces took the form of an armed uprising. This uprising followed by the Yugoslav civil war initiated early in July 1941 when the Central Committee of the CPY called upon the peoples of Yugoslavia to take up arms, and in the course of that same year the uprising spread to all parts of Yugoslavia, but in the first instance to the parts of the country settled by Serbs. The proclamation of the uprising of all Yugoslav people was populated by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPY on July 4th, 1941, the day after Stalin's speech to the Soviet people on the radio. This proclamation became an inspiration to transform previous sabotage actions to the partisan war against occupiers [Petranović 1988, 78–79; Dedijer 1973, 478]. From that moment the passive conduct of the CPY, influenced by the Ribetrop-Molotov Pact (August 23rd, 1939) was transformed



into a “mobile state”. Considerable territory in western Serbia was liberated. After proclamation of the liberated territory as the Užice Republic, the Supreme Headquarters of the Yugoslav partisans under Tito’s command established itself there.

The CPY had direct radio communication with the Comintern which was facilitated by Josip Kopinič, a very good friend of J. B. Tito. J. Kopinič was sent by the Comintern to Yugoslavia in February 1940 to “carry out a special task” [Tito 1979, t. VII, 41; Petranović 1992; 64, 161, 162, 180]. The headquarters of this radio was located in Zagreb and J. Kopinič was sending his reports to Moscow from there until 1944. Tito started to use this radio from January 1941 in order to inform Moscow personally [Bosić 1972, 167; Tito 1979, t. VII, 48].

This radio was part of a Soviet agency in Yugoslavia which was established in summer 1940. The Soviet military attaché in Yugoslavia set apparatus with a secret code to the correspondent of the *United Press*, Miša Brašić, in June 1941, when the Soviets left Belgrade after the German attack on the USSR.

After the outbreak of Tito’s partisans’ uprising in July 1941 this radio-apparatus was used by the Supreme Headquarters of the partisan units [Popović 1988, 39–40]. Moreover, in the summer of 1941 the CPY maintained connections with Moscow with three independent radio-apparatuses operated by Josip Kopinič in Zagreb, Mustafa Golubić and Miša Brašić in Belgrade. It is generally acknowledged that due to them, the Comintern collected very important information about the political and military situation in Yugoslavia during the critical period of the German attack on the Soviet Union (June–December 1941).

The Soviet Union was the only country which broke off diplomatic relations with the Yugoslav government-in-exile (May 1941). Acting in this way, the USSR recognised *de facto* the occupation and partition of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia by Italy, Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria. However, in July 1941 the Soviet Union restored diplomatic relations with the Yugoslav Royal Government in London. Consequently, it was beneficial for Moscow to have double relations with Yugoslavia: one was public and legal (with the Yugoslav government in London) and the other one was secret and nonofficial (with the CPY as one of sections of the Comintern). Soviet historiography

claimed that the Comintern, as an international organisation, was independent (did not work under orders from the Soviet government). However, Yugoslav historiography disagrees with this opinion. It stresses the fact that the Comintern was located in the Soviet Union which was dominated by Stalin and that the Comintern was an “extended hand” of the official Soviet government. Yugoslav historians have concluded that the policy of the Comintern was precisely the policy of the Soviet government.

Moscow interfered and supported any resistance movement in Europe which could weaken German military pressure on the Eastern front, and bring advantage to the military situation of the Soviet Union. Consequently, the Balkans, Yugoslavia and the CPY, were seriously taken into consideration by Stalin, the Comintern and the Soviet government. The Soviet Union’s policy, based on Stalin’s desires, to destroy the Kingdom of Yugoslavia because being a member of the “Versailles system” Yugoslavia maintained to stop Soviet influence in Europe. Soviet policy towards Yugoslavia was carried out through the Comintern, in fact through the CPY as member of Comintern [Vinaver 1968, 150]. The Comintern required from the other communist parties to undertake all measures necessary in order to weaken the Nazis’ attacks on the Soviet Union. It was implicitly emphasized immediately after the outbreak of “Barbarosa” in June 22nd, 1941 when the Executive Committee of the Comintern sent a message to the Central Committee of the CPY informing it that the defence of the Soviet Union was the responsibility of the other enslaved nations and their leaders – the Communist parties. The Comintern required that during the war any local contradictions and conflicts be postponed and replaced with the fight against fascism [Petranović 1988, 78–79]. This Comintern demand implied that the CPY should temporarily halt the call for class struggle and unite all forces for the fight against Nazism and Fascism [Ostrožinski Pravilnik 1941; Dedijer 1973, 474].

I would argue, on the basis of historical sources, that the uprising in Yugoslavia, organised by the CPY in the summer of 1941, was ordered by the Comintern (the Soviet government behind it) to reduce Nazi military pressure on the Eastern front. This was manifested in a telegram of the Comintern sent to the Central Committee of the Communist

Party of Croatia at the end of July 1941. This telegram answered Kopinič's reports to Moscow about the situation within the Communist Party of Croatia. The Comintern stated that all members of the CPY were obliged to join the army, to defend the Soviet Union if it would be necessary and to give their lives for "the freedom of the Soviet Union". Every member of the party was expected to be a soldier of the Red Army [Popović 1979, 55]. In the Announcement to the Montenegrin people at the end of June 1941 issued by the Provincial Committee of the CPY for Montenegro, Sandžak and Boka Kotorska it was written that "the biggest guarantee for success for national freedom in the fight against the occupiers is the powerful and almighty *Red Army* and the revolutionary forces of the international proletariat..." [Zbornik 1950, 14]. The Comintern, during this period of the war, even required from Yugoslav partisans that they collaborate with Mihailović's royal četnik forces in order to be able to fight the Germans [Zečević 1993, 105]. Thus, Tito attempted to enlist cooperation of the četniks under Colonel (later General) Draža Mihailović who was located in a nearby part of Serbia in joint fighting against the enemy. However, the četniks supported by the Royal Yugoslav government-in-exile in London and the UK firstly provoked and later (in November) openly attacked by Tito's partisans fought back acting against the partisan detachments during the German offensive against the liberated territory in November and December 1941. On this way, Tito's military units started the civil war in Serbia with the final aim to occupy it.

The British strategy concerning Yugoslav affairs (i.e. the civil war) was to give support to that movement that would ensure restoration of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia after the war. The enigma, which liberation movement official London would support, was resolved in the autumn of 1941 when Great Britain was beginning to send military missions to the četnik high command. Not a single British or Soviet mission at that time was sent to the Supreme Headquarters of the partisan detachments [Kardelj 1980, 25–40]. Nevertheless, the British attitude about the Yugoslav civil war (i.e. the struggle between the partisans and the četniks) changed after the Soviet victory over the Germans in the Stalingrad battle early 1943. As it became clear for London that after Stalingrad the Red Army would drive further toward Central Europe and the Balkans,

the British government decided to make direct contacts with Tito in order to increase its own and decrease Soviet influence among Yugoslav partisans. The purpose of this revised British policy in Yugoslavia was not to allow Moscow to establish its full domination over postwar Yugoslavia. Consequently, in April 1943 the first British mission was sent to the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (the NLAY), but afterwards they continued to arrive regularly and included even American military officers. The competition over Yugoslavia among the allies continued in early 1944 when the Soviet Union also sent a military mission to Tito [Kardelj 1980, 50–54].

Moscow and the question of socialist transformation of Yugoslav society

The intention of the Yugoslav communists to achieve a social transformation of Yugoslav society as their final goal in the war in Yugoslavia (1941–1945), was stimulated by Stalin's speech on November 7th, 1941, when he predicted the end of the war the following year. Stalin's statement was instigated by successful Soviet counterattack in the battleground of Moscow.

Tito considered Stalin's speech to be a signal to prepare the CPY for taking power in Yugoslavia before the end of the war. However, Tito's partisans faced defeat by the German Nazis in Western Serbia in December 1941, which postponed achievement of his ultimate political aims in Yugoslavia [Vujović 1967, 79; Petranović 1992, 319–328]. Nevertheless, J. B. Tito always emphasised that the CPY in its struggle for power in Yugoslavia would get support only from Moscow [Tito 1979, t. VIII, 35]. In order to encourage partisan units after their failure with Nazi troops, Tito continued to believe that he would gain a quick victory by the Soviet Union against the Germans. This influenced Tito to rearrange the organisational structure of the Yugoslav Communists and partisan units according to the Soviet model. Partisan units were shaped according to Soviet norms with Soviet symbols and a political-commissar structure. In liberated territory (the Užice Republic in Western Serbia) the People's Liberated Councils were formed on the model of the *soviets* in the USSR [Zbornik 1965, I/20].

Specific features of the war of liberation and the reintegration of Yugoslavia include the fact that the territories liberated by Tito's partisans became established as the communities of a nation at war, which had no direct links with the previous local authorities in the old system of government that had collapsed. The CPY as one of the mobilizing and organising forces for the uprising and war of liberation, adopted the principle of the *soviets* in order to elaborate a strategy for the emancipation and reintegration of Yugoslavia in the course of its liberation. In many parts of Yugoslavia (Montenegro, Slovenia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina) the local committees of national liberation (or national liberation and revolutionary councils) were created on the liberated territories to perform government functions. But, all of them were organised and functioned according to the Soviet model. Consequently, on November 16th, 1941 the Supreme National Liberation



Committee of Serbia was set up on liberated territory of the Užice Republic. Likewise on February 1942 the National Liberation Committee of Montenegro was formed on liberated territory of Montenegro.

Furthermore, the creation of a military unit called "The First Proletarian Brigade" was formed on Stalin's birthday (December 21st) in the Bosnian village of Rudo in 1941. Such actions by Tito were criticised by the Comintern which, orchestrated by the Soviet Union, tried to stop Tito's "socialist revolution" at that moment, since the Soviet government attempted to keep positive diplomatic relations with its western allies. This caused distant relations between the USSR and the CPY for the latter's achievement in "the socialist revolution" in Yugoslavia. The Comintern took all responsibilities to detach Tito's actions from Soviet policy in order not to deteriorate the British and American relations with the Soviet Union. This Comintern position was dispel to disband the suspicions of

Great Britain and the USA about the partisans' socialist revolution and its communist character in Yugoslavia.

Relationships between the Soviet government and the Yugoslav Royal government-in-exile in London, which in the eyes of the allies represented the legal government of Yugoslavia, became seriously complicated in the summer of 1942. The reason for this was the question of the četnik movement in Yugoslavia, led by General Dragoljub Draža Mihailović and officially supported by the Yugoslav government-in-exile. On August 1st, 1942 the Soviet government published the *Resolution*, which was mistakenly represented as written by the "patriots" from Montenegro, Boka Kotorska and Tjentište. This document detailed the "collaboration and treachery" of General Draža Mihailović. For the first time, the Soviet media published such resolution. Previously Soviet newspapers described only the partisans fight and their military successes, but nothing was mentioned about the četniks and their "treacherous activities" [Труд 1942; Большевик 1942; Красная звезда 1942; Правда 1942; Гибианский 1987, 49]. The Yugoslav Royal Government officially protested to the Soviet ambassador in London. This diplomatic protest inspired the Soviet government to write the *Memorandum* handed to S. Simić, the Yugoslav ambassador in Kujbischew on August 3rd, 1942. Presenting this *Memorandum*, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs overtly uttered its opinion that General D. Mihailović had been a collaborator. The *Memorandum* provided the "facts", received from Tito's partisans, about Mihailović's collaboration with the Germans and the Italians in Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro [Krizman 1981, 334–335]. This announcement of the Soviet government indicates the recognition of its relationships with the CPY, on the one hand, and the changing relationships with the Yugoslav Royal government, on the other. The counter-*Memorandum* of the Yugoslav Royal government (August 12th, 1942) explained the četniks' activities against the occupiers and tried to improve the deteriorating diplomatic relations with Moscow [Marjanović 1979, 278]. However, the Soviet government decided to rupture relations with officials of the Royal Yugoslav government-in-exile.

In 1942, J. B. Tito requested permission from the Comintern to discredit publicly the Yugoslav government-in-

exile and its protege in Yugoslavia - General D. Mihailović. Tito's final intention was to receive international support in order to replace Yugoslav Royal government in London as the representative of the Yugoslav people. The leader of the Yugoslav partisans had been waiting the reply from Moscow during the whole of 1942 and 1943. Nevertheless, in the meantime, a favourable moment for public dismissal of General D. Mihailović and his proponents in London did not occur. Ultimately, Tito decided to make use of the meeting of the "big-three" at the Teheran conference for his political aim to present himself and his partisan movement as the real and moral representatives of the Yugoslavs. Tito organized the second session of the Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (the ACNLY) in the Bosnian town Jajce (November 29–30th, 1943), exactly coinciding with the sessions of the Teheran conference. The ACNLY, when it was formed in November 1942 in the Bosnian town of Bihać, did not have any prerogatives of a supreme organ of government because of foreign policy considerations. But, one year later, conditions were changed and the second session of the ACNLY adopted far reaching decisions connected with the establishment of the new (socialist) Yugoslavia. The deputies of the ACNLY decided to create the National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia (the NCLY) which would play the role of new Yugoslav government. At the same time, the ACNLY was transformed into the people's assembly. The return of the Yugoslav king and Royal Karadjordjević family to Yugoslavia was forbidden until the war was over. The question of the political structure of the state (republic or monarchy) was supposed to be discussed after the liberation. The federal structure of the future Yugoslavia was proclaimed in advance. The federal internal structure of Yugoslavia, instead of centralist model, was propagated by Yugoslav communists even before the war broke out. For Yugoslav communists, federalisation of the country was designed from 1937 onward as one of the crucial achievements of socialism. They took the Soviet Union's federal model of internal state organisation as an example for the federal organisation of socialist Yugoslavia [Petranović B., Zečević M. 1991; 45]. For Yugoslav communists, a federal organisation of Yugoslavia was a cornerstone of a new union of liberated nations [Kardelj 1980, 42–43].

While Moscow disapproved the creation of the ACNLY (November 26–27th, 1942) because of possible negative reactions from the Anglo-American side [Dedijer 1980, 352], a convocation and the legislative work of the second session of the ACNLY a year later were supported by Moscow [Popović 1988, 108]. From the very beginning of the war J. B. Tito strongly insisted that the Soviet government would recognise the partisan units in Yugoslavia as the regular army of all Yugoslav nations. In Tito's mind this recognition was supposed to be followed by a Soviet military mission sent to the Supreme Headquarters of the Yugoslav partisans' National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia [Tito 1979, t. XVI, 153]. Tito's main diplomatic goal in the autumn of 1943 was to obtain from Moscow public recognition of the alliance between the Soviet government and the CPY.

To be sure, according to relevant historical sources, Tito utilised the preparation for the Ministerial Conference in Moscow between the USSR, the USA and Great Britain (held from October 19th to October 30th, 1943) to present his war aims in Yugoslavia to the Soviet government. The leader of the Yugoslav partisans sent a message to G. Dimitrov (October 1st, 1943) informing the Soviet government that:

- 1) the Yugoslav National Liberation Movement recognises neither the Yugoslav Royal government in London nor the Yugoslav king because they supported D. Mihailović – “a collaborator and traitor of the Yugoslav nation”;
- 2) the National Liberation Movement would not allow Yugoslav government-in-exile and Yugoslav king to return to Yugoslavia because their arrival in Yugoslavia could give rise to civil war in the country; and
- 3) “the sole legitimate government at the present time is represented by the national liberation committees, headed by the Anti-Fascist Council” [Dedijer 1980, 312].

Tito in the same telegram presented his main revolutionary (socialist) claims to the Comintern as well. The message influenced the Soviet government and during the Moscow Ministerial Conference Soviet foreign minister Molotov demanded from the USA and the UK two approvals:

- 1) to send a Soviet military mission to the Supreme Headquarters of the National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia; and
- 2) to establish military base in the Middle East in order to supply war materials to Tito's partisans [Petranović 1981, 291].

Tito's telegram, sent to Dimitrov, proves for me at last that the Soviet government was well acquainted with the revolutionary aims of the National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia. In the autumn of 1943 Moscow recognised the revolutionary claims of the CPY [Popović 1988, 111] giving Tito a "green light" to prepare the Jajce's session of the ACNLY. I believe after detailed investigation, that the official Soviet government in Moscow was using the Comintern for its political purposes. Because the Comintern did not answer Tito negatively about his intention to hold the ACNLY's session in Jajce with a previously designed schedule of work and prepared decisions, one can only conclude that the Soviet government sustained Tito's intention to change the political system in Yugoslavia by revolutionary means [Tito 1979, t. XVII, 54–70]. For that purpose, regular reports of Soviet officials on this region expressed the view that the CPY appeared like the only political power in this country which was capable of restoring the Yugoslav state. In the backing of this Soviet policy to manipulate the CPY in order to create a new satellite, a socialist Yugoslav state, was the Soviet claim to establish political domination over Central and Southeastern Europe. Socialist Yugoslavia would play a very important role in Stalin's concept of the *Pax Sovietica Commonwealth* as the country connecting Central and Southeastern Europe's territories under Moscow's control and guidance.

There are indications from the sources that Stalin designed for Yugoslavia a leading role among postwar Balkan member-countries of the Soviet commonwealth. Such indications can be found in Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo's memoirs *Borba za Balkan (Struggle over the Balkans)*. Specifically, from March 1943 onwards (i.e. immediately after the Red Army defeated the Germans at Stalingrad) Tempo was working to set up a joint Balkan headquarters to coordinate military operations in the border regions of Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria and Greece against the Germans and Italians. The command of the joint Balkan liberation forces

would be given to the Yugoslav communists, a sign that postwar Yugoslavia would play a chief role among other Balkan members of the *Pax Sovietica Commonwealth*. Tempo was working in haste “especially considering the fact that the landing of allied troops from Africa in the Balkan Peninsula was expected any day, and this would have greatly affected the balance of power in each Balkan country. There was no time for delay!” [Tempo 1981, 80–88]. However, developments did not take the expected course, since Anglo-American forces invaded Sicily and later on southern Italy but not the Balkans. The idea of a Balkan Union under the Soviet supervision seemed to be realized in 1946–1947 when Tito and Dimitrov negotiated upon a Yugoslav-Bulgarian Confederation. At last, the idea turned out to be quite illusory in 1948–1949 with the Tito-Stalin confrontation and the Yugoslav departure from the *Pax Sovietica Commonwealth*.

The Soviet Union increases its domination over the *National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia*

One of the important agreements of “the big three” in Teheran was to give aid to Tito’s NLAY which practically meant that assistance to General Mihailović and his royal četnik movement was ended. The western allies obviously reversed their attitude towards events in Yugoslavia in view of the successes of the NLAY. The British as well were at that time becoming more interested in the liberation movements in other Balkan countries with a view to the opening of a second front. However, agreement on aid to the NLAY became beneficial mostly beneficiary to the Soviets since the Red Army could give this aid faster than the British or Americans. As a result, decisive Soviet influence in Yugoslavia at the last stage of the war was expressed by way of material support for the Yugoslav communists.

Soviet support given to Tito’s combatants had four features:

- 1) war equipment and material;
- 2) medical aid;
- 3) financial support; and
- 4) support for education of officers of the National Liberal Movement of Yugoslavia (the NLMY).

These Soviet provisions had a material and an ideological basis. During the war the NLMY did not have any factories for production of war material at its own disposition. Therefore that the CPY and the Supreme Headquarters of the NLMY applied for material support from the Allies. However, the NLMY could expect this support only from the Soviet government, because the USA and the UK favoured the četniks of General Mihailović until the summer of 1944. The ideological reason stay in the hopes of the Central Committee of the CPY that Moscow is the natural (political and ideological) ally of the Yugoslav communists.

Nevertheless, the first consignments and medical materials were received from the Anglo-American side as part of their anti-Nazi program in June 1943. The Soviet Union delivered its first material support to Tito's NLMY in March



1944 [Milošević 1970, 1]. It came after the visit of a Soviet military mission to the Supreme Headquarters of the NLMY on February 23, 1944 as the Soviet answer to Tito's requests [Arhiv 1944a, 12]. The Soviet government was forced to react to possible Anglo-American power in Balkans immediately, in

order to prepare the soil for its own sphere of influence in Yugoslavia, Central and Southeastern Europe after the war.

A great success of Tito came when the Soviet State Committee of Defence decided on September 7th, 1944 that weapons and equipment for twelve infantry and two air-divisions would be transferred to the NLMY. This military aid was contemplated during the conversation between Tito and Stalin in Moscow from September 21st to 28th, 1944 [Antić, Joksimović, Gutić 1982, 487]. In order to fulfil this decision, the Soviet government organised a military base in Romania (Craiova). The Soviets continue to deliver war material to Yugoslav partisans from Bari and started to do it in autumn 1944 as well from Sofia (with trucks) and Craiova (with aircraft and trains). Some military help came also from the Headquarters of the third Ukrainian front. During October 1944, from all these Soviet military bases, 295,000 tons of war

material were transferred to the NLMY. I claim that this huge Soviet military support, sent to the Yugoslav partisans in October 1944 played a crucial role in the battle for Belgrade (October 18th–20th). After “the Belgrade Operation” and the taking of the Yugoslav capital, and establishment of their own military and political control Tito’s partisans finally won a victory over Mihailović’s četniks. As a result, the Yugoslav civil war was resolved in the Tito’s favour with great Soviet military support. After “the Belgrade Operation” the Soviet government started to send to Tito food shipments ordered by Stalin on November 20th, 1944. The first Soviet food aid, comprising of 50,000 tons of grain, was delivered to Yugoslavia at the begging of December 1944 [*Коммунист* 1979, 80].

According to the Tito-Tolbuhin agreement signed on November 15th, 1944 in Belgrade, the NLMY received two air divisions and one air base with technical equipment, weapons and manpower from the Soviet side. From then until the end of the war, 350 Soviet aircraft were given to the Supreme Headquarters of the NLMY [*Советские* 1960, 49]. It is evident that these air-craft and war materials received from Moscow after the partisans entrance to Belgrade were used by the Yugoslav Army for the purpose of taking control over the whole territory of Yugoslavia as well as for entering Trieste on May 1st, 1945. In April 1945 with Soviet support, forty two storming (IL-2) and eleven hunting (Jak-3) air divisions were formed and included into Yugoslav Army [*Zbornik* 1967, t. X/2, 412]. During 1944 and the first five months of 1945 the total Soviet support for the NLMY (from January 1st, 1945 transformed into the Yugoslav Army) was: 96,515 rifles; 20,528 pistols; 68,423 machine guns and submachine guns; 3,797 anti-tank’s rifles; 3,364 mortars; 170 anti-tank’s guns; 895 field’s guns; 65 tanks; 491 airplanes and 1,329 radio stations [*Strugar* 1969, 311]. After the end of the war all Soviet aircraft from the Bari military base were given to the Yugoslav Army which become the forth largest army in Europe in manpower and military equipment. The total Soviet air support of Tito’s partisans during the whole war came to 491 aircrafts.

Soviet help in training Tito’s army was also important. From autumn 1944 to February 1945, 107 Yugoslav pilots and 1104 technicians were trained in the USSR. In April 1945 3,123 members of Tito’s Yugoslav Army were in Soviet military schools. The total number of Yugoslav pilots and technicians

trained in Soviet schools during the war was 4,516 [Антосяк 1978, 71].

Soviet medical support sent to the NLMY was variegated and voluminous. It comprised medical material, medicaments and hospitals. Soviet doctors gave help to approximately 11,000 soldiers of the NLMY including those soldiers who were hospitalised in Bari [*Советские* 1960, 50; Spasić 1976, 59]. In Yugoslavia seven Soviet mobile and four surgical field hospitals were operating during the whole war [Патников 1974, 105].

The first financial contract between the Yugoslav partisans and the Soviet government was signed in Moscow in May 1944. Stalin allowed financial support of \$10,000,000. In June 1944, Tito's General Velimir Terzić signed a new financial contract, also in Moscow. It was an interest free loan of \$2,000,000 and 1,000 roubles. This financial aid was given by Moscow in order to help the NLMY to develop and organise its own legations, missions and to make a new Yugoslav currency. In December 1944 the Soviet Union delivered three billion new Yugoslav dinar. In January 1st, 1945 the NLMY had \$1,233,480 and 300,000 roubles on its own account in Moscow's "Gosbank" [Arhiv 1944b, 371–375].

The victory of the socialist revolution in Yugoslavia and Moscow

The Second Session of the ACNLY held in the Bosnian town Jajce (November 29th–30th, 1943) showed overtly that socialist transformation of Yugoslav society was the main aim of the CPY and its fight against the occupiers. The conclusions of this session were used by Moscow for its own political purpose in relations with its western allies and the Yugoslav government-in-exile. Moscow refused to sign the Yugoslav-Soviet pact of friendship and co-operation proposed by Yugoslav Prime Minister Božidar Purić on December 22nd, 1943 with the explanation that the Soviet government did not see any possibility for negotiations with the Yugoslav Royal government because of the "totally confused, unclear and unresolved situation in Yugoslavia". However, real reason for such a Soviet attitude toward the Yugoslav government-in-exile was Moscow's intention to recognise Tito's government,

established in Jajce, as the only legal government of Yugoslavia. For the same reason Moscow rejected the British initiative that the USSR and the UK should pursue a common policy toward Yugoslavia. The Soviet government recognised the changes in the political organisation of Yugoslav society in the case of communist victory during the war with a public proclamation of all decisions of the Second Session of the ACNLY via the *Free Yugoslavia* radio station located in Moscow and controlled by the Comintern and the Soviet government. At that time, Ralph Stevenson, the new British ambassador at the Yugoslav court, observed that it was not possible to think that the Soviet government could allow anything to be proclaimed on the radio station *Free Yugoslavia* that was not in accordance with Soviet policy [Tito-Churchill 1981, 67].

British policy toward Yugoslavia during the war was to help the Yugoslav king, Petar II Karadjordjević to return to his country in order to combine the partisan and četnik movement. The leadership of these united forces would be shared between Tito and the king. This was proposed by Churchill in a letter sent to Tito on February 5th, 1944 [Tito-Churchill 1981, 83-84]. This proposal Tito delivered to G. Dimitrov in order to get a piece of advice from Moscow. Tito received Dimitrov's answer on February 8th, 1944 with the Soviet decisions:

- 1) the Yugoslav government-in-exile had to be dismissed together with General Mihailović;

- 2) the Yugoslav government in the country (the National Committee for Liberation of Yugoslavia) should be recognised by the British government and other members of the Alliance as the only Yugoslav government;

- 3) the Yugoslav king had to be subordinated to the laws issued by the ACNLY; and

- 4) cooperation with the king would be possible only if Petar II would recognise all decisions proclaimed by the ACNLY in Jajce [Dželebdžić 1986, t. XV, 449].

The Soviet government recognised the NCLY as the only legal Yugoslav government in May 1944 with the signing of the first financial contract with the NCLY's mission in Moscow. It was the first international contract which was signed between the NCLY and a foreign government. This contract was a result of the new Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia which was quite

different from Moscow's attitude toward the Yugoslav political and military situation at the beginning of the war.

Soviet diplomacy during the autumn and winter of 1941 required that Tito cooperate with Mihailović's četniks. General Mihailović was officially appointed to the position of Minister of Defence by the Yugoslav Royal government in London in the winter of 1941. The reason for this Soviet policy at that time was Moscow's wish to cooperate with the British and the Yugoslav governments in consideration of the difficult position of the Red Army right near the Soviet capital. As the position of the Red Army was much better in the summer and autumn of 1942, Moscow started to change its policy toward Yugoslavia by publishing "information" about collaboration between the četniks and the occupiers in Yugoslavia. This "information" was sent by Tito's partisans to the Comintern. Such kinds of "information" the Soviet government continued to receive from the Supreme Headquarters of partisan units in Yugoslavia and after the abolishment of the Comintern in the summer of 1943. During the whole war the Soviet government was very well informed about the military situation in Yugoslavia, particularly about the balance of power between the two domestic but ideologically and politically antagonistic resistant movements: Mihailović's četniks and Tito's partisans. After the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, when the USSR won two crucial victories in the war and became the supreme partner in relationships with the USA and the UK, Moscow gradually improved its relations with Tito. Officially, Moscow supported the British policy of compromise in Yugoslavia. It was a great encouragement for Churchill to force the Yugoslav government-in-exile to find a *modus vivendi* with Tito, but only under the condition that General Mihailović would be dismissed and that the Yugoslav Royal government would recognise all decisions issued by the ACNLY in Jajce.

The British government was well aware that supporting Tito its relations with the Yugoslav government-in-exile would be deteriorated tremendously. The British vision of the political and military situation in Yugoslavia was expressed in the *Memorandum* from the British Foreign Office submitted by Anthony Eden to the cabinet on June 7th, 1944. In this document Tito was seen as the victor in the Yugoslav civil war but quite surprisingly a leader who would pursue an independent policy after the war! According to the authors of

the *Memorandum* Great Britain should support Tito in order to benefit later from his policy of independence from Stalin. At the same time, the Soviet Union was trying to exploit its ideological bonds with the CPY and its national liberation movement. Surely, in the summer of 1944 London saw in its joint Yugoslav policy with Moscow the best means to reduce Stalin's influence on the Yugoslav partisan leader. This, in my opinion, can be confirmed by the above mentioned British *Memorandum* where full support to the Yugoslav communist-led movement was proposed in order to influence Tito "to follow a line which would suit us, thus taking the wind off the Russian sails". It was necessary if Great Britain was planning to play an active role in Yugoslav (and Greek) internal affairs. The new British policy regarding Yugoslavia was verified by Churchill who proposed to Tito during their meeting in Naples in the summer of the same year that allied (Anglo-American) military forces, in cooperation with the NLAY would enter Istria.

This common Soviet-British policy of compromise in Yugoslavia achieved a full success when the Tito-Šubašić agreement was signed in the island of Vis on June 16th, 1944 which Tito negotiated in the name of the NCLY and Ivan Šubašić in the name of the Yugoslav government-in-exile as its Prime Minister. This agreement was a great victory for Tito's partisans, supported by the Soviet government which announced the conditions of the agreement on radio *Free Yugoslavia*. The "Tito-Šubašić agreement" required:

- 1) federal organisation of the future Yugoslavia;
- 2) recognition of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (led by Tito) by the Yugoslav Royal government;
- 3) that the NCLY and Yugoslav government in London would create a common Yugoslav government;
- 4) all anti-fascist fighting forces in Yugoslavia would be united with the NLAY; and
- 5) that the question of monarchy in Yugoslavia would be re solved after the war [Tito 1977, 114–122; Kardelj 1980, 59–61].

The Tito-Šubašić agreement gave official sanction to the ACNLY's decisions and further consolidated the international position of the NLMY. This agreement was signed in full accordance with Soviet policy and diplomatic tactics. Formally, the Soviet government cooperated with the western members

of the Alliance but in reality Moscow supported Tito in his fight to take a power in Yugoslavia. The Soviet press was overwhelmingly on Tito's side in 1944 and 1945, charging Mihailović's četniks with collaboration. Indirectly, Moscow charged the Yugoslav government-in-exile with the same collaborations with the Germans because General Mihailović was under its protection.

Finally, a turning point in relations between the Soviet government and the CPY occurred in September 1944 when Tito for the first time during the war visited Moscow. In three meetings with Stalin (September 21st-28th) Tito made a deal with the Soviet leader to send the Red Army across the Danube in order to support Tito's partisans to take the Yugoslav capital before Mihailović's četniks would do so [Strugar 1969, 265-268]. Likewise, Soviet troops were allowed to operate against the Germans in a limited part of Yugoslav territory. Officially, the Soviet government asked Tito for permission to cross the Danube and to enter Yugoslav territory. This Soviet "application" was interpreted by the Americans and the British as the Soviet *de facto* recognition the NCLY as the legal Yugoslav government. The NCLY's prohibition of the British navy to use Yugoslav sea ports became a part of the Tito-Stalin agreement. With full Soviet military support Tito's partisans conquered Belgrade on October 20th, 1944. The Yugoslav Royal government and its exponent in the country, General D. Mihailović lost the civil war against Tito. To conclude, the socialist revolution in Yugoslavia achieved a victory through extensive coordination between Tito's communists and the Soviet government.

British diplomacy tried at the last moment to save what could be saved in the Balkans by direct negotiations with the Soviet government. For that purpose, the British Premier went to Moscow in October 1944 and had a meeting with the Soviet leader. On this occasion Stalin and Churchill decided on a division of spheres of interests (in percentage) in Southeastern Europe: in Yugoslavia and Hungary 50:50, in Rumania 90 for the Soviets, in Bulgaria 75 for the Soviets and finally in Greece 90 for Great Britain. Without any doubt an important consideration for London in granting such concessions to Moscow was the Soviet penetration into the eastern portion of the Balkans and the real possibility that the Red Army would move rapidly into Central Europe. Thus the question of

Yugoslavia became once again very important in the minds of the creators of the postwar division of spheres of influence. At first sight it looked like Churchill lost the battle over Yugoslavia with Stalin as immediately after the war Tito followed Stalin's policy of incorporation of the new Yugoslavia into the Soviet block. Even in March 1945 Churchill complained in vain to Stalin that Marshal Tito had taken power in Yugoslavia completely, and a little bit later, that Great Britain's influence in Yugoslav affairs was reduced to less than 10 percent. However, it turned out in 1948–1949, that Tito's Yugoslavia left Stalin's community of people's democratic countries and continued its existence with substantial western help to get out of the borderlands of the *Pax Sovietica Commonwealth* [Tito 1977, 13].

Conclusion

The Soviet Union had two types of relations with Yugoslavia during the Second World War. The first type was relations with Yugoslav Royal government, which was in exile and located in London. This type of relations was official set up on diplomatic level and carried out through legislation. The other type was relations with the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and its the National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia. These relations were a secret and illegal carried out at the beginning by radio-apparatus and later by military missions.

The radio-connections between the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Soviet government were carried out through the Comintern until its abolishment at the summer 1943 and after that personally with G. Dimitrov. These relations were various but the most important was the Soviet material support given to the National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia. The turning point in these relations occurred in September 1944 when Tito made a deal with Stalin in Moscow about real military support by the Red Army in order to help Yugoslav partisans to take power in the country.

Approaching the question of the social revolution in Yugoslavia the Soviet government had a double attitude. During the first half of the war (till summer 1943) Moscow

mainly supported the British position that in Yugoslavia should be united both of resistant movements (J. B. Tito's and General D. Mihailović's) into one anti-fascist alliance. During this period the Comintern required from Supreme Headquarters of the NLMY to give up socialist propaganda and revolutionary way of taking power. After the great victories of the Red Army (Stalingrad and Kursk battles) behaviour of the Soviet government was radically changed. From autumn 1943 Moscow supported the new (communist) government in Yugoslavia pointed his "Yugoslav" policy toward revolutionary (socialist) changes in the country. Evidently, Yugoslav partisan resistance movement and the spread of the liberation war in Yugoslavia by Tito's NLMY were factors which in the eyes of Stalin, the Comintern and Soviet government should have fitted in their own objectives, mainly in a political rather than in a military respect. In the other words, Tito's military efforts were used by Moscow for Soviet political effect, for which they were often manipulated. The roots of this Moscow policy in Central-Southeastern Europe run deep, to the established Soviet foreign policy in the 1920s, implemented by the Comintern in the 1930s. This Soviet policy of domination should ensure the obedience of the communist parties in other countries and more important to exert direct Soviet influence over foreign and domestic affairs of those countries under the communist leadership by their incorporation into Moscow political system of *Pax Sovietica Commonwealth*. According to Stalin's conception of postwar Europe, Yugoslavia should become one link of Soviet chain composed by Central-Southeast European socialist countries.

Četnik movement, led by General Dragoljub Draža Mihailović, was the main discord in relationships between the Soviet government and the Yugoslav government-in-exile supported by the British government. In this relations distinctive turning point occurred in December 1942 when Moscow overtly required from London to influence Yugoslav Royal government to change its policy toward četnik movement.

The crucial support which during the whole war the CPY got from outside of Yugoslavia was that received from Moscow what was the principal reason that Yugoslav civil war was resolved in the favour of Tito's Yugoslav communists. Finally, such Moscow policy towards Tito's partisans ultimately benefited the USSR with fixing Central-Southeastern European borderlands of *Pax Sovietica* on the eastern littoral of Adriatic and eastern Alps. Consequently, "the bridge" connecting Europe and Asia became immediately after the Second World War divided between "Eastern" and "Western" political-military blocks since the major portion of the Balkans and Southeastern Europe left under Soviet control while Asia Minor and Greece were dominated by the western alliance.



Furthermore, historical Central Europe was as well divided between the Soviets and the Westerners on East Central Europe and West Central Europe. At last, political-military-economic division of Europe on *Pax Sovietica* and *Pax Occidentonica* was sanctioned by "big

three" on Yalta and Potsdam conferences in 1945. To make a final conclusion, during the Second World War the allied plans were not so much concerned with the contribution made by resistance movements to the overall war effort as with the political importance such movements might acquire, to the detriment of the interests of some of the Great Powers and their agreements. The fighting for liberation of Yugoslav people 1941–1945 and the politics of the allies, especially of the USSR, regarding it serve as a good illustration of the above.

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
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A front page of the U.S. TIME from 1942. The issue is devoted to the Ravna Gora Movement led by general Dragoljub Draža Mihailović



Division of the territory of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia after its occupation in the spring of 1941 after the “April War”. The largest part of it was given to the Independent State of Croatia composed by Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Srem and southern Dalmatia.

Central Serbia with Banat and northern Kosovo was under German occupation. Biggest part of Kosovo, Metohija, western Macedonia and eastern Montenegro were incorporated into the Greater Albania. Central and eastern Macedonia and south-east Serbia were under Bulgarian occupation. Northern Slovenia was incorporated into the Third Reich while southern Slovenia and biggest part of Dalmatia were under Italian rule. Montenegro with whole Sanjak was proclaimed as independent state under Italian domination. The central province of Vojvodina – Bachka was given to Hungary. After Italian capitulation in September 1943 the territory of Independent State of Croatia became enlarged with Istria and the rest of Dalmatia



Za govornicom Prvog kongresa USAOJ-a; Bihać, 27. decembar 1942. g.

At the platform of the First Congress of USAOJ, Bihać, 27th December 1942.

На трибуне Первого съезда ОСАМЮ; Бихач, 27 декабря 1942 г.

Austro-Hungarian sub-officer (kaplar, like Adolf Hitler) from the WWI and later in 1943 self-proclaimed “marshall”, Josip Broz Tito (Roman Catholic half Croat and half Slovene) at the platform of the First Congress of USAOJ in Bihać in Bosnia on December 27th, 1942. As it is seen on the wall-map, Tito’s partisan’s the so-called “liberated territory” was almost only within the Independent State of Croatia as a result of direct collaboration between Communist Party of Yugoslavia and Croat nazi regime (ustashi) in Zagreb. Eastward from Drina River the communists and their partisan military detachments did not have any significant support by the local population. Serbia became in October 1944 in fact occupied by Tito’s partisans who came from the territory of Independent State of Croatia



Photo of the evidence of direct collaboration between nazi Croat party-military detachments (ustashi) and Yugoslav partisans organized and led by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The photo is made on the territory of the Independent State of Croatia eastward from the Drina River



Kosovo Albanian nazi SS Division "Skenderbeg"



President of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in London in 1948. Tito was brought to power in Yugoslavia due to the Soviet and British diplomatic and military help. Churchill and Tito made a deal in summer 1944 in Neaple in Italy upon communist taking power in Yugoslavia. In Churchill vision Tito had to play a role of the “Trojan horse” within the Soviet block. This Tito’s duty was maintained till June 28th, 1948 when Stalin excluded Tito’s Yugoslavia from the block of the communist states. After 1948 Tito’s Yugoslavia became a typical western client state

6. DISINTEGRATION OF EX-SERBO-CROAT LANGUAGE: BOSNIAK IDENTITY AND BOSNIAN LANGUAGE

Annotation: *This research paper is a part of a wider study upon the reasons and the stream of the dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia (Владислав Б. Сотировић, Социолингвистички аспект распада Југославије и српско национално питање, Нови Сад-Србије: Добрица књига, 2007). The research started in 1995 using different archival sources and material as well as scientific literature in Yugoslav and international archives and libraries. This article is a contribution to better understanding the process of dissolution and destruction of the former Yugoslav (con)federation from sociolinguistic and politolinguistic points of view.*

Keywords: *Balkans, ex-Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbo-Croat language, Bosnian language, Bosniak identity, sociolinguistics*

Introduction

The research object of the paper is to examine the process of making separate (from Serbian, Croatian and Montenegrin) Bosniak (Bosniac, Boshnjak) ethnonational identity by using the technique of “linguistic engineering/chirurgic” in the process of creation of an independent (from Serbian/Montenegrin and Croatian) Bosnian Language as a national language of Bosnian-Herzegovinian South Slavic Muslims (former speakers of common Serbo-Croat language).¹⁶⁹ The final aim of the paper is to discover and present the ways in which various elements of linguistic diversity within former Serbo-Croat language have been “emblemized” and taken as markers of ethnonational and political identity of Muslim Bosniaks in multicultural/multiconfessional Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1993, when official Bosniak ethnonational identity was introduced, up today. The main scientific research methods

¹⁶⁹ This paper is a part of the COST Action IS0803 research project: „Remaking Eastern Borders in Europe: A Network Exploring Social, Moral and Material Relocations of Europe's Eastern Peripheries“.

applied are the method of text analyze and the method of comparison of different archival sources and scientific literature.

Linguistic situation at the Balkans and ex-Yugoslavia

From linguistic point of view, the Balkans (or in more modern expression the South East Europe), appears to be both very fragmented and united. Surely, it is a meeting ground between language families. The Slavonic languages of Bulgarian, Macedonian, Croatian, Serbian, Montenegrin, Slovenian and Bosnian are similar (in some cases the same) and linguistically can be treated as a single language, like the disparate dialects that were forged into what is today standardized German and English language in the public use. Historically, it did not happen for the sake that Balkan Slavs went to separate state formations that prevented creation of a single South Slavic ("Yugoslav") standardized language (Barbour, Carmichael, 2000: 223). The only success was proclamation of "Serbo-Croat" standardized language in both first Yugoslavias (1919–1941/1954–1990) that was at the same time and a native spoken language of four (out of six) officially recognized *nations* in J. B. Tito's Yugoslavia: Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins and Muslims (today Bosniaks).¹⁷⁰ Slovenes and Macedonians have been officially speaking separate languages. At any case, the common Serbo-Croat language was in fact the Shtokavian (Štokavian/štokavski) dialect that is unquestionably up today mother tongue of these four nations regardless how officially it is named after the collapse of ex-Yugoslav (con)federation in 1991.

¹⁷⁰ In the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918–1929) and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1929–1941) it was even *Serbo-Croato-Slovenian* language as official one, but in the practice it was split into *Slovenian* and *Serbo-Croat*. Spoken Serbo-Croat was more uniformed in 1991 than in 1918 or 1945. Nevertheless, the Serbo-Croat became the basis of current Serbian, Montenegrin, Croatian and Bosnian language(s). According to Croatian philologist Sito Sučić, the lexical variation between these languages is 3–7% (Sučić, 1996: 13). They are mutually comprehensible, and, what is very important, dialect frontiers cut across state boundaries. The practice proved that it is possible that one "nation" (Croat) can have several (three) linguistic spirits (Shtokavian, Chakavian, Kajkavian), that one sub-dialect can be shared by several "nations" (Ijekavian by Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins and Bosniaks), that one "nation" (Serbs) can have standardized two sub-dialects for their literal language (Ekavian and Ijekavian), and that in one state (Bosnia-Herzegovina) is possible that the same spoken language (ex-Serbo-Croat) is standardized into three separate "national" languages (Serbian, Croatian and Bosniak).



Map of ex-“Serbo-Croat” language area on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia with the dialects. This language, today broken into four separate languages, encompasses a wide territory from Macedonia to Slovenia including whole Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and biggest part of Croatia. Ex “Serbo-Croat” language was a native one for 75% of Yugoslavia’s citizens and relative to the neighbouring “Macedonian” and “Slovenian”. At the time of the royal Yugoslavia (1918–1941) officially it existed one language under the name “Serbo-Croato-Slovenian” following the ideology of “integral Yugoslavism” that Serbs, Croats and Slovenes are one ethnolinguistic nation/people divided into three regional/historical “tribal” groups

Even if we can refer in the Balkan case to detached languages from different language groups, the popular speeches of the Balkan inhabitants have experienced a great deal of admixture during the past times and due to the migrations (Ивић, 1991: 239–269; Pinson, 1996: 14, 60, 81, 132; Donia, Fine, 1994: 37–38, 73). Many scholars are inclined to define the Balkans in terms of one or more the so-called “linguistic community”.¹⁷¹ Surely, today all “independent” South Slavic languages are belonging to one linguistic community by both linguistic criteria (grammar, morphology, phraseology, lexicon, syntax, orthography) and the level of understanding.¹⁷² The characteristic use of the infinitive verb is often given as an example of a “linguistic community” phenomenon in the Balkan Peninsula. It is clear that Balkan peoples greatly influenced each other’s languages.¹⁷³

The present day Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is divided between the Croatian-Bosniak Federation (51%), which is covering the south-western area, and the Serb Republic (49%), administering the north-eastern provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Dayton-Paris peace settlement in the fall of 1995 does not recognize the former pre-war ethnic composition according to the census of 1991. The language of the Serb Republic (*Republika Srpska*) is from 1996 defined as *Serbian*, whereas within the *Federation* (composed by Bosniak and Croatian parts) the “Croatian” and “Bosnian” are spoken and used in the public life. The practice shows that till the late 1980s mainly it was very difficult to recognize linguistic differences between those three ethnoreligious groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, the 1980s experienced a deeper sociolinguistic practice of making more independent republican and ethnoconfessional republican linguistic differences, which finally destroyed the *Novi Sad Agreement* of 1954 according to which, a single *Serbo-Croat* language was promoted with two regional variants – *Eastern* and *Western* (Greenberg, 1996:

¹⁷¹ For instance, “The language of the Croats is the Sclavonick somewhat corrupted, but there is very little difference between them. The great extent of this language is something surprising. For it is talked not only here but likewise in Bosnia, Servia, Albania, Dalmatia, Moldavia, Wallachia, Bulgaria, in great parts of Hungary, Bohemia, Poland, Russia and (if one may believe travelers) in Tartary, and almost as far as China: and all these different countries have only so many different idioms of the original language” (“Letter of May 31st, 1737”).

¹⁷² Level of understanding between remote South Slavic provinces is much higher in comparison with the German speaking remote areas.

¹⁷³ See for instance: (Hendriks, 1976).

393–415).¹⁷⁴ However, as a result of sociolinguistic policy of differentiating dialects from each other, at the census of 1991 overwhelming majority of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims accepted *Bosanski* (Bosnian) as their native speech, but only after decisive advice by the leading Muslim local Party of Democratic Action which fought for the political independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Sučić, 1996: 10–16).

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosnian language and Bosniak national identity

The relationship between language, nation and state is a part of an ideological composition either in Bosnia-Herzegovina or in the rest of the Balkans (similarly to majority of European regions). Bosnia-Herzegovina is a Balkan historical province where the consequences of the clash between national ideologies, which are both domestically rooted and imported from outside with more or less autonomous currents of thinking and behaviour, have been deep and extreme. Imported ideology of the 19th century German Romanticism of linguistically rooted ethnonational identity and solving the national-state problem (“Eine sprache, ein folk, ein staat”) is fused with more autonomous currents that were heavily imbued with “bloody memories” from the WWII and resulted in what is labelled to be “post-Communist nationalism”. Such amalgamation became a basis for creation of increasingly homogeneous states with rejuvenation of inter-ethnic intolerance in the most extreme meaning [see: (Sotirović 2005: 85–108)]. The land of Bosnia-Herzegovina is probably the best Balkan example of a crucial interface between language and nationalism. For the purpose that they are separate nations all three major ethnoconfessional players in Bosnia-Herzegovina legally proclaimed their own national languages to be disconnected with ex-Serbo-Croat one. That was of especial importance to the Muslims/Bosniaks as without “evidence” that their native language is different from Serbian and Croatian they will hardly convince international community that they are not originally Serbs or Croats what was of a

¹⁷⁴ The text of the 1954 Agreement states that “the national language of the Serbs, Croats and Montenegrins is a single language”. The Muslims/Bosniaks are still not mentioned as a separate nation as they have been considered at that time only as a confessional ethnicity.

crucial justification of their claims to live in internationally independent “national” state organization.¹⁷⁵

The *Bosnian* language (de facto of only Muslim Bosniaks), as a separate (South) Slavic one, was officially inaugurated in 1996 by publishing the book: S. Halilović, *Pravopis bosanskog jezika (Orthography of Bosnian Language)* in the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina – Sarajevo. According to the *Orthography...* (and other similar publications), Bosnian language is different in comparison with “relative” Serbian and Croatian because of the following main reasons:

- The use of phoneme “h” in certain words differently from Serbian, Croatian and Montenegrin. For instance, the word “coffee” is written and pronounced in these languages as: in Bosnian: *kahva*; Serbian/Montenegrin: *кафа/kafa*; Croatian: *kava*; in Bosnian *hudovica* (widow), in Serbian/Croatian *udovica*, etc.¹⁷⁶

- Greater use of “Turkish” words (i.e. of Oriental origin) like *ahbab* (friend); *amidža* (uncle); *adet* (custom/habit), *akšam* (twilight), etc. (all of these words are known in Serbian, Montenegrin and Croatian languages but not used regularly as they are replaced by the Slavic words).¹⁷⁷

- Using of only one form of the Future tense: “ja ću kupiti/kupit ću” (I will buy) that is used in standard Croatian as well, but no use of forms “купићу/ја ћу да купим” as in standard Serbian/Montenegrin.¹⁷⁸

- The use of Ijekavian sub-dialect of the Shtokavian dialect but not the Ekavian one of the same dialect.¹⁷⁹ However, Ijekavian sub-dialect is used in spoken and standard language by all Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks westward from Drina River (historically and politically separating Serbia from Bosnia-Herzegovina) and by Serbs in Western Serbia and by all Slavs in Montenegro.


¹⁷⁵ An extra ordinary feature of Bosnia-Herzegovina is that it covers the fault lines between three major confessions: Roman Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Islam. From this point of view, local nationalism(s) are not only ethnic; they are even more confessional ones.

¹⁷⁶ For instance: (Isaković, 1993: 6).

¹⁷⁷ “Lexical differences have been a primary criterion for the establishment of a separate Bosnian language” (Greenberg, 1998: 717).

¹⁷⁸ However, both Serbs from Eastern Herzegovina (regularly) and Western Serbia (in many cases) are using future tense construction “ja ću kupiti/kupit ću” like in standard Bosnian and Croatian.

¹⁷⁹ Former Serbo-Croat language was composed by (officially) three dialects: Chakavian, Kajkavian and Shtokavian. The last one became standardized literal language for Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins and Muslims/Bosniaks. Shtokavian dialect was/is subdivided into three sub-dialects: Ijekavian (*mlijeko* = milk), Ikavian (*mliko*) and Ekavian (*mleko*). Ikavian is not standardized.



Ethnolinguistic map of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1994 (before the civil war of 1991–1995 was over). No one ethnolinguistic group had an absolute majority of population

Nominally, Bosnian language is written by both Latin and Cyrillic scripts. However, in practice it is done only by Latin (like Croatian) for the purpose to break any link with the Serbs for whom the Cyrillic script is (by language law) the first, while Latin is the second national alphabet.¹⁸⁰ It has to be emphasised that Croatian, Bosnian, Montenegrin and Serbian Latin script is absolutely the same one. In historical context, the native language of the inhabitants of Bosnia-

¹⁸⁰ Similar policy of using alphabet in *Bosnian* language was pursued by Austro-Hungarian authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1878–1918 (Танасић, 2000: 1167; Bugarski, 1997: 35).

Herzegovina (claimed to be *Bosnian* one) was written by three alphabets: “latinica” (Latin), “bosančica/bosanica” (Cyrillic) and “arabica” (Arabic). However, what concerns “bosančica”, it is not recognized the fact that this script came to mediaeval Bosnia-Herzegovina from Serbia and during the Ottoman rule it was known within the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslim feudal circles as “Old Serbia” up to the mid-19th c.¹⁸¹ At the same time Croatian philology claims that “bosančica” is Croatian national Cyrillic script.¹⁸² By “arabica”, undoubtedly, it was written one of the most beautiful profane lyric, religious and fine literature – “književnost adžamijska”.¹⁸³

Regardless on official domestic and international recognition of separate Bosnian language from the neighbouring ones, linguistically speaking, grammar and orthography of Serbian, Montenegrin, Croatian and Bosnian languages are the same what means that linguistic structure of them is not differentiating.¹⁸⁴ It shows that all four of them have the same origin, process of development and linguistic essence. Even the fact that there are 8% of lexical differences between them does not make any practical obstacles for inter-understanding in everyday life.

The common link that is connecting in practice and even in literature Bosnian with neighbouring Croatian, Serbian, Macedonian and Montenegrin languages are c. 3000 Oriental words (“turcizmi”). For many of them there is no domestic Slavic alternative.¹⁸⁵

One of the main problematic issues concerning ethno-linguistic-statehood reality of Bosniaks is the fact that their ethnic, language and state names are not having the same terminology as it is championed by majority of European nations (ex. Polish nation; Polish state; Polish language, etc.).

¹⁸¹ Upon Serbian claims see: (Буковић, Костић, 1999: 21–56).

¹⁸² Upon Croatian claims see: (Moguš, 1995: 27, 53).

¹⁸³ Besides these mentioned, historically, on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina have been used and Glagolitic and Greek scripts.

¹⁸⁴ According to the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina official languages are: Bosnian, Serbian and Croatian. Such constitutional-linguistic situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is quite similar to the Swiss one – Italian, French and German (plus Romansh, spoken by very small community).

¹⁸⁵ During the Bosnian-Herzegovinian civil war of 1992–1995 Bosnian-Herzegovinian Serbs tried unsuccessfully to purify their language by elimination of the “Turkish” words. However, in many cases it was impossible without creation of new neologisms (ex: *čarape*=socks, *šećer*=sugar, *pamuk*=cotton, etc.). It is interesting that common nickname for Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims given by the local Christians, but also and as a group name used by Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims to identify themselves, was *Turci* (the Turks). The Bosnian-Herzegovinian Christians used and the term *poturice* (those who became the Turks, i.e. convertors). The Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims, on the other hand, called the real ethnolinguistic Turks (Turkish language speakers) from Anatolia as *Turkuše* or *Turjaši*.

In other words, their ethnonational name – “Bosniaks” does not correspond to the name of their national state – “Bosnia-Herzegovina” and both do not correspond to their national language name – “Bosnian”. In this context, we can wonder, for instance, which language speak population in Herzegovina or why Bosniaks does not speak Bosniak language but Bosnian one? On this place it has to be said that originally from 1991 up to 1996 Bosniaks pretended to officially speak Bosniak language (but never tried to rename Bosnia-Herzegovina into “Bosniakia”). Such practice was even internationally sanctioned by the Dayton Peace Treaty in November 1995 when the text of the agreement was signed in four languages: English, Croatian, Serbian and Bosniak (not Bosnian!) (Wyn, 1997: 98). However, very soon the ideologists of Bosniak ethnonational identity understood that international science of Slavonic philology is very suspicious upon the use of *Bosniak* language as it is not at all rooted in the historical sources in which from the year 1300 up to 1918 is mentioned only *Bosnian* language (in fact as a provincial language spoken by the Orthodox, Catholic and from 1463 Muslim communities).¹⁸⁶ Elevation of Bosnian language, as a mother tongue of all inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina was especially promoted at the time of Austro-Hungarian administration in this province from 1878 to 1918.¹⁸⁷ However, such solution was decisively rejected by Serbs and Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina who called their languages after their ethnic names. Thus, the idea of Bosnian language at that time (as today as well) was accepted only by local Islamic inhabitants.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁶ In historical sources the name *Bosanski jezik* (Bosnian language) is mentioned for the first time in the year of 1300 (“Historijat jezika i države” in <http://www.bosnianlanguage.com>). It is true that the earliest Slavonic philologists like P. J. Šafařík, J. Dobrovský and J. Kopitar used the term *Bosnian* language but only as provincial speech of all inhabitants of the Ottoman *Pashaluk of Bosnia* but not as a language of *Bosnians* in ethnic term (Милосављевић, 2000: 67–68).

¹⁸⁷ For instance, according to the decree of 1880 for Austro-Hungarian administration in Bosnia-Herzegovina existed only *Bosniaks* who are by confession divided into those of Muslim, Catholic and Orthodox denominations: “Vlada u odnosu na domaće stanovništvo u Bosni i Hercegovini zna samo za Bošnjake koji se po vjeri dijele na muslimane, istočno-pravoslavne i katoličke hrišćane” (*Arhiv Bosne i Hercegovine*, 1880). In general, Austro-Hungarian administration in Bosnia-Herzegovina very much favored local Roman Catholic and Muslim inhabitants at the expense of the Orthodox (Екмечић, 2010: 293–294).

¹⁸⁸ It has to be emphasized that even before Austro-Hungarian administration in Bosnia-Herzegovina the local population used the terms *Bosnian* (“bosanski”) for the language and *Bosnians* (“Bosanci”) for themselves as inhabitants of this province alongside with more pure ethnic names *Serbian/Serbs* and *Croatian/Croats* (Okuka, 1998: 47).

Nevertheless, the Austro-Hungarian policy of Bosnian language as a native one of all inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina is accepted today in a full extend by the main advocators of Bosnian language as a mothertongue of Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks from Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the Bosniaks from Sandžak area (*Pauka* in Serbian language and historiography). The last one was devided after 1913 between Serbia and Montenegro but before 1878/1908 being a part of Ottoman province (pashaluk in Serbo-Croat) of *Bosnia* (not of Bosnia-Herzegovina!) which existed from 1580 to 1878/1908.¹⁸⁹ There is also and unproved claim (in the sources) that even before Slavic settlement at Bosnia-Herzegovina (the 7th c.) existed such name for whole Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The truth is that in the 15th and the 16th centuries “Bosnian” (or “Serbo-Croat” or “Serbian” or “Croat”) language was second diplomatic and official language at the court in Istanbul (after the Turkish one) due to the fact that at that time there were many highest Ottoman officials and the Janissaries¹⁹⁰ in Istanbul (including and Grand Vizirs) originating from Bosnia-Herzegovina (Božić et al. 1973: 141). However, this fact became a basis for the claims that exactly *Bosnian* language was at that time some kind of Balkan *lingua franca* and even one of the most diplomatic languages in Europe. Nevertheless, the sources are telling us that in the most cases the local South Slavic population of ex-Serbo-Croat language (especially those from Dubrovnik) have been calling their language as “our language”, “Slavic language”, “Illyrian language”, etc., but only in very rear cases by ethnic names.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁹ Ottoman *Pashaluk of Bosnia* before 1683 encompasses and parts of historical territories of Croatia and Dalmatia.

¹⁹⁰ Vinko Pribojević, a Dominican friar from the island of Hvar in Dalmatia in his *De origine successibusque Slavorum* (Venice, 1532) pointed out that Ottoman sultans appointed many South Slavs as the commanders of his army and that 20.000 of his guard (the Janissaries) are recruited among the Thracians, Macedonians and Illyrians (for Pribojević all of them have been South Slavs – aboriginal Balkan people, speaking one language that was later on called “Serbo-Croat”). With the help of them the Ottomans subjugated many states and peoples in Europe.

¹⁹¹ Mavro Orbini, a Benedictine abbot from Dubrovnik, in his famous pan-Slavic book (“the Bible of pan-Slavism”) *De regno Sclavorum* (in Italian version *Il regno degli Slavi*), printed in Pesaro in 1601, was very clear telling that all South Slavs are speaking the same language and composing one nation within a wider network of united ethnolinguistic Slavdom (Орбини, 1968). More precisely, he inclined to call all speakers of ex-Serbo-Croat language of Shtokavian dialect as the *Serbs* (Радјочић, 1950). However, a Croatian nobleman of German origin from Senj, Pavao Ritter Vitezović (1652–1713) in his political-ideological-programmatic book *Croatia rediviva: Regnante Leopoldo Magno Caesare*, Zagreb, 1700 claimed that all Slavs, including and those in the Balkans, originated from the *Croats* and speaking in the essence Croatian language with regional dialects (Vitezović, 1997). About Vitezović see in: (Sotirović, 2003: 150–189). The

The creators and promoters of modern idea of separate Bosnian language from the relative neighbouring ones, in order to prove their standpoint, implied the technique of



Division of Bosnia-Herzegovina according to the Dayton Peace Agreement in November 1995: “Republic of Srpska” (eastern and – northern territories, 49% of the B-H land) and “Bosniak-Croat Federation” cantonized into 10 cantons (central and western territories, 51% of B-H land). Differently to the case of the “Bosniak-Croat Federation”, the “Republic of Srpska” is not cantonized. The Dayton Accord was written and signed into four languages: English, Serbian, Croatian and “Bosniak”

essence of both Orbini’s and Ritter’s (likewise Pribojević’s) writings is that all South Slavs (especially the Shtokavians) are composing one ehnolinguistic group (in modern sense - *nation*).

“linguistic engineering”, similar to their Croatian colleagues concerning Croatian language.¹⁹² In both cases, it was and is done for the very purpose to prove that their ethnic groups are linguistically independent what has to give them a right to call themselves as a separate *nations* who is justifiably struggling for their own independent political entities which has to be internationally recognized as independent national states according to the rights to self-determination. However, differently to Croatian case, Bosnian “linguistic engineering” is not based on introduction of neologisms¹⁹³ but rather on re-introduction of the Oriental words which have been brought to the Balkans by the Ottoman authorities (those words are of Turkish, Arab and Persian origin).

Findings and conclusions

In conclusion, we can say that the problem of official recognition of a separate Bosnian language of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Bosniaks can be solved taking into consideration two standpoints:

- ♦ Linguistic standpoint; and
- ♦ Socio/polito-linguistic standpoint.

De facto (linguistically), Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian and Montenegrin languages are still belonging to one standard-linguistic system. They express unity in orthography, grammar, morphology, syntax, phonology and semantics. For instance, all of them have 30 phonemes (25 consonants and 5 vocals). Between them there are only app. 8% lexical differences (including and “neologisms”). However, there is a tendency to create lexical differences for the sake of lesser inter-understanding in order to firmly justify ethno-linguistic and state-political “independence” from, in fact the same, ethno-linguistic neighbours. The obvious fact is that the level

¹⁹² “Linguistic engineering” of Croatian language can be followed even from 1967 when a majority of the most important Croatian scientific, literal and cultural institutions signed a *Declaration upon the name and position of Croatian literal language* (“Deklaracija o nazivu i položaju hrvatskog književnog jezika”) requiring to be officially separated from Serbian one and purified from the so-called “srbizmi” (the words of a Serbian origin).

¹⁹³ Croatian neologisms in fact have to replace both the international words (not translated in Serbian) and common Croato-Serbian words in order to make a deeper distance between Croatian and Serbian languages for the sake of lesser understanding as a crucial proof that these two languages and ethnic groups are separated. For instance: *korjenoslovstvo* (etymology), *narječoslovstvo* (dialectology), *točnozor* (sniper), *vrhoskuplje* (summit), *odmoridbenik* (tourist), *veleprevrat* (revolution), etc. (Okuka, 2006: 233). There were and such proposals for neologisms which hardly took roots like: *okolotrbušni hlačodržač* (belt for trousers), *uljudba* (civilization), *vrtolet* (helicopter), *prosudba* (mark), etc.

of inter-understanding is almost 100% (excluding the most newest neologisms).

De Iure (in socio/polito-linguistic point of view) these four languages are separate ones and internationally recognised. However, Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian and Montenegrin are separate languages according to the names, almost no different according to the essence and no separate in structure.

The crucial technique of “linguistic engineering/chirurgic” of Bosnian language is its lexical Orientalization with the three sociolinguistic and ethnonational tasks to be achieved:

1. inner homogenization of *Bosniak* nation;
2. denacionalization of Croats and Serbs within Bosnia-Herzegovina (by suggestion that all inhabitants of this state speak Bosnian language);¹⁹⁴ and
3. external heterogenization of ethnoconfessional Bosniak nation in relation to the neighbouring Serbs and Croats.¹⁹⁵

The politics of “linguistic engineering” or “linguistic chirurgic” in the case of Bosnian and Croatian languages was implied for the final aim to create firstly independently standardized national languages within officially common Serbo-Croatian one (during ex-Yugoslav (con)federation) and later (after collapse of Yugoslavia in 1991) internationally recognized separate languages by deepening and using as much as the dialectical/regional differences of the same spoken Serbo-Croatian language. The ultimate result was that minor speaking differences were proclaimed for the national characteristics and as such have been used to be the foundations of the newly declared autonomous *national* languages. Consequently, common Serbo-Croatian language ceased to exist together with a common Serbo-Croatian nationality.

¹⁹⁴ The first President of post-Yugoslav independent Bosnia-Herzegovina and a leader of ruling Muslim political *Party of Democratic Action* (SDA), Alija Izetbegović, was known as an author of nationalistic *Islamic Declaration* from 1970 according to which any form of multiculturalism and multiconfessionalism was not possible for the Muslims who have to establish pure Islamic society firstly by Islamization of the whole Muslim community (Izetbegović, 1990).

¹⁹⁵ The most problematic and unproved in the sources hypothesis upon the ethnic origins of the Bosniaks (supported by, for instance, Bosnian-Herzegovinian linguist Dževad Jahić) is that they are posteriors of the mediaeval Bosnian-Herzegovinian *Bogumils* who allegedly have been a separate ethnic group, i.e. not Serbs or Croats (Simpozij, 1999). Such hypothesis are scientifically absolutely irrelevant (Fine, 1996: 11–15).

Finally, the Muslim community in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 20th century passed the way from *religious community* in inter-war Yugoslavia, to *nationhood* in Socialist Yugoslavia and *statehood* in post-Communist era¹⁹⁶ with the final codification and internationally recognized their own *national* language. However, Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina (likewise from Montenegro, Sandžak or ex-Republic of Serbian Krayina) all speak the same language which in the 20th century came to existence as *Serbo-Croat*¹⁹⁷ and have a shared historical past. The only difference between them is discrete confessions (Donia, Fine, 1994: 9, 13). If one will apply German Romanticist criteria upon ethnonational identity of/among the Yugoslavs surely at least all Shtokavians (all Serbs, all Montenegrins, all Bosniaks and majority of the Croats) would be considered as a single ethnolinguistic nation with the right to live in their one national state organisation which we can name as *Shtokavia*.

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¹⁹⁶ See: (Banac, 1996: 129–153). This book, likewise of Donia and Fine (1994) or Malcolm (1994), is trying "to demonstrate the antiquity of a distinctive Bosnian identity"... However, "they certainly do not contribute to a demonstration of the antiquity of the nation; but they do contribute a great deal to the contemporary process of its retrospective, symbolic construction at a time when the legitimization of a Bosnian state is fundamentally contested" (Allcock, 2000: 323).

¹⁹⁷ For accounts of historical development of literal languages on the Serbo-Croat-Bosniak-Montenegrin territory see: (Ивић, 1990: 87–140).

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Santrauka

BUVUSIOS SERBŲ-KROATŲ KALBOS DEZINTEGRACIJA: BOŠNJAKO IDENTITETAS IR BOSNŲ KALBA

Pagrindiniai žodžiai: *Balkanai, buvusi Jugoslavija, Bosnija ir Hercegovina, serbų-kroatų kalba, bosnių kalba, bošnjako identitetas, sociolingvistika.*

Šio straipsnio tyrimo objektas yra atskiro (nuo serbų, kroatų ir juodkalniečių) bosnių etnonacionalinio identiteto kūrimo procesas, pasinaudojant “lingvistinės inžinerijos/chirurgijos” metodu, siekiant sukurti savarankišką bosnių kalbą kaip nacionalinę Bosnijos ir Hercegovinos (faktiškai pietų slavų musulmonų kalbą anksčiau vartojusių bendrą serbų-kroatų kalbą). Straipsnio tikslas – ištirti ir aprašyti būdus, kuriais lingvistinės įvairovės elementams buvusioje serbų-kroatų kalboje buvo užklijuotos etiketės ir kurie buvo traktuojami kaip Bosnijos musulmonų etnonacionalinio bei politinio identiteto žymekliai

multikultūrinėje Bosnijoje ir Hercegovinoje nuo 1993 m. (kai oficialiai buvo pristatytas bosnių etnonacionalinis identitetas) iki šių dienų.

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Coat of arms of the ruling Kotromanić's dynasty of the Kingdom of Bosnia in the Middle Ages. The dynasty was of a Serb origin

7. EMIGRATION, REFUGEES AND ETHNIC CLEANSING IN YUGOSLAVIA, 1991–2001

“I think most of us would agree that nationalism is today one of the most powerful forces in the world, and that the national state has been for a century at least, and continues to be, the cornerstone of international politics” (Smith A., “Nations and their pasts”, Nations and Nationalism, 2 (3), November 1996, p. 359).

Introduction

“We Serbs are not against the whole world; the whole world is against us” (Interview with Bosnian-Herzegovinian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic at NTV Studio B, Belgrade, May 7th, 1993).

The forceful decomposition of the former Yugoslavia followed by internationalization of the conflict put the problems of borders in regard to her territory once again on the first place of regional importance. Probably, both the internal and external Yugoslavia's borders could be fixed in the past on the better way in order to reduce the problems of minorities. However, as it was not properly done either in 1919 or 1945, the border issue became one of the main reasons for the civil war and ethnic cleansing on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia during the 1990s. Taking into consideration the savagery, and consequences of dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia and ethnic conflicts followed by a large scale of atrocities occurred on the territories of her successor states, one could undoubtedly conclude that it was unexampled case of the civil war in Europe after the end of the Second World War.

This paper sets out to examine and clarify the problem of overlapping the national-state's borders with ethnographical ones during the period of destruction and dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia, Yugoslav civil war, Kosovo crisis, and Slavic-Albanian conflict in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) from 1991 to 2001 in the light of forced migration, emigration and ethnic cleansing. The research is focused on Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, “Republic of Serbian Krayina”, “Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina”, “Republic of

Srpska” and finally on Kosovo-Metohija region and independent FYROM.

One of the focal topics to be discussed is the ideological background of Yugoslav ethnic conflicts, tracing its roots and development from the time of a national awakening and creation of the ideological concepts of “united” and “greater/great” independent national states, i.e. from the beginning of the 19th century onwards. In view of the fact that according to these ideologies, national state's borders should follow both the borders of ethnographical dispersion of the nation and national historical state's borders, ethnic cleansing was “unavoidable” in the areas of ethnically mixed composition.¹⁹⁸

The problem of emigration, forced migration, displaced persons and ethnic cleansing on the territory of the former Yugoslavia will be investigated from the angle of religious wars, as religious nationalism in the Balkans has exceptionally strong impetus on the concepts of national identification and nationhood.¹⁹⁹ Present-day created national state borders on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia are not only “ethnic” borders; they are “religious” as well. It happened, for instance, that certain number of political representatives of ethnic Croats (of Christian Roman Catholic faith) from Bosnia-Herzegovina inclined themselves 1992–1995 on the side of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Serbs (of Christian Orthodox faith) requiring the inner administrative rearrangement of Bosnia-Herzegovina to be done on ethno-confederate foundations, while Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslim Bosniaks (Bošnjak) stubbornly insisted on a unitary state of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Subsequently, according to the Muslim Bosniak design, the inner administrative division of unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot be set up on the basis of ethnic division lines between three leading political/ethnic entities (Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats). Nevertheless, quite oppositely, Bosnian-Herzegovinian Serbs and Croats demanded that clear inner political/ethnic borders within a confederal Bosnia-Herzegovina had to be

¹⁹⁸ For Croats, for instance, state of Croatia was always *Regnum Chroatorum*, i.e., “the state of the Croats”.

¹⁹⁹ For instance, see 10 min. of video footage from the town of Podujevo in Kosovo-Metohija how the Muslim Albanian mob is setting in flame local Serbian Orthodox church with throwing down the main cross from the roof during “The March Pogrom”, March 17–19th, 2004: <https://vimeo.com/20687706>. About “The March Pogrom” with documentary evidence see: *March Pogrom in Kosovo-Metohija, March 17–19, 2004 with a survey of destroyed and endangered Christian cultural heritage*, published by Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Serbia and Museum in Priština (displaced), Belgrade, 2004.

established as a precondition for political survival of the republic in the future.

The final purpose of this paper is to properly explain the complexity of reasons for making “ethnic” and “religious” borders that are on the first glance primarily separating people but not uniting them. However, peaceful shaping/reshaping of these borders might play a positive role in the future cooperation of the new Balkan communities according to the formula: “integration through separation”. My deep conviction is that a long-standing (perpetual?) peace among the Yugoslav (and the Balkan) ethnic groups and regional security can not be reached without a proper determination of “national ownership” and establishment of “national governance” over the disputable territories.



Hypothetically, there were approximately 3,500,000 refugees and displaced persons from and within the territories of Republic of Croatia and Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina only during the first two years of the last Yugoslav ethnic wars (1991–1992). According to the UNHCR reports there were officially 2,117,205 registered displaced persons of whom 1,494,891 have been from Bosnia-Herzegovina with 810,000 of them in Bosnia-

Herzegovina. There were 644,192 displaced persons in Croatia, 424,396 in Serbia, 70,000 in Slovenia, 61,000 in Montenegro and 31,300 in Macedonia, according to the same source. It is also estimated that there were 250,000 Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslim refugees in Turkey, 200,000 Serbian emigrants from the former “Republic of Serbian Krayina” in present-day Croatia, 220,000 Serbian refugees from Kosovo-Metohija and several ten thousands of Albanian migrants from Albania to Kosovo-Metohija after the Treaty of Kumanovo on June 9th, 1999. A total number of refugees, emigrants (including and those who emigrated abroad) and displaced persons from the

territory of the former Yugoslavia from 1991 to 2001 is around 4 million.

The expulsion of persons according to the ethnic background, which came to be labeled as „ethnic cleansing“, was committed for the purpose to secure national rights on the land. However, because the war was waged to define who can belong, and who can not, to a particular state and its territory, it makes no distinction between soldiers and civilians, between military and civil targets. Comparison, for example, of the population structures of “Republic of Srpska” and “Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina” shows the real effects of ethnic cleansing and national homogenization in this Balkan republic during the civil war 1992–1995:

Table № 1. *The Effects of Ethnic Cleansing and National Homogenization in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992–1995 by Comparison of the Population Structures (in per cents) of the “Republic of Srpska” and the “Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina”*²⁰⁰

	“Republic of Srpska”		“Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina”	
	<i>1991</i>	<i>1997</i>	<i>1991</i>	<i>1997</i>
Muslims	28,77	2,19	52,09	72,61
Serbs	54,32	96,79	17,62	2,32
Croats	9,39	1,02	22,13	22,27
Others	7,53	0,00	8,16	2,38

I claim that conditions of the destruction and breakdown of the former Yugoslavia and Yugoslav civil order, on one hand, and the ideologies and goals of nationalist politicians supported by huge number of “ordinary” citizens, on other, came together in alliance with war to decide national sovereignty over disputed lands.

²⁰⁰ Data presented on the workshop “Quo Vadis Bosnia-Herzegovina”, Summer Academy 2000, European Academy of Bozen/Bolzano, September 2000, Bressanone/Brixen, Italy. See: *International Police Task Force* (IPTF), January 17, 1999 (report).

Finally, the idea that a national safety and freedom are only secured within national-state borders, made by the 19th century ideologists and advocated by contemporary Yugoslav politicians, is a key point in understanding the core of the Yugoslav conflict(s) and civil war(s), either former or future ones.

Ideology, Nationalism and National Claims of the Yugoslavs: Historic Overview

“Ethnic affiliation has never been forgotten in the territories of the former Yugoslavia. It did play a certain role, and it did influence decisions even during the Tito era of strict ‘Brotherhood and Unity’” (Várady T., “Minorities, Majorities, Law and Ethnicity: Reflections of the Yugoslav Case”, *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 19, 1997, p. 42).

People, Nation and State

I fully agree that “in Yugoslavia all political problems are intimately linked with the issue of nationalism”.²⁰¹ Indeed, the fixing of inner or administrative borders between Yugoslavia’s nations and nationalities became one of the main issues that forged nationalism after the Second World War onward and most probably in the future as well. The problem was in fact that internal borders between socialist republics and two autonomous provinces²⁰² of the ex-Yugoslav federation (from 1974 to 1991 Yugoslavia was de facto confederation of eight political entities) were set up in 1945 and definitely delimited ten years later, but they very often did not follow historical, natural, or ethnic principle. The core of the puzzle became that constitutionally six federal republics and two autonomous provinces were seen as “national” states, i.e., with the dominance of a nation or nationality, but the inner

²⁰¹ Holmes L., *Politics in the communist world*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986, p. 331.

²⁰² These two provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohija) are created only within a federal unit of Serbia and had been very much politically independent from her. However, each of ex-Yugoslav republics could get their own autonomous provinces according to the same criteria applied in the case of Serbia which at that sense became asymmetrically federated with the rest of the country and even in the inferior position. According to the last Yugoslav constitution of 1974, Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohija received the same political power as all other Yugoslav republics including and the veto right in the upper chamber of the state’s Parliament (the Federal Assembly) – the Council of Republics.

administrative borders failed in many cases to strictly separate ethnic communities. To be honest, it was impossible without exchanging of the parts of national groups between republics and provinces what finally was done during the civil war of 1991–1995 and after the Kosovo war of 1998–1999 within the framework of the ethnic cleansing, i.e. the forced exchange of the population to the „proper“ side of the borders.



The first problem to be solved is to define the terms of a “people”, a “nation” and a “state”. In search of definitions of terms „people“, „nation“ and „state“ it should be pointed that a “modern” state is composed by three elements: the territory, people and power, while patriarchal theory of state is based on four elements: the family, tribe, people and nation. Definition by “objective” criteria of a “people” or/and a “state” in the ethnic sense takes into consideration the language, religion, history, culture and fate: persons speaking the same language, adhering to the same religion, or with the same history, culture or fate are a people (for instance, Serbs, Croats, Bulgarians, Albanians and Greeks). Individuals with the same characteristics form a people or a nation (German “Kulturnation”). However, according to the theory of ethnic indifference, all persons who hold the citizenship of a state, regardless of their ethnic or national origin, confessional affiliations etc., form the people of the state (for instance, Bosnians, Americans, Swiss people, Canadians).

Definition through “subjective” criteria (favored by Ernest Renan) points that “a people is made up of all persons who want to live together”.²⁰³ Therefore, according to the theory of ethnic indifference, for instance, all citizens of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina are one people, i.e. one nation (Bosnians), but according to “subjective” criteria they can be either Serbs, Croats or Muslims/Bosniaks.²⁰⁴ However, if we

²⁰³ “L’existence d’une nation est un plébiscite de tous les jours”.

²⁰⁴ The “Muslims” as a distinctive ethnic group within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were officially proclaimed by the Yugoslav authorities (i.e. by the League of Yugoslav Communists) in 1961. Official recognition of this religious group as the “Muslim nation” (predominantly living in Bosnia-Herzegovina) was done in 1971 census. There were officially 25,69% of Muslims out of total percentage of

would implement in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina the understanding of a nation in the sense of German 19th century romanticist ideology (favored by Herder, Humboldt, Fichte)²⁰⁵ that only language determines a people/nation we have to recognize only two “ethnicities”, i.e. peoples, within Bosnia-Herzegovina: Serbs and Croats. The same case is with the so-called “Montenegrins” who are in fact Serbs by their “ethnicity”.²⁰⁶

The crucial question on this place is: when does a people (Greek *ethnos*, French *ethnie*) become a nation? The answer according to the „nationality“ principle is: a nation is a people in possession of or striving for its own state.²⁰⁷

The relationship between a state and a nation is vital in the case of Yugoslav nationalism(s). In the times of Reformation, Counter-Reformation and Baroque the nationalism on the Yugoslav lands was shaped in accordance to the famous model of the Augsburg Religious Peace Settlement of 1555: “Cuius regio, eius religio”. However, already from the epoch of Enlightenment followed by the age of Romanticism the nationalism among the Yugoslavs, especially among the Serbs and Croats, was modeled according to the

Bosnia-Herzegovina’s inhabitants in 1961, while according to 1971 census there were 39,57% of them. The term “Bosniaks” (Bošnjaci) is related only to the Bosnian-Herzegovinian “Muslims”, but not to the ethnic Serbs or Croats from the same republic, while under the term “Bosnians” should be understood all citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, there is a strong propagandistic tendency to put equality between the terms “Bosniaks” and “Bosnians”.

²⁰⁵ For instance: “weit mehr die Menschen von der Sprache gebildet werden, denn die Sprache von den Menschen”, Fichte G. J., *Reden an die deutsche Nation*, Berlin, 1808, p. 44. About the ideas of German Romanticism see: Craig G. A., *The Politics of the Unpolitical: German Writers and the Problem of Power, 1770–1871*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1995; Walzel O. F., *German Romanticism*, Capricorn Books, New York, 1966; Beiser F., *The Early Political Writings of the German Romantics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996; Beiser F., *Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism: The Genesis of Modern German Political Thought, 1790–1800*, Harvard University Press, Mass., 1992.

²⁰⁶ Carter F. W., Norris H. T. (eds.), *The Changing Shape of the Balkans*, UCL Press Limited, London, 1996, p. viii. “Montenegrin” nation was officially proclaimed for the first time in history by the Yugoslav officials after the Second World War. By that time, the Orthodox Slavic population in Montenegro was considered as ethnic Serbs and as such they have been declaring themselves at the censuses. However, according to the “ethnolinguistic” theory of national identification, all Serbian-speaking population (the individuals whose mother speech is Shtokavian) regardless on religion are ethnic Serbs what practically means that Roman Catholic inhabitants around the Gulf of Boka Kotorska (south-west Montenegrin littoral close to Dalmatia) are members of Serbian nation likewise Roman Catholic citizens of Dubrovnik. About Dubrovnik see: Костић М. Ј., *Насилно присвајање дубровачке културе*, Нови Сад, Добрица књига, 2000.

²⁰⁷ *Ethnos* can be defined as a people, i.e. group of people, who have common name, motherland, historical memory, culture and sense of solidarity. *Nation* can be described as *ethnos* which lives in its own national state organization, or seeks to create such organization (see: Hroch M., “From national movement to the fully-formed nation. The nation-building process in Europe”, *New Left Review*, № 198, March/April 1993, pp. 3–20; Kaplan R., “The coming anarchy: how scarcity, crime, overpopulation and disease are eroding the social fabric of our planet”, *Atlantic Monthly*, February, 1994, pp. 44–76; Moinyhan D. P., *Pandemonium*, Random House, New York, 1992.



new formula: “cuius regio, eius lingua”.²⁰⁸ Finally, the South Slavs advocated a separation of state and ethnicity (mainly understood as ethnolinguistic people) from the mid-19th century.

The most distinguished feature of majority of Yugoslav and Balkan nationalism(s) is that they accepted the formula: “one language—one people—one nation—one state”.²⁰⁹ In the process of (national)-state building the Yugoslav ethnicities followed exactly the axiom created by David Miller: “Political communities should as far as possible be organized in such a way that their members share a common national identity, which binds them together in the face of their many diverse private and group identities”.²¹⁰ Likewise Miller’s axiom, the saying of Ernest Gellner that nationalism is political principle according to which political unity (i.e. state) should be overlapped with national unity (i.e. nation)²¹¹ is quite valid for the majority of examples of the Yugoslav and Balkan nationalism(s), especially for those from the 20th century – a century of ethnic cleansing, forced migrations and assimilation in the Balkans.²¹²

²⁰⁸ This formula is in our days present in the cases of Switzerland, Belgium, Quebec, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

²⁰⁹ About connections between the language and nationalism in Europe see: Blommaert J., Verschueren J., “The role of language in European national ideologies”, *Pragmatics*, 2, 3, 1992, pp. 355–375; Barbour S., Carmichael C. (eds.), *Language and Nationalism in Europe*. New York, Oxford University Press, 2000. Albanian protesters in Prishtina, Kosovo-Metohija, for instance, required in October 1992 restoration of university education system in Albanian language, but this demand was seen by Serbian authority as expression of Albanian separatism. It has to be remarked that today there is no university education system in Russian language in Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia and that today as well as there is no any educational system in Serbian language in Albanian ruled “Republic of Kosova” as “independent” state (self-proclaimed on February 17th, 2008).

²¹⁰ Miller D., *On Nationality*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995, p. 188.

²¹¹ Gellner E., *Nations et nationalisme*, Editions Payot, Paris, 1989, p. 13.

²¹² The contemporary “developed West”, however, is not “immune” on the nationalism as well, especially on the linguistic one: “Nationalism is the will to have a particular way of being and the possibility to build up one’s own country”...“Our [Catalan] identity as a country, our will to be, and our perspectives for the future depend on the preservation of our language”...“It is task of all those who live in Catalonia to preserve its personality and strengthen its language and culture”, Pujol J., *Construir Catalunya*, Pòrtic, Barcelona, 1980, pp. 22, 35, 36; or: “If you cannot speak Welsh, you carry the mark of the Englishman with you every day. That is the unpleasant truth”, *The Guardian*, November 12, 1990, p. 1. See: D’hondt, Sigurt, Blommaert J. i Verschueren J., “Constructing Ethnicity in Discourse: The View from Below” in *Migration, Citizenship, and Ethno-National Identities in the European Union*, Marco Martiniello (ed.), Avebury, 1995, pp. 105–119.

The other significant peculiarity of Yugoslav nationalism(s) is that some of them (for instance, Croatian in the 19th century and Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslim/Bosniak in the 20th century) accepted (with local modifications) the French model of ethnic indifference in state formation and nation-building. According to this state-nation model, there are three main pillars of the state-nation building:

- popular sovereignty: “people” = legal fiction to constitute normative principles: (individual) equality and democratic state organization;
- national sovereignty: “nation” = legal fiction to defend external independence and to discriminate internal pluralism, also in terms of ethnic difference;
- effects: repression of pluralism through assimilation.²¹³

In other words, all inhabitants of Croatia are “Croats” and all citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina are “Bosnians”. I argue that ultimate goal of acceptance of such a model among the Yugoslavs was not to build a “civic society” but to assimilate “other” national groups for the purpose of creation of nationally homogeneous state.²¹⁴

On the other hand, instead of the French state-nation model, some of Yugoslav nationalism(s) (for instance, Serbian, Albanian, Slovenian and contemporary Croatian and Macedonian) in regard to the state creation and nation-building had (has) a feature of the Central and East European nation-state model, which had (has) the next main characteristics:²¹⁵

²¹³ Prof. Joseph Marko, lecture: “State Formation and Nation-Building in Europe, Summer Academy 2000: “Regions and Minorities in a Greater Europe, European Academy of Bozen/Bolzano, September 2000, Bressanone/Brixen, Italy.

²¹⁴ About the issue of historical process of the creation of the national identities in the Balkans see: Bianchini S, Dogo M. (eds.), *The Balkans. National Identities in a Historical Perspective*, Ravenna, Longo Editore Ravenna, 1998.

²¹⁵ This model was implemented in the 19th century building of Italian and German nation and state. The product was Italian (1859–1866) and German (1866–1871) unification. This model had direct impact on the Central, East and Southeast European ethnic groups. About Italian unification see: Rene A. C., *Italy from Napoleon to Mussolini*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1962; Smith D. M., *Mazzini*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1994; Lucy R., *The Italian Risorgimento. State, Society and National Unification*, London and New York, Routledge, 1994; Lucy R., *Cavour and Garibaldi, 1860: A Study in Political Conflict*, Cambridge, 1985; Beales D., *The Risorgimento and the Unification of Italy*, London, 1981; Header H., *Italy in the Age of the Risorgimento, 1790–1870*, London, 1983; Coppa F., *The Origins of the Italian Wars of Independence*, London, 1992; Delzell C. F. (ed.), *The Unification of Italy, 1859–1861. Cavour, Mazzini or Garibaldi?*, New York, 1965. About German unification see: Michael J., *The Unification of Germany*, London and New York, Routledge, 1996; Rodes J. E., *The Quest for Unity. Modern Germany 1848–1970*, New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Atlanta, Dallas, Montreal, Toronto, London, Sydney, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971; Pflanze O., *Bismark and the Development of*

- nationality principle: “nation” = one people + one state;
- political function: unification for state-formation;
- the “individual” is no longer the ethnically indifferent “citoyen”, but defined by membership in a certain ethnic community;
 - “equality” relates only to members of own group;
 - “difference” of groups is translated into majority/minority position;
 - possible effects: ethnic cleansing through expulsion from territory, extinction.²¹⁶

In other words, the “nation-owner” of a state has more rights than the “nations-non-owners”. The “nations-non-owners” are in fact proclaimed, or treated, as the ethnic (national) minorities. However, it is a common Yugoslav and Balkan understanding of minorities that they are in fact a great source of “irredenta”, i.e. of secession. Therefore, if one Yugoslav or Balkan country can not avoid to have a minority group then the slogan “why should we be a minority in your country when you can be a minority in our” should be respected.

In the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFR Yugoslavia) existed the so-called “three-level system” of national rights. On the first level there were six „Nations of Yugoslavia“ (Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Muslims, Serbs and Slovenes). Each of them had their own “national” state that was one of six socialist republics. On the second level there were ten „Nationalities of Yugoslavia“ (Albanians, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Gypsies, Italians, Romanians, Ruthenians, Slovaks, Turks).²¹⁷ Finally, on the lowest third level there were „Other Nationalities and Ethnic Groups“ (Austrians, Greeks, Jews, Germans, Poles, Russians,

Germany. Volume I: The Period of Unification, 1815–1871, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1962; Pflanze O. (ed.), *The Unification of Germany, 1848–1871*, European Problem Studies, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Atlanta, Dallas, Montreal, Toronto, London, University of Minnesota, 1969; Medlicott E., *Bismarck and Modern Germany*, Mystic, Conn., 1965; Darmstaedter F., *Bismarck and the Creation of the Second German Reich*, London, 1948.

²¹⁶ Prof. Joseph Marko, lecture: “State Formation and Nation-Building in Europe, Summer Academy 2000: “Regions and Minorities in a Greater Europe, European Academy of Bozen/Bolzano, September 2000, Bressanone/Brixen, Italy.

²¹⁷ Each of these ten “Nationalities of Yugoslavia”, except Gypsies (Roma) and Ruthenians, had (has) its own national state outside Yugoslavia.

Ukrainians, Vlahs, “Yugoslavs”,²¹⁸ etc.).²¹⁹ I have to stress that there were only three recognized constitutive nations within the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes from 1918 to 1929 and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia from 1929 to 1941: Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.²²⁰ However, in post-war socialist Yugoslavia there were recognized six of them: Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins and Muslims. Actually, the last three have been newly proclaimed nations.

In sum, there are two types of national identification:

- 1) based on “civic” criteria of grouping (France, Croatia in the 19th century, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Canada, the U.S.A., etc); and
- 2) based on “ethnic” criteria of classifying as relationship and culture (Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians, Macedonians, Slovenes, Albanians, etc.).²²¹

In conclusion, referring to the Yugoslav case, I agree with Anthony Smith: “By ‘nationalism’ I shall mean an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity of a human population, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation.’”... “A ‘nation’ in turn I shall define as a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths²²² and memories, a mass, public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members”.²²³

²¹⁸ “Yugoslavism” was only unifying ideology but it never was and real identity, Pavlowitch S. K., “Yugoslavia: the failure of a success”, *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, Vol. 1, № 2, 1999, pp. 163–170.

²¹⁹ Poulton H., *The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict*, Minority Rights Publications, London, 1994, p. 5.

²²⁰ About the process of making the first Yugoslav state see: Sotirović V., *Creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 1914–1918*, Vilnius, Vilnius University Press, 2007.

²²¹ Smith A., “The ethnic sources of nationalism”, *Survival*, Vol. 35, № 1, pp. 5–26.

²²² For instance, Kosovo-Metohija is always seen by the Serbs as a part of a national mythology as the cradle of Serbian nation and political and cultural center of national state. See: Шмајс А., “Из проблематике историјског развоја косовске традиције”, *Зборник Филозофског факултета у Београду*, VIII-2, 1969, pp. 617–624.

²²³ Smith A., “Nations and their pasts”, *Nations and Nationalism*, 2 (3), November 1996, p. 359. With the break up of the socialist Yugoslavia the communist ideology, as a “cement” of common existence of different nations, nationalities and ethnic minorities, was replaced by a historical memories, which played the role of the “archive of animosity”.

Nationalism, Ideology and formation of National State

There are many talks about nationalism among the peoples from the former Yugoslavia during the last two decades what is understandable taking into consideration the post-communist atrocities, as a continuation of the Second World War crimes,²²⁴ committed on the territory of the ex-Yugoslavia. I want to argue that there is a direct link between contemporary nationalism(s) among the Yugoslavs and their national ideologies, which are developed in the previous decades and even centuries. What happened with the Yugoslavs from 1991 to 2001, and probably to be repeated in the 21st century once again, it can not be explained and understood without a proper knowledge of their national histories, interethnic relations, and above all without familiarity with historical developments of the Yugoslav, South Slavic and Balkan nationalism(s) in the European context.²²⁵

²²⁴ That the war of dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia, 1991–1995 was understood by many Yugoslavs as a continuation of, or retaliation for, the mass atrocities committed during the Second World War, especially against the Serbs on the territory of “Independent State of Croatia”, confirm many interviews with the local inhabitants (see, for instance, BBC documentary movie: *Death of Yugoslavia*; Guskova J., *Istorija jugoslovenske krize*, I, Beograd, IGA “M”, 2003, p. 311). About Nazi Croat ethnocide committed against the local Serb civilians within the territory of the “Independent State of Croatia”, which included and Bosnia-Herzegovina and eastern Serbia’s province of Srem, from 1941 to 1945 see: Ривели М. А., *Надбискуп геноцида. Монсињор Степинац, Ватикан и усташка диктатура у Хрватској, 1941–1945*, Никшић, Јасен, 1999; *НД Хрватска. Држава геноцида, Двери српске. Часопис за националну културу и друштвена питања*, год. XIII, бр. 47–50, Београд, 2011.

²²⁵ About genesis and development of European nationalism(s) see: Wilson T. M., *Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998; Silvert K. H., *Exceptant Peoples: Nationalism and Development*, New York, Random House, 1963; *Nationalism*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Frank Cass, London, 1963; Diamond L. J., *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994; Hobsbawm E. J., *Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge, Canto, Cambridge University Press, 1992. About genesis and development of Serbian and Croatian nationalism(s) in the 19th century see: Bukowski J., “Yugoslavism and the Croatian National Party in 1867”, *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, 3, No. 1 (fall) 1975, pp. 70–88; Djordjević M., *Srpska nacija u građanskom društvu*, Beograd, Narodna knjiga, 1979; MacKenzie D., “Serbian Nationalist and Military Organizations, 1844–1914”, *East European Quarterly*, 16, 1982, pp. 323–344; MacKenzie D., *The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism 1875–1878*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1967; Meriage L. P., “The First Serbian Uprising (1804–1813): National Revival or a Search for Regional Security”, *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, 4, No. 1 (spring) 1977, pp. 187–205; Mirković M., Janjić D. (eds.), *Postanak i razvoj srpske nacije*, Beograd, Narodna knjiga, 1979; Perović R., “Oko Načertanija iz 1844 godine”, *Istorijski glasnik*, № 1, 1963, pp. 71–94; Gale S., “The Absence of Nationalism in Serbian Politics Before 1844”, *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, 4, № 2, (fall) 1976, pp. 77–90; Boban Lj., “Misija Jancikovića u inozemstvo”, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, XII, № 1, 1980, pp. 27–74; Bogdanov V., *Historija političkih stranaka u Hrvatskoj od prvih stranačkih grupiranja do 1918*, Zagreb, Novinarsko izdavačko poduzeće, 1958; Ciliga V., *Slom politike Narodne stranke (1865–1880)*, Zagreb, Matica Hrvatska, 1970; Despalatović E. M., *Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian Movement*, New York and London, Boulder, East European Monographs, 1975; Dizdar Z., “Ljubljanski ‘Jugoslavenski kongres’ 1870 u najnovijoj literaturi”, *Istorijski zbornik*, 27–28, 1974–75, pp. 331–341; Gross M., “Einfluss der sozialen Struktur auf den Charakter der Nationalbewegung in den Kroatischen Ländern im 19. Jahrhundert” in *Sozialstruktur und Organisation Europäischer Nationalbewegungen*, Theo

Whoever wants to resolve any contemporary problem in the Balkans has to know Balkan history. If somewhere the motto “*Historia est magistra vitae*” is useful for the settlement of the current problems it is the Balkans and especially the ex-Yugoslavia. Therefore, it should be known that among the Balkan people national history is understood as a long-standing continuation of efforts which are leading to transform the ethnolinguistic group from the status of *ethnos* into the status (or level) of nation. It practically means that final historical and natural “task” of each Balkan ethnic group is to live in united national state.²²⁶ This “national sacral task” is to be realized by any means.

Clearly, territory and common will to live together are crucial elements in definition of nation in the case of Yugoslav and Balkan peoples (and others as well).²²⁷ There is no nation without definitely marked borders of the territory where the nation is living. The members of nation have a consciousness of the exact borders of the territorial distribution of their *ethnos*.²²⁸ Consequently, ethnographic borders should be transformed into national-state borders; i.e. state borders should follow current ethnolinguistic dispersion of people but as well in great extent and historical borders of “national” state. No more – no less! Historical consequence, however, was (and is) that there was more blood than available land for satisfaction of every single national claim in the ex-Yugoslavia.

Schieder (ed.), München, Oldenbourg, 1971, pp. 67-92; Gross M., *Povijest pravaške ideologije*, Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Institut za Hrvatsku povjest, Zagreb, 1973; *Hrvatski narodni preporod u Dalmaciji i Istri*, Matica hrvatska, 1969; Jelavich C., “The Croatian Problem in the Habsburg Empire in the 19th Century”, *Austrian History Yearbook*, 3, 1967, pp. 83-115; Pavličević D., *Narodni pokret 1883 u Hrvatskoj*, Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Institut za hrvatsku povjest, Zagreb, 1980; Petrović R., *Nacionalno pitanje u Dalmaciji u XIX stoljeću: Narodna stranka i nacionalno pitanje 1860-1880*, Svjetlost, Sarajevo, 1968; Pribić B., “Srpsko pitanje pred Hrvatskim saborom godine 1861”, *Časopis za suvremenu povjest*, 12, № 1, 1980, pp. 75-96; Stančić N., *Hrvatska nacionalna ideologija preporodnog pokreta u Dalmaciji: Mihovil Pavlinović i njegov krug do 1869*, Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Centar za povjesne znanosti, Odjel za hrvatsku povjest, Zagreb, 1980; Vuchinich W., “Croatian Illyrism: Its Background and Genesis” in *Intellectual and Social Developments in the Habsburg Empire from Maria Theresa to World War I: Essays Dedicated to Robert Kann*, Winters S. B., Held J. (eds.), East European Monographs, Boulder and New York, 1975, pp. 55-113.

²²⁶ Anthony Smith claims that this national historical “task” is accepted by every nation. See: Smith A., *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1986.

²²⁷ Dumont L., *Religion, Politics and History in India*, Mouton, Paris, 1970, p. 70.

²²⁸ Mauss M., “La nation”, *L’Année Sociologique*, 3e série, pp. 16-17. See: Smith A., *National Identity*, University of Nevada Press, Reno, 1991; Smith A., *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986; Weber E., *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France*, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, 1976; Edwards J., *Language, Society, and Identity*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985; Connor W., “A Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic Group, Is a...”, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 1, № 4, 1978, pp. 377-400.

The Yugoslav nationalism(s) is composed by seven main elements: I) territory; II) state; III) language and alphabet; IV) history and collective memory; V) religion; VI) people, and VII) tradition and custom. The essence is that according to the national(istic) perceptions a single culturally and linguistically homogenous ethnic group (people) had been living in the past on its own ethnographical space. However, due to historical circumstances like foreign occupations, wars, famines, etc. (for example, Ottoman occupation, German conquest, Hungarian and Italian rule, permanent shortage of food in Montenegro and Herzegovina), one bigger or smaller part of national community left its own genuine (national) soil and went to diaspora settling itself on the territories of the “others” (for instance, Serbs from Kosovo-Metohija, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia proper to the Southern Hungary, Slavonia, Srem, Croatia and Dalmatia in 1690 and 1737).²²⁹ However, in the meantime the “abandoned” national soil was resettled with “newcomers” of different ethnolinguistic background in comparison with the “genuine owners” of this soil (for instance, Albanian migrants to Kosovo’s plain from Albania’s mountains after the First Serbian Great Migration from that region in 1690). Nevertheless, according to the “historical rights” the nation of the “genuine ownership” of the soil in question has a legitimate right to resettle itself once again to the disputed territory and even more to include this territory, which historically belongs to the “genuine ownership-nation”, into united national state (for instance, the territory of “Srpska Krajina” in Croatia, Kosovo, “Turkish Croatia”²³⁰ in Bosnia, Western Macedonia, etc.). Furthermore, according to the “ethnic rights” of a nation certain territories where the nation is in majority and living there for the long period of time (regardless that these territories are not belonging to the nation according to the “historic rights”) had to be included

²²⁹ See: Cvijić J., *Metanastazička kretanja, njihovi uzroci i posledice*, Srpska kraljevska akademija, Beograd, 1922.

²³⁰ From the time when the Ottomans transformed Bosnia-Herzegovina into *Bosnian pashalik* in 1580 “Croatia Turcica” became the term to mark the last conquered part of historic Croatia by the Ottomans that was the land between rivers of Vrbas and Una. The rest of historic Croatia, known as *Reliquiae reliquiarum* became parts of Habsburg Monarchy on January 1st, 1527. The Croatian “reconquista” started in 1699, by Karlowitz (Sremski Karlovci) Peace Treaty, followed by the Treaty of Passarowitz (Požarevac) in 1718 and by Treaty of Svishtov in 1791. Subsequently, present day borders of the Republic of Croatia are mainly products of these treaties. Finally, in 1954 when Trieste crises became resolved between Italy and Yugoslavia the Istrian peninsula (which never was included into Croatian state before) became part of Socialist Republic of Croatia. Borders between Hungary and Croatia on the river of Drava and Croatia and Slovenia nearby Zagreb are ones of the oldest in Europe.

into the national united state. For instance, Serbs claim the territory of “Srpska Krajina” in Republic of Croatia according to Serbian “ethnic rights” (and morality because of the genocide, i.e. ethnocide, that was committed over Serbs in this region by the fascist government of Croatia during the Second World War), but at the same time Serbian demand upon Kosovo is based on their “historic rights” in regard to this particular region. A totally complicated situation emerged when Croats claim the territory of “Srpska Krajina” according to Croatian “historical rights”, and Albanians are demanding Kosovo/a according to their “ethnic rights”. Unfortunately, the way out from such stalemate situation of overlapping of different rights of several nations over the same territories is found in forced deportations, expulsions, ethnic cleansing and genocide/ethnocide committed at that moment by politically and military stronger ethnolinguistic community over the weaker one(s).

“Ethnic” society was usually preferred in stead of “civil” society among the Yugoslavs.²³¹ Probably the main reason for this preference is the fact that a person is usually identifying himself with a nation, i.e. with national belonging; but a nation can be “realized” only in its own national state. I agree with the opinion that strongest and the most sincere loyalty is a loyalty towards a national state. National culture can be as well better preserved and further developed within the national state borders. Surely, one of the crucial preconditions for the freedom all over the globe (or at least in the Balkans) is a strengthening of the national states.²³² However, there are no real national states without clearly fixed national borders.

If one would compare the size of present day independent states in the Balkans with their size from the previous centuries when they firstly became autonomous and later independent (Montenegro 1516/1878; Serbia 1829/1878; Greece 1829/1830; Bulgaria 1878/1908; Romania 1859/1878) s/he will notice that these states in the time of achieving autonomous status and independence included no more than a half of the territory ruled by them nowadays. All of them obtained their autonomy and independence by

²³¹ While the French Revolution of 1789–1794 declared the “Right of Man”, the German philosophy of romanticist nationalism declared the “Right of Nation”. The Yugoslavs followed the latter option.

²³² Smith A., *Theories of Nationalism*, Duckworth, London, 1983, p. 21.

secession from declining Ottoman Empire (the “Sick Man on the Bosphorus”) and later enlarged their national territories by irredentist policy of conquering still “non-liberated” national soil(s). The purpose of such policy of irredentism was to overlap national-state borders with the ethnographical borders of ethnic dispersion. This process is not finished until today. This irredentist attitude led all Balkan countries to the serious ethnic conflicts during the last two centuries because of the mixed populations in many territories (for instance, “Srpska Krajina” in Croatia, Kosovo/a, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Vojvodina, Western Thrace, etc.) and the lack of clear national awareness in these lands (for instance, Slavic population in the 19th century Macedonia).

According to Robert Hislope, there are four factors of ethnic conflicts, either among the Yugoslavs or elsewhere:

- Primary source of contention;
- Cleavage lines;
- Role of culture;
- Role of elite.²³³

The results of ethnic conflicts between the Yugoslavs are:

- two hundred years of animosities and warfare;
- assimilation of the minorities;
- repression of the minorities;
- ethnic cleansing;
- promotion of historical revisionism.

The national dreams of creation of united, enlarged and greater national states, however, are only partially realized by the Yugoslavs and other South-East European people in several historical occasions (as results of either struggles against foreign rule or inter ethnic conflicts). It can be seen from the table below:

²³³ Hislope R., “Can evolutionary theory explain nationalist violence?”, Nations and Nationalism, ASEN, October 1998, Vol. 4, pp. 474–477.

Table № 2. Realization of the Greater (partly or almost united) National-States in the South-Eastern Europe in the 19th and 20th century

	Territories included into the national-state borders
Greater Bulgaria 1878 (“San Stefano Bulgaria”)	Bulgaria proper (from Danube River to the Balkan Range and from Timok River to the Black See), East Rumelia (from the Balkan Range to Adrianopol/Edirne including upper and middle stream of Maritza River with Philippopol/Plovdiv and Burgas on the littoral of the Black Sea), the whole portion of Vardar Macedonia (present day independent state of FYR Macedonia including Bitola and Ohrid), part of Aegean Macedonia including Kastoria, Kavala and Seres in present day Greece to Saloniki and Chalkidiki peninsula, south-east part of present day Albania including Koritza, parts of present day South-Eastern Serbia including Vranje, Pirot, Caribrod and Bosiljgrad, Southern Dobrodgea (Dobrudscha) including Mangalia, and part of present day European Turkey to Midia on the Black Sea littoral.
Greater Bulgaria 1885-1913	Bulgaria proper (from Danube River to the Balkan Range and from Timok River to the Black See) and East Rumelia (from the Balkan Range to Adrianopol/Edirne including upper and middle stream of Maritza River with Philippopol/Plovdiv and Burgas on the littoral of the Black Sea).
Greater Bulgaria 1913-1915	Bulgaria proper (from Danube River to the Balkan Range and from Timok River to the Black See), East Rumelia (from the Balkan Range to Adrianopol/Edirne including upper and middle stream of Maritza River with Philippopol/Plovdiv and Burgas on the littoral of the Black Sea), Pirin Macedonia

	with Strumica and Western Thrace with Xanthi, Dedeagatsch and part of Aegen littoral from Enos to near Kavala.
Greater Bulgaria 1915-1918	Bulgaria proper (from Danube River to the Balkan Range and from Timok River to the Black See), East Rumelia (from the Balkan Range to Adrianopel/Edirne including upper and middle stream of Maritza River with Philippopel/Plovdiv and Burgas on the littoral of the Black Sea), Pirin Macedonia with Strumica and Western Thrace with Xanthi, Dedeagatsch, part of Aegen littoral from Enos to near Kavala, additional part of Western Thrace with Dimotika, the whole Eastern and South-Eastern Serbia to Great Morava River including the whole stream of Southern Morava River, part of Kosovo with Prishtina to near Vuchitrn, the whole part of Vardar Macedonia, eastern part of Aegean Macedonia with Kavala and Seres to the Chalkidiki peninsula and the whole portion of Dobrodgea (between the lower Danube, the delta of Danube and the Black Sea with Constanta).
Greater Bulgaria 1941-1944	Bulgaria proper (from Danube River to the Balkan Range and from Timok River to the Black See), East Rumelia (from the Balkan Range to Adrianopel/Edirne including upper and middle stream of Maritza River with Philippopel/Plovdiv and Burgas on the littoral of the Black Sea), Pirin Macedonia with Strumica and Western Thrace with Xanthi, Dedeagatsch, part of Aegen littoral from Enos to near Kavala, eastern part of Aegean Macedonia with Kavala and Seres to the Chalkidiki peninsula, Southern Dobrodgea, Western, Central and South-East parts of Vardar Macedonia, part of Eastern Serbia with Pirot, Bosiljgrad and Caribrod and major part of South-Eastern Serbia with Vranje, Preshevo, Kachanik,

	and Surdulica.
Greater Moldavia 1856-1878 (Romania from 1859)	Moldavia and Southern Bessarabia
Greater Romania 1878-1913	Romania proper (Wallachia and Moldavia-from the Danube, the Carpathian Mountains, Transylvanian Alps to the Prut) and the main part of Dobrodgea (between the lower Danube, the Danube delta and the Black Sea with Constanta).
Greater Romania 1913-1916	Romania proper (Wallachia and Moldavia-from the Danube, the Carpathian Mountains, Transylvanian Alps to the Prut) and the whole portion of Dobrodgea (including and Southern Dobrodgea with Silistria).
Greater Romania 1918-1940	Romania proper (Wallachia and Moldavia-from the Danube, the Carpathian Mountains, Transylvanian Alps to the Prut), the whole portion of Dobrodgea (including and Southern Dobrodgea with Silistria), Bessarabia, Bucovina, Transylvania, Eastern Banat, Crisana and Maramures.
Greater Romania 1945 onward	Romania proper (Wallachia and Moldavia-from the Danube, the Carpathian Mountains, Transylvanian Alps to the Prut), the main portion of Dobrodgea, the whole portion of Transylvania, Western Banat, Northern Bucovina.
Greater Serbia 1878-1912	Serbia proper (from the Danube to the lower stream of South Morava and Ibar rivers and from Drina to Timok rivers) and South-Eastern Serbia (with the cities of Vranje, Nish, Leskovac and Pirot and the region of Toplica).
	Serbia proper (from the Danube to the lower stream of South Morava and Ibar rivers and

Greater Serbia 1913-1915	from Drina to Timok rivers), South-Eastern Serbia (with the cities of Vranje, Nish, Leskovac and Pirot and the region of Toplica), Northern part of Sanjak (with the cities of Novi Pazar, Sjenica, Prijepolje, Nova Varosh and Priboj), Eastern Kosovo and Vardar Macedonia (present day FYR Macedonia).
Greater Serbia 1918	Serbia proper (from the Danube to the lower stream of South Morava and Ibar rivers and from Drina to Timok rivers), South-Eastern Serbia (with the cities of Vranje, Nish, Leskovac and Pirot and the region of Toplica), Northern part of Sanjak (with the cities of Novi Pazar, Sjenica, Prijepolje, Nova Varosh and Priboj), Eastern Kosovo, Vardar Macedonia (present day FYR Macedonia), Montenegro (including Western Kosovo [the so-called Metohija] and Southern Sanjak with the cities of Bijelo Polje, Pljevlja, Rozaj and Berane), Southern Baranja, Western Banat and Bachka.
Greater Serbia 1945-1999	Serbia proper (from the Danube to the lower stream of South Morava and Ibar rivers and from Drina to Timok rivers), South-Eastern Serbia (with the cities of Vranje, Nish, Leskovac and Pirot and the region of Toplica), Northern part of Sanjak (with the cities of Novi Pazar, Sjenica, Prijepolje, Nova Varosh and Priboj), Kosovo-Metohija, Western Banat, Eastern Srem and Bachka.
Greater Croatia 1939-1941 ("Banovina Hrvatska")	Croatia proper (from the Drava to Senj and from the Sutla to the Korana including the cities of Zagreb, Karlovac, Varazdin, Sisak and Petrinja), Slavonia (from the Drava to the Sava), Western Srem (including Ilok and Shid), Dalmatia, the main part of Adriatic islands, the region of Dubrovnik, part of Southern Bosnia-Herzegovina (including the cities of Travnik, Bugojno, Fojnica, Duvno, Imotski, Stolac, Mostar, Ljubushki,

	Metkovic and Kupres) and part of Northern Bosnia-Herzegovina (including the cities of Brčko, Gradacac, Derventa and Bosanski Brod).
Greater Croatia 1941-1945 ("Independent State of Croatia")	Croatia proper (from the Drava to Senj and from the Sutla to the Korana including the cities of Zagreb, Karlovac, Varazdin, Sisak and Petrinja), Slavonia (from the Drava to the Sava), the whole portion of Srem (between the Danube and the Sava), Southern Dalmatia, the region of Dubrovnik, the islands of Pag, Brač and Hvar, and the whole portion of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Greater Croatia 1945 onward	Croatia proper (from the Drava to Senj and from the Sutla to the Korana including the cities of Zagreb, Karlovac, Varazdin, Sisak and Petrinja), Slavonia (from the Drava to the Sava), the western portion of Srem (between the Danube and the Sava including the city of Ilok but excluded the city of Šid), the whole of Dalmatia, the region of Dubrovnik, all Adriatic island, the city and district of Rijeka, Southern Baranja including the city of Beli Manastir, Eastern Međimurje including the city of Čakovec and the whole portion of Istria.
Greater Slovenia 1945 onwards	Slovenia proper (Carniola or Krain or Kranjska), Southern Styria or Steiermark or Štajerska, Southern Carinthia or Kärnten or Koruška, Slovenian littoral with the cities of Koper, Portorož, Izola and Piran, Prekmurje with the city of Murska Sobota and Western Međimurje.
Greater Albania 1941-	Albania proper (from the city of Scutari or Shkëmbi and the Prokletije Range to the Devoll and the upper stream of the Vjosa, and from the Drim and Ohrid Lake to the Adriatic littoral), Kosovo with Metohija including Prishtina, Peja/Peje, Gushinje and

1945	Gnjilane but without Mitrovica, Eastern Montenegro including Ulcinj but without Bar and North-Western Macedonia including Struga, Kichevo, Debar, Tetovo, Gostivar but without Ohrid.
Greater Albania 1999 onward (in the process of creation)	Albania proper (from the city of Scodra or Skutari or Skadar and the Prokletije Range to the Devoll and the upper stream of the Vjosë, and from the Drim and Ohrid Lake to the Adriatic littoral), Kosovo with Metohija including Prishtina, Pec/Peja, Gusinje, Gnjilane and Mitrovica, Western Macedonia and expectedly, Western Montenegro with the littoral from the Bojana to Bar including Ulcinj and northern part of Southern Epirus, which is today a part of Greece.
Greater Hungary 1938-1944	Hungary proper (present day Hungary, i.e. Hungary around the Alföld Plain), Southern Slovakia, Ruthenia, Northern Transylvania, Prekomurje, Medjumurje, Southern Baranja and Bachka.
Greater Montenegro 1878-1913	Montenegro proper or “Ancient Montenegro” (from Lovcen to the Zeta and from Pustilisac to Sutorman including Cetinje, Rijeka Crnojevica, Virpazar and Kchevo), Rudine, Vasojevici, Shavnik, Podgorica region, the littoral from Skadar Lake to Bar, Ulcinj and the Bojana, Nikshic, Durmitor, Kolashin, Sinjajevina and the land around Piva River.
Greater Montenegro 1913-1916	Montenegro proper or “Ancient Montenegro” (from Lovcen to the Zeta and from Pustilisac to Sutorman including Cetinje, Rijeka Crnojevica, Virpazar and Kchevo), Rudine, Vasojevici, Shavnik, Podgorica region, the littoral from Skadar Lake to Bar, Ulcinj and the Bojana, Nikshic, Durmitor, Kolashin, Sinjajevina, the land around Piva River, Southern Sanjak with Pljevlja, Shahovici, Bijelo Polje, Mojkovac, Berane, Rozaje, Gusinje, Plav and Ceotina River, Western

	Kosovo, which is called Metohija including Djakovica, Pec and Istok and the area around central-Skadar Lake.
Greater Montenegro 1945 onward	Montenegro proper or "Ancient Montenegro" (from Lovcen to the Zeta and from Pustilj to Sutorman including Cetinje, Rijeka Crnojevica, Virpazar and Kchevo), Rudine, Vasojevici, Shavnik, Podgorica region, the littoral from Skadar Lake to Bar, Ulcinj and the Bojana, Nikshic, Durmitor, Kolashin, Sinjajevina, the land around Piva River, Southern Sanjak with Pljevlja, Shahovici, Bijelo Polje, Mojkovac, Berane, Rozaje, Gusinje, Plav and Cetina River, the area around mid-Skadar Lake, the Adriatic littoral from Bar to Grbalj and the Gulf of Boka Kotorska with the cities of Kotor, Risan, Hercegnovi and Perast.
Greater Greece 1881-1913	Greece proper (Morea, Livadia and Attica), Ionian islands, western part of Aegean islands (Cyclades and Sporades) and Thessaly with Larissa and Volos Gulf.
Greater Greece 1913-1915	Greece proper (Morea, Livadia and Attica), Ionian islands, western part of Aegean islands (Cyclades and Sporades), Thessaly with Larissa and Volos Gulf, Southern Epirus with Ioanina, Aegean Macedonia with Salonika, Chalkidiki peninsula and Kavala, the island of Crete, and the rest of Aegean islands.
Greater Greece 1919-1922	Greece proper (Morea, Livadia and Attica), Ionian islands, western part of Aegean islands (Cyclades and Sporades), Thessaly with Larissa and Volos Gulf, Southern Epirus with Ioanina, Aegean Macedonia with Salonika, Chalkidiki peninsula and Kavala, the island of Crete, the rest of Aegean islands, Western Thrace with the littoral and Smyrna region in Asia Minor.
	Greece proper (Morea, Livadia and Attica),

Greater Greece 1945 onward	Ionian islands, western part of Aegean islands (Cyclades and Sporades), Thessaly with Larissa and Volos Gulf, Southern Epirus with Ioanina, Aegean Macedonia with Salonika, Chalkidiki peninsula and Kavala, the island of Crete, the rest of Aegean islands and the islands of Dodecaneses.
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Nevertheless, the national aspirations in the point of territories would be totally realized only when the entire ethnic and historical lands are included into the national-states borders. Therefore, a final national aim is to achieve a total national unification by creation of a “Great” or “United” national state. The table below shows the “ideal solutions of national questions” in territorial point of view:

Table № 3. Realization of totally United (Great) National-States in the South-Eastern Europe in the future²³⁴

	Territories which should be included into the national-state borders
Great/United Bulgaria	Territory of present day Bulgaria, Vardar Macedonia (present day independent FYR Macedonia), whole Dobrodgea, Aegean Macedonia with Salonika, Kavala and the Chalkidiki peninsula, South-East portion of present day Albania (around the lakes of Ohrid and Prespa including the city of Koritza), eastern part of present day Serbia (from the River of Great Morava to the Bulgarian border) and European part of present day Turkey.
Great/United Romania	Territory of present day Romania, historical Bessarabia (present day independent Moldova and the Black Sea littoral from Dniester to Prut), whole Banat, Crisana

²³⁴ The most extreme territorial claims are not represented in this table.

	(eastern part of present day Hungary from Tisa River to Transylvania), Maramures, whole Bucovina and whole Dobrodgea.
Great/United Serbia	Territory of present day FR Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo-Metohija), territory of present day FYR Macedonia, whole Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dubrovnik, South and Central Dalmatia, the territory of former "Republika Srpska Krajina" (1991-1995), and Northern Albania with Durres.
Great/United Croatia	Territory of present day Croatia, whole Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro ("Red Croatia"), Slovenia ("Alpine Croatia"), Eastern Srem and Bachka.
Great/United Slovenia	Territory of present day Slovenia, the city and region of Trieste, part of Italy to the west from Socha River, Northern Carniola with Villach (Slo. Beljak) and Klagenfurt (Slo. Celovec) and part of Austrian Styria.
Great /United Albania	Territory of present day Albania, whole Kosovo/a with Metohija, whole Western Macedonia including Ohrid, Prespa, Veles, Kumanovo and Skopje (to the River of Vardar), Eastern Montenegro including Podgorica, Bar and Ulcinj, South-East Serbia including Medvedja, Bujanovac, Vranje and Preshevo, and Southern Epirus with Ioanina (North-West Greece).
Great/United Hungary	Territory of present day Hungary, whole Transylvania, Southern Slovakia, Medjumurje, Prekomurje, Southern Baranja, Srem, whole Banat and Bachka.
Great/United Montenegro	Territory of present day Montenegro, Metohija (Western Kosovo), Northern Sanjak, Southern Dalmatia with Dubrovnik (from Kotor to Neretva River), whole Herzegovina and part of Northern Albania

	with Skadar.
Great/United Greece	Territory of present day Greece, Northern Epirus (Southern Albania), Smyrna region in Asia Minor, part of Vardar Macedonia, whole Cyprus and European portion of Turkey with Constantinople/Istanbul.
Great/United Bosnia-Herzegovina	Territory of present day ("Dayton") Bosnia-Herzegovina (consists "Republika Srpska" and "Federation of B-H"), whole Sanjak, part of Western Serbia (districts of Jadar and Radjevina) and part of Dalmatia.
Great/United Macedonia	Territories of present day FYR Macedonia (Vardar or Serbia Macedonia), Aegean Macedonia (Greek Macedonia) and Pirin Macedonia (Bulgarian Macedonia) – from Mt Olympus to Mt Shar and from Pindus Mt to Rhodops Mt.

I would like to emphasize that while the current state borders of the West European countries are very similar to those established either till 1815 or till 1885, and while the Central and East European borders are almost identical with those established from 1919 to 1924, the external borders of successor states of the ex-Yugoslavia are identical with those established by Titoist government in 1945 as inner borders within socialist Yugoslavia.


The Balkan, South Slavic and Yugoslav nationalism(s) have deep historic roots. They could be traced back to the time of the Baroque epoch, followed by development of the national ideologies in the era of the Enlightenment and the time of Romanticism, and finally coming to us in very slightly modified version of the original postulates. Contemporary irredentism of the Yugoslav nations, which can be also named as "piedmontism" according to the archetype of the Italian unification from 1859 to 1861/66, is essentially based on historical development of the national ideologies of the Yugoslavs. Adopted policy of irredentism led unavoidably Yugoslav peoples to the bloody ethnic conflicts followed by ethnic persecutions and cleansing during the last Yugoslav civil war, which started in 1991 and still is not over on the

ground of the FYR Macedonia.²³⁵ The part of irredentist approach was regular non-recognition of the neighboring nations.

It is necessary to mention in the next paragraphs the most representative cases of such approach - the cases which influenced minds of Yugoslav politicians and national ideologists in the 19th and 20th century.

Firstly, Pavao Ritter Vitezovic, 1652–1713, an aristocrat of German origin of the Dalmatian city of Senj, was the first South Slavic national ideologist who extended the Croatian ethnic name not only to the Balkan Slavs but rather to all Slavs. Using several different medieaval historical sources upon Slavic settlement on the Balkan Peninsula and many of South Slavic literal and historical works that recorded a popular tradition about Balkan-Illyrian origin of all Slavic peoples, Vitezović concluded that legendary Slavic progenitors, brothers Czech, Lech and Rus, should be understood as of Croat ethnolinguistic origin. Identifying the brothers as Croats, Vitezovic concluded that in fact the entire Slavic population in the world is descended from Croats.

During the last stage of the Great Vienna War, 1683–1699, between Christian Alliance against the Ottomans, when the struggle between Venice and the Habsburgs for division of South Slavic lands emerged, Vitezovic wrote a memorandum to the Austrian Emperor in order to refute any Venetian claim on the territory of Croatian historical lands. His work about *limites totius Croatiae* (“the borders of whole Croatia”) demonstrated the borders of a



²³⁵ Until 1923 the majority of population of geographic Macedonia was of Slavic origin. However, because of influx of the Greek settlers from Asia Minor after the Greco-Turkish war (800,000 Greek refugees) followed by the emigration of 350,000 Muslims under the Treaty of Lausanne, the ethnic composition of Aegean Macedonia changed tremendously at the Slavic expense. The Greek Macedonia (Aegean Macedonia) became after 1923 definitely hellenized province.

Greater Croatia, which was divided into two parts: *Croatia Septemtrionalis* (Northern Croatia) north of the Danube composed by Bohemia, Moravia, Lusatia, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania and Russia, and *Croatia Meridionalis* that was the Balkan Peninsula with Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Epirus, Thessaly, Serbia, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Thrace. Balkan Croatia was further subdivided into *Croatia Alba* (White Croatia) and *Croatia Rubra* (Red Croatia). Transdanubian Croatia was subdivided into *Sarmatia*: Poland, Lithuania and Russia, and *Venedia*: Bohemia, Moravia, and Lusatia. Shortly, 17th century Croatian usage of the terms “Illyrian” and “Croat” as the synonyms Vitezovic simply extended to all Slavs understanding them as the peoples of the Croat origin. In the other words, each Slavic people was only speciem of Croatian gens.

The ideology of Pan-Croatianism created by Pavao Ritter Vitezovic, who developed the ancient theory upon derivation of all Slavs from the Croats, was a historical construction and a political program as protest against long-time fragmentation of Croatian historical and ethnic territories, but it was at the same time politics against territorial pretensions on the Croatian historical-ethnic space by Republic of St. Marco. Finally, Vitezovic attempted by his writings to obtain Habsburg political-military support for establishing of united Croatia, i.e. *Croatia rediviva*. Vitezovic's arguments were both historical and ethnolinguistic that helped him to appropriate a vast territory of Europe, from the Adriatic and Black Sea to Ural and the Baltic Sea, to Croatia.

Vitezović even considered the whole territory of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as Croato-Slavic land primarily due to the fact that his knowledge about Poland and Lithuania primarily came from the writings of pro-Polish and pro-Slavic authors who saw Lithuania as Slavic territory, which was in the great extent Polonized, i.e. became of Slavic feature, through the Polish language and culture. In addition, Vitezovic's apprehension of Lithuania as Croato-Slavic land came from the facts that Slavic languages, among the others, were languages of official correspondence within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and what is more important that majority of Lithuania's population was of Slavic origin. Subsequently, according to his Croatocentric doctrine, “Slavic” Grand Duchy

of Lithuania was actually populated by ethnolinguistic Croats and belonged to united and Greater Croatia rediviva.²³⁶

Secondly, the Karlovci Metropolitan Stevan Stratimirovic created the idea of autonomous tributary religion-language-based Orthodox Shtokavian Slavonic – Serbian state in 1804. The state should be governed by the Russian Grand Duke, to be under the Russian political-military protectorate, as well to be only nominally included into the Ottoman Empire and finally to pay annual fixed tribute to the Turkish Sultan as its suzerain. Stratimirovic's concept of politically united religion-language-based Serbian nation within the borders of a single national state anticipated unification of the historical and ethnic Serbian territories from both the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy. His notion of national identification of the Serbs was rather innovative at that time. In the other words, he created the idea of Serbian nation combining the language criteria and the religious principle. As a result, according to Stratimirovic's opinion, Serbian nation was represented by the entire Christian Orthodox South Slavic population who spoke Serbo-Croatian language of the Shtokavian dialect. Subsequently, all Balkan territories settled by the Orthodox-Shtokavian South Slavs had to be included into the unified Serbia. Stratimirovic's ideas were expressed in the *Memorandum* submitted to the Russian Emperor Alexander I Romanov. The *Memorandum* gave a great contribution to the history of Serbian pre-modern political doctrines and ideologies as one of the most important national state project. This project was created during the turning point moment in the whole Serbian history. It was the time of the First Serbian Uprising (1804–1813) against the Turkish lordship. There were many plans during the uprising connected with the question of Serbian liberation and national

²³⁶ Vitezović P. R., *Croatia rediviva: Regnante Leopoldo Magno Caesare*, Zagreb, 1700; Vitezović P. R., *Offuciae Ioannis Lucii de Regno Dalmatiae et Croatiae Refutate*, Zagreb, 1706; Vitezović P. R., *Oživjela Hrvatska*, Zagreb, 1997; Vitezovich P., *Kronika, aliti szpomen vszega szvieta vikov*, Zagreb, 1696; Vitezović P. R., *Mappa Generalis Regni Croatiae Totius. Limitibus suis Antiquis, videlicet, a Ludovici, Regis Hungariae, Diplomatus, comprobatis, determinati* (1:550 000, drawing in color, 69,4 x 46,4 cm.), Hrvatski državni arhiv, Kartografska zbirka (Croatian State Archives, Cartographic Collection), D I. Zagreb, 1699; Ritter P., *Stematographia, sive Armorum Illyricorum delineatio, descriptio et restitutio*, Wien, 1701; Ritter P., *Anagrammaton, Sive Lauras auxiliatoribus Ungariae liber secundus*, Wien, 1689; Ritter P. E., *Indigetes Illyricani sive Vitae Sanctorum Illyrici*, 1706, Zagreb; Ritter P. E., *Responsio ad postulata comiti Marsiglio* in Count Marsigli's collection, manuscript volume 103, entitled *Documenta rerum Croaticarum et Transylvanicarum in Commisione limitanea collecta*, fol. 27r-34r, Biblioteca Universitaria di Bologna, Bologna, 1699; Ritter P. E., *Kronika, Aliti szpomen szvieta vikov*, Zagreb, 1696.

political unification. The Memorandum was one of the most important of them.²³⁷

Thirdly, the movement of Croatian national revival from the first half of the 19th century that is usually called as “Illyrian movement” had Pan-Croatian form of national identification and creation of national states of Croats. According to the ideology of Illyrian movement, all South Slavs (Slovenes, Serbs, Croats, Bulgarians, Slavs from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro) belonged to the Croatian nation. Their national languages were considered as dialects of Croatian language while their territories were accounted into Croatian national soil.²³⁸ Thus, Croatian historian Josip Parlash printed in Zagreb in 1862 Historical Map of Entire Old Kingdom of Croatia. According to the map, Croatia, Dalmatia, Slavonia, Srem, Montenegro, all Adriatic islands and Bosnia-Herzegovina belonged to historic Kingdom of Croatia. The author of the map insinuated that all of these historic lands of Croatia should be integral part of new independent state of Croatia. He was followed by another Croatian historian, N. Z. Bjelovuchic, who printed in 1933 a map of Ethnographic Borders of Croats in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Bjelovuchic included within these borders whole Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Istria, Montenegrin littoral, Srem, whole Baranja, and Western Bachka. Finally, contemporary Croatian historiography follows similar way of thinking regarding territorial dispersion of Croatian nation and ethno-historical borders of united Croatia.²³⁹ Probably, the most extreme case is the book History of Croatia by Dragutin Pavlichevic where is written that Serbs

²³⁷ Димитријевић С. Т., *Стевана Стратимировића, Митрополита Карловачког План за ослобођење српског народа*, Београд, 1926; Руvaraц Д., *Географске белешке о Турској Митрополита Стратимировића из године 1803 и 1804*, Београд, 1903; Слијепчевић Ђ. М., *Стеван Стратимировић митрополит Карловачки као поглавар цркве, просветни и национално-политички радник*, Београд, 1936; Стратимировић С., “Објашњење постанка и узроци устанка српских хришћана 1804”, *Српски књижевни гласник*, № 18, Београд, 1907.

²³⁸ Derkos I., *Genius patriae super dormientibus suis filiis*, Zagreb, 1832; Drašković J., *Disertatio iliti raygovor, darovan gospodi poklisarom zakonskim i budućem zakonotvorcem kraljevinah naših*, Karlovac, 1832; Starčević A., *Politički spisi*, Zagreb, 1971.

²³⁹ For instance: Perić I., *Povijest Hrvata*, Zagreb, 1997; Macan T., *Povijest hrvatskoga naroda*, Zagreb, 1999; Bilandžić D., *Hrvatska moderna povijest*, Zagreb, 1999; Tuđman F., *Hrvatska u monarhističkoj Jugoslaviji*, I, II, Zagreb, 1993; Tuđman F., *Povijesna sudba naroda*, Zagreb, 1996; Marković M., *Descriptio Croatiae*, Zagreb, 1993; Sekulić A., *Bački Hrvati*, Zagreb, 1991; Sekulić A., *Hrvatski srijemski mjestopisi*, Zagreb, 1997.

were not living in Bosnia before the Turks occupied this province in mid-15th century.²⁴⁰

Fourthly, Albanian nationhood was understood in the 19th century romanticist notion of the nationality, i.e., Albanians were the Balkan people whose mother tongue was Albanian one regardless on confessional division of Albanian people into three denominations (Islamic, Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox).²⁴¹ Such “methodology” of national identification was implemented as well as by Communist regime in Albania from 1967 to 1990 under the motto: “Our religion is Albanianism”.²⁴² Within the north Albanian tribes, especially among the Mirditi, the Roman Catholic Church was very influential. The Roman Catholic Church became the principal vigilante of the language, cultural heritage and national identity of the Albanians in Northern Albania.²⁴³ The expression of common sense of Albanian nationhood was uttered by Albanian political leadership in the years of Balkan Wars 1912–1913 in the following slogan: “Neve Shqiptar nuk jemi Greke, Sllav, or Teerk, neve jemi Shqiptar” (“We Albanians are not Greeks, Slavs, or Turks, we are Albanians”). Albanian political “methodology” before and during the Balkan Wars was applied to prepare unification of all “ethnically Albanian territories” in the Balkans into (great/united) Albania - a single national state of all Albanians, i.e., within alleged Albanian historical and ethnic borders demanded by the Albanian League of Prizren in the years of its existence 1878–1881. Essentially similar national-state concepts were also included in political programs of the Albanian Peja League, from 1899, the Greater Albanian Kosovo Committee, from 1920, and the

²⁴⁰ Pavličević D., *Povijest Hrvatske. Drugo, izmijenjeno i prošireno izdanje sa 16 povijesnih karata u boji*, Zagreb, 2000, p. 138.

²⁴¹ However, Albano-Syrian scholar, Muhammad Mūfākū al-Arnaut claims that Islamic faith preserved Albanian nationality (Mūfākū al-Arnaut, “Islam and nationalism in the Balkans – the role of religion in the shaping of peoples” [original in Syrian], Yarmuk University, published in Syria, in *Dirāsāt Tā’rīkhiyya*, September–December, Nos 47 and 48, pp. 121–140, 1993. The same opinion is shared by Yugoslav scholar Balić S., in “Eastern Europe, the Islamic dimension”, *Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 1, No 1, 1979, p. 29. Linguistic nationalism is even today very strong in Europe including and west Europeans as well. For instance: “If you cannot speak Welsh, you carry the mark of the Englishman with you every day. That is the unpleasant truth”, *The Guardian*, November 12th, 1990, p. 1; or: “It is task of all those who live in Catalonia to preserve its personality and strengthen its language and culture”, Pujol J., *Construir Catalunya*, Pòrtic, Barcelona, 1980, p. 36.

²⁴² Turnock D., *Eastern Europe: an economic and political geography*, Routledge, London, 1989, p. 29.

²⁴³ Draškić S., “Nadmetanje Austro-Ugarske i Italije koncem XIX i početkom XX veka u Albaniji”, *Marksistička misao*, Beograd, 1986, Vol. 3, No 2, pp. 129–132. See also: Starova G., “The Religion of the Albanians in the Balkan European Context”, *Balkan Forum*, Skopje, 1993, Vol. 1, No 4, pp. 201–204. The Roman Catholicism and Latin alphabet play also the pivotal role in national identification of the Croats whose language is the same as that of the Serbs.

Second Albanian League, from 1943. Shortly, preservation of the traditional, common law and local community as the organisational basis of the national movement followed by the demand for unification of all territories populated by the Albanians became Albanian primary national interest from 1878 onward: for instance, both Kosovo and Macedonian Albanians demanded in March-May 1981 during the mass demonstrations a separation of Kosovo province and Western Macedonia from the SFRY and their inclusion into a Greater Albania.



The process of creation of Albanian nationality was not finished yet at the end of the 19th century. The Albanian nation was not considered as a political reality in Europe by many politicians. The Albanian people were among the last one in Europe to build their own national identity and national community. When during the sessions of the Congress of Berlin in 1878 the question of Albania and the Albanians was put on the agenda, the German Chancellor (Kanzzellar) Otto von Bismarck decisively rejected to speak about it with the explanation that there was no any kind of

Albanian nationality in Europe.²⁴⁴ At the same period of time, the Serbs (either from Serbia or Montenegro) and the Greeks considered themselves as a nation (i.e., ethnic groups which had its own states) while the Albanians were understood only as the Balkan ethnic group (i.e., the group of people who did not have its own state). Consequently, ethnic group of Albanians could live only as an ethnic minority included into

²⁴⁴ Logoreci A., *The Albanians. Europe's Forgotten Survivors*, Colorado, 1977, p. 41.

some of the Balkan national states and can not expect more than the right to autonomy within them.

At the turn of the 20th century many politicians in Serbia, Montenegro and Greece shared opinion that ethnic group of Albanians was culturally and politically incapable of a modern national development and above all unable and incompetent to establish and administer their own national state.²⁴⁵ The backwardness of development of the Albanian society at the beginning of the 20th century were seen in the fact that initiated process of modernisation (Europeanisation) just started to change the Albanian tribal society, but failed to replace it with a modern European type of the industrial, parliamentary and civil society. The Albanian national movement was seen as an archaic social movement that can not reach a level of national cohesion in modern terms. This movement produced among the Serbs, Montenegrins and Greeks a feeling of jeopardising the political and territorial integrity of Serbia, Montenegro and Greece.²⁴⁶ For them, the theory of Illyrian-Albanian continuity is essentially a nationalistic ideological construction which became a driving political-ideological force for the Albanian politicians to create, from the Albanian point of view, the borders of united Albanian national state according to the Albanian ethnic rights. Geopolitically, this project demanded not only the territories which ethnically and historically belonged to the Albanians, but it went beyond them and encompassed the entire Illyrian-Albanian ethnic population, dispersed in different areas over the neighbouring Balkan regions: Kosovo-Metohija, Southern parts of Central Serbia, Çameria (the Greek Epirus and Greek

²⁴⁵ That can be understood as old theory which was used during the Balkan Wars 1912–1913 to justify Serbian conquering of the Northern Albania, Greek occupation of the Southern Albania and Montenegrin military occupation of the city of Skadar (Scutari) (Туцовић Д., *Србија и Албанија, један прилог критички завојевачке политике српске буржоазије*, Београд, pp. 177–118).

²⁴⁶ The Serbs, Montenegrins, Macedonians and Greeks are accusing the Albanian intellectuals and politicians for using the theory of the Illyrian-Albanian ethnic, linguistic and cultural continuity for the sake of a realization of the political concept of a “Greater/Great Albania” at the Balkans. This concept can not be realized without a radical change of borders of the Balkan states established in 1912–1913, following two Balkan Wars. Such change of the borders would violate the territorial integrity of Serbia, FYR of Macedonia and Greece. In conclusion, the concept of a “Greater/Great Albania”, based among other ideological constructions and on the wrong theory of the Illyrian-Albanian ethnogenesis, may serve as a prelude to the next Balkan war. About the concept and consequences of creation of a “Greater/Great Albania” at the Balkans see, for example, in: Čanak J. (ed.), *“Greater Albania”. Concept and possible Consequences*, Institute of Geopolitical Studies, Beograd, 1998; Borožan Dj., *“Greater Albania” - Origins, Ideas, Practice*, Institute of Military History of the Yugoslav Army, Beograd, 1995. It should be stressed that in addition to the Christian Orthodox faith and the so-called St. Sava’s spiritual legacy, the province of Kosovo-Metohija is a third pillar of Serbian national identity.

part of the Western Macedonia), Western parts of the Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and the Eastern Montenegro.²⁴⁷

Contrary to the theory of a backwardness of the Albanian social development, the Albanian political and intellectual leadership from the turn of the 20th century argued that the Albanians met all conditions required by contemporary political science to be recognised as a nation:

1) they had their separate ethnic, linguistic and cultural identity,

2) Albanian population settled on the Balkan territory is compact,

3) the Albanians had a very precisely defined national program, and

4) they possess abilities to build up a community and their own independent state which would be capable to administer their own people.²⁴⁸

The Albanian political and intellectual leadership often stressed that Albanians with their own national idea would never be successfully integrated either into the Serbian, Montenegrin or Greek societies and their national states. That is, in addition to the other numerous and diverse reasons, due to the facts:

- that the Albanians do not belong to the Slavic or Greek linguistic and cultural groups,
- that a divergence of national developments of the Serbs, Montenegrins and Greeks, on the one hand, and the Albanians, on the other, was so deep, and
- that their different national movements, political elites and national ideologies were incompatible.

The Albanians, surely, were among the very few Balkan peoples who managed to find an internal balance between three confessions (Islam, Roman-Catholicism and Orthodox

²⁴⁷ See the map of a United Albania, drawn by Ali Fehmi Kosturi and distributed since 1938. Historically, there are three attempts to create a "Greater/Great Albania": firstly in 1912 supported by Austria-Hungary; secondly, in 1941 with the direct intervention of the fascist Italy and the logistics support of the Third Reich; and thirdly, from 1998 onward by separation of Kosovo-Metohija from Serbia and separation of Western Macedonia from FYR of Macedonia. In all of these three cases the concept of a "Greater/Great Albania" reasserted the demands by the 1878–1881 Albanian League of Prizren to create an Albanian state inside alleged Illyrian-Albanian historical-ethnic borders.

²⁴⁸ Similar arguments referring to Kosovo-Metohija were presented by the Albanian Kosovo intelligentsia in the 1990s during the Kosovo crisis. See for example: Maliqi S., "Strah od novih ratnih uspeha", *Borba*, Beograd, September 16, 1993, p. 4.

Christianity) and to build up the three-confession's based national identity.²⁴⁹

Fifthly, the nationalists of Pan-Serbian orientation during the interwar period, 1919–1940, primarily members of the Serbian Radical Party, denied existence of separate Slovene and Croat nationalities understanding both of them as parts of Serbian national ethnolinguistic body.

Sixthly, in the second half of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century Bulgarian nation did not exist in many eyes of ultra Serbian, Croatian and Greek nationalists, while many Serbs considered north Albanians as “lost Serbs” (i.e., Albanized Serbs) at the same time when many Greeks understood the Orthodox Albanians as Albanized Greeks.

Seventhly, majority of Croats and Serbs understood all Muslims from Bosnia-Herzegovina as a part of their nationalities and never sincerely recognized either distinctive „Bosnian“ nationality or „Bosniak“ ethnicity. Both Serbs and Croats saw Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims, Roman Catholics and Orthodox Christians as the population who spoke the same language as they were speaking. Consequently, all inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina have to be included into united Serbia, united Croatia respectively. The 19th century philologist Vuk Stefanović



Karadžić and politician Ilija Garašanin are the founders of the idea that only ethnolinguistic Serbs were living in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which should be included into a Great/Greater Serbia. At the same time, Karadžić and Garašanin created the notion of “linguistic” Serbian nationhood and statehood – an

²⁴⁹ In Albania Islam is followed by 70% of Albania's population (in addition to the Albanians from Kosovo-Metohija, Western Macedonia and Eastern Montenegro), Orthodox Christianity is professed by 20% of Albania's population (from the Southern Albania in addition to the Greece's Northern Epirus) and Roman Catholicism, confessed by 10% of Albania's inhabitants (mainly from the Northern Albania in addition to the small group from Kosovo-Metohija). To this very day, the Albanian Muslims are the driving force of the Albanian national movement. The concept of a “United”, or “Great/Greater”, Albania, in its original form, was partially under the influence of a conservative, political Islam.

idea that can be realized only through significant changes of political borders in the Balkans.²⁵⁰

The main achievement of Vuk Stefanović Karadžić was the fact that he gave a new (linguistic) definition of the Serbdom. He replaced the artificial Slavonic-Serbian literary language with Štokavian dialect of the Serb folk. He included into Serbdom all those who spoke Štokavian dialect, regardless on their religion. The Serbian nation therefore was not exclusively the Orthodox one. If “they spoke Štokavian, common to the Croats and the Serbs, which in Karadžić’s system belonged only to the Serbs, the Roman-Catholics and the Muslims had to be the Serbs.”²⁵¹ Garašanin “clearly accepted a new conception of Serbian linguistic nationhood, thereby rejecting positions of Orthodox traditionalists, he was not accepting the Illyrianist idea of South Slavic reciprocity, which Zach also championed”.²⁵²

Karadžić’s idea of “linguistic” Serbdom and Garašanin’s concept of a united Serbian national state had a great impact on development of Serbian political thought for the future generations of Serbian national workers. For instance, Serbian geographer and historian, Miloš St. Milojević, influenced by



Karadžić’s and Garašanin’s teaching, printed a „Historical-Ethnographic-Geographic Map of the Serbs and Serbian (Yugoslav) lands in Turkey and Austria“ in 1873 in Belgrade. According to the map, all South Slavs were seen as ethnolinguistic Serbs and all territories

settled by them (38 historical provinces) should compose a united Serbia as a national state of all Serbs. Milojević was soon followed by Serbian professor of history, ethnology and geography, Vladimir Karić, who printed in 1887 another map

²⁵⁰ Караџић В. С., “Срби сви и свуда”, *Ковчежић за историју и обичаје Срба сва три закона*, № 1, Беч, 1849; Караџић В. С., *Црна Гора и Бока Которска*, Београд, 1972; Караџић В. С., *Писменица сербског језика, по говору простог народа*, Беч, 1814; Гарашанин И., *Начертаније*, Београд, 1844 (secret document). See: Sotirović B. V., “Nineteenth-century ideas of Serbian “linguistic” nationhood and statehood”, *Slavistica Vilnensis*, Kalbotyra 49 (2), Vilnius, 2000, pp. 7–24; Љушић Р., *Књига о Начертанију. Национални и државни програм кнежевине Србије (1844)*, Београд, 1993.

²⁵¹ Banac I., *The National Question in Yugoslavia. Origins, History, Politics*, Ithaca and London, 1993, p. 84.

²⁵² *Ibid.*

of ethnogeographic dispersion of the Serbs at the Balkans. For him all South Slavs, except Bulgarians and Slovenes, were ethnolinguistic Serbs.²⁵³ His suggestion was that the national-state's borders of the Serbs should be identical with the ethnogeographic dispersion of the Serbian nation at the Balkans. Soon after the last Yugoslav civil war of 1991–1995 followed by the destruction of FR Yugoslavia, Serbian philologist from Belgrade and the university professor, Petar Molosavljević claimed in his book *Serbs and their Language* (Priština, 1997) that overwhelming majority of Yugoslavia's Slavic population are originally ethnolinguistic Serbs. In other words, a reader can very easily conclude that external borders of Republic of Serbia (as potentially a national state of all Serbs) should be justifiably “moved” westwards in order to include Štokavian lands of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, main parts of Croatia and Dalmatia and whole Slavonia.²⁵⁴

Eighthly, in the mid-19th century increased cultural emancipation of Slovenes within the Habsburg Monarchy caused more demands for political autonomy for Slovenian lands in the monarchy. Slovenian intellectual elite drafted in revolutionary years of 1848–1849 for the first time in history a political program for creation of a “United Slovenia”. They called for unification of all Slovenian ethnic lands into a single political province within the Habsburg Monarchy with their own parliament. Slovenian language will be an official language in “United Slovenia”.

Finally, the area of Macedonia was the crucial point of disputes among the Balkan states at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century (1870–1913). The clash of the Balkan nationalism(s) over Macedonia and Macedonian Slavs was a result of:

- a struggle between European Great Powers over the territory of the Balkans,
- development of the young Balkan Christian states, and
- a national awakening of the Christian population within the borders of the Ottoman Empire.

²⁵³ Проф. Карић В., *Србија. Опис земље, народа и државе*, Београд, 1887, colored “Map of Dispersion of the Serbs” between pages 240 and 241.

²⁵⁴ Милосављевић П., *Срби и њихов језик. Хрестоматија*, Приштина, 1997.

A policy of European Great Powers in regard to the “Eastern Question” inclined in favor of protection of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, what means in favor of protection of the status quo at the Balkans. On other hand, the Balkan states had to finish their own process of national liberation and possible unification, what means to dissolve the Ottoman Empire. However, their wish to finish the process of national liberation was challenged by their own antagonistic nationalisms how to partition liberated territory from Turkey. This problem had two main issues: historical and ethnic backgrounds of their territorial demands. Both of them became bases for their requirements over the territory of Macedonia. The crucial problem was to fix exact borders between the Balkan states after the military victory over the Ottoman Empire. All Balkan nations at that time accepted a German romanticist principle of creation of the national state: “one language-one nation-one state”. However, practical implementation of this principle at the Balkans, especially in some regions like Macedonia or Bosnia-Herzegovina, became tremendously difficult for the reason that different nations (ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious groups) lived mixed together as a consequence of migrations. The faith even today plays one of the crucial roles in ethnic or national identification among the Yugoslav and Balkan peoples and it will have a strong impact on their group’s identification in the future as well. Religious identity plays important role in defying the borders of ethnonational group because religious association is allied with the territorial aspect of the group identification. For that reason, the aspect of confession plays in many cases a pivotal role in fixing and demarcating the “national” living space, contributing at the same time to the image of the territory which has a particular (religious) character. However, the nationalism of the Balkan ethnic groups, being unable to fix clear ethnic and national-state borders, found in many historical cases as the best “solution” to “solve” the border problems: different types of “ethnic cleansing”, assimilation and exchange of the ethnic minorities.

The geo-political background played also a significant role with regard to the “Macedonian Question”. Serbia as a continental state, being at the Northern Balkans with the state's borders on the Danube, was under strong political, economic and cultural influence from the Central Europe.

Serbian foreign policy became completely changed after the Berlin Congress in 1878. Up to the Berlin Congress Serbian foreign policy was directed towards the west; in other words, towards Bosnia-Herzegovina with a final aim to annex this Ottoman province. However, after the congress Serbian aspirations concerning territorial enlargement and national unification turned to the south where the Ottoman Empire was in the process of internal dissolution and dismemberment. Serbia's policy toward the "Macedonian Question" was characterized by three national and political-economic reasons:

- the first one was expressed in her desire to annex part of Macedonian territory, which was considered to be populated by the ethnolinguistic (Štokavian speaking) Serbs,
- the second one was based on her desire to escape from political and economic patronage by Austria-Hungary by obtaining the exit to the Aegean Sea as Serbia's exit to the Adriatic Sea by unification with Montenegro was halted and obviated by Austria-Hungary after 1878, and
- the basic argument of those Serbs who claimed that the Macedonian Slavs (or one part of them) are ethnic Serbs is based on the fact that Slavic population from Macedonia has one typical Serbian national custom: the *slava* – a family celebration of the day when the family ancestor was converted to Christianity.

Similar territorial requirements and desires were present in political programmes of national unification by all other Balkan nations and states, as for instance in the case of Greece that was and is both Balkan and Mediterranean state. During the period of national revival the Greek policy concerning territorial enlargement was fluctuating between the north and the south: in other words, between the mainland and the islands. Bulgarian penetration (from the west) into Macedonia, in comparison to Serbian political-economic penetration (from the north) and Greek (from the south), was strongest. Bulgarian foreign policy was mainly directed towards Macedonia. For Bulgarian foreign policy makers the annexation of all Macedonia was the best instrument to

prevent Serbia's and Greece's²⁵⁵ attempts to have a common state's borders by division of Macedonia between them.²⁵⁶ At the turn of a century „Macedonian Question“ became a main apple of discord between Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece.

However, during the last decade of the 19th century an additional political factor emerged and took important place and role in solving the “Macedonian Question”. It was Bulgaria's sponsored *Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization* – IMRO, which worked under the slogan; “Macedonia for the Macedonians”. Officially, the IMRO was fighting either for an autonomous status of Macedonia within the borders of the Ottoman Empire or for political unification of the entire territory of historical and geographic Macedonia as an independent state. Nevertheless, the IMRO was under strong Bulgarian political influence and in the course of time received visible Bulgarian national character. The Serbian official political



²⁵⁵ From the Greek point of view, ethnic Slavs who are living within the borders of the present-day Greece are understood and officially recognized as the “Slavophone Greeks”.

²⁵⁶ According to Serbian-Bulgarian Agreement reached on March 3rd, 1912 against the Ottoman Empire the territory of Macedonia was to be shared among themselves on the following way:

- all territory of Macedonia that was eastwards from the Mt. Rhodope and the River of Struma will be annexed by Bulgaria,
- Serbia would annex all portion of “liberated territories” from the Ottomans westwards and northwards from the Mt. Shara, and
- the central portion of Macedonia, between the Mt. Rhodop and Mt. Shara was proclaimed as a “contested territory”.

However, Belgrade and Sofia preliminary divided this disputed zone (“contested territory”) of Macedonia by drawing a delimitation line that was running from the Lake of Ohrid to Kjustendil between Skopje and Veles. According to the agreement, Serbia will not claim the territories southwards from this line, while Bulgaria will accept a demarcation line arbitrated by the Russian Emperor (“Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Kingdom of Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Serbia with the secret Appendix”, Sofia, February 29th (old style), 1912, in Snežana Trifunovska (ed.), *Yugoslavia Through Documents. From its creation to its dissolution*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1994, pp. 114–117). Similarly to this case from the beginning of the 20th century at the end of the same century there were ideas of division of Macedonia among Serbian politicians. Thus, for instance, Vojislav Šešelj, a leader of ultra right Serbian Radical Party favored the partition of the FYR of Macedonia between Serbia and Bulgaria with small areas given to Albania. There were Serbs who suggested in 1992 to the Greeks to be established a common Greek–Yugoslav border by dividing the territory of the FYR of Macedonia between Greece and the FR of Yugoslavia.

circles rejected to recognize Macedonian autonomous status within the Ottoman borders fearing that such kind of autonomous Macedonia will be finally included into the borders of Bulgaria. The idea of San Stefano Bulgaria from 1878 became a crucial fear for the Greek and Serbian territorial aspirations at the Balkans. In both Belgrade and Athens, especially after 1908, it existed a strong consternation that Bulgaria would incorporate whole Macedonia as she did with the Eastern Rumelia in 1885. In fact, Belgrade and Athens wanted to divide Macedonian territory between themselves and Bulgaria.²⁵⁷

The most eminent proponent of the concept of a United Macedonia became the IMRO either before the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 or after Macedonia's independence in 1991. Today, this party-movement under the current name of the "VMRO-DPMNE" (the *Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity*) is politically

working under the official slogan of "Spiritual and Territorial

Unification of Macedonia". In the case of territorial unification of the entire geographical Macedonia into a



single national state, the territory of such United Macedonia would cover the area of 499,00 square km. and would be composed by 132,000 square km. of a Greek Macedonia, 256,000 square km. of the FYR of Macedonia, and 111,000 square km. of a Bulgarian Macedonia. The total population of United Macedonia would be (according to the 1991 census) 4,5 million, as the population of Bulgarian part of Macedonia is 400,000, while the population of both the Greek Macedonia and the FYR of Macedonia are approximately the same, a little more than 2 million each.

²⁵⁷ See: Aarbakke V., *Ethnic Rivalry and the Quest for Macedonia 1870–1913*, Copenhagen, 1992; Poulton H., *Who are the Macedonians*, London, 1995; Brailsford H. N., *Macedonia. Its Races and their Future*, New York, 1971; Adanir F., *Die Makedonische Frage: Ihre Entstehung und Entwicklung bis 1908*, Wiesbaden, 1979.

In conclusion, for the Balkan nations *territorial* and *national rights* were always of much greater importance than *human* or *civic rights*. This historical fact became a milestone for development of national ideologies among the Yugoslavs, who put on a pedestal of “national policy” the aim to transform ethnographical borders into the national-state borders. A period of the bloody destruction of the SFR of Yugoslavia followed by the inter-ethnic conflicts in Kosovo-Metochija and the FYR of Macedonia (1991–2001) is typical example of such national policy based on the idea of creation of a united national state, if possible without the ethnic minorities.

Inter-Ethnic Conflicts on the Territory of ex-Yugoslavia

“Where are Serbian graves – these are Serbian lands!” (Vuk Draskovic, a leader of Serbian Revival Movement, told on RTV Serbia in November 1990).

A fall of Berlin Wall and the rising of the Iron Curtain was followed in the Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe by two types of the state dismemberment: 1) peaceful (Czechoslovakia), and 2) violent (the ex-Yugoslavia).

There are three main reasons why the SFR of Yugoslavia’s dissolution did not take a model of the Czechoslovak’s peaceful dismemberment in January 1993 that is usually called as a “Velvet Divorce”, which was a direct outcome of the Czechoslovak “Velvet Revolution” in 1989:²⁵⁸

1. ethnic borders between the Czechs and the Slovaks were much “clear” than it was the case with the Yugoslavs, especially with the Serbs, Muslims/Bosniaks and Croats in the mid-Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina);
2. the Yugoslavs, differently to the Czechs and the Slovaks, “entered” the process of “divorce”, i.e. inter-ethnic separation, with strong impact of their own national ideologies whose prime principle was that the national-state borders should be overlapped with ethnogeographical borders of their own nations;

²⁵⁸ Johnson R. L., *Central Europe. Enemies, Neighbors, Friends*, Oxford, New York, 1996, pp. 141–142.

3. the peoples from Czechoslovakia, quite contrary to the Yugoslavs, during the stage of “divorce” (1989–1993) were not psychologically heavily influenced by the “burden of the past”, i.e. by the bloody experience of their inter-ethnic relations during the First and especially the Second World War.²⁵⁹

It is clear that the Yugoslav national leaders used “unresolved” national questions to define their political agendas and make firm their political coalitions by nationalist mobilization.²⁶⁰ One of the purposes of this paper is to answer the question why the “Velvet Revolution” was practically “impossible” in the Yugoslav case. A great part of the answer is



in a history of the Yugoslav national ideologies that is presented in the first half of the paper. In the second half of this paper we will present the examples of the Yugoslav violent inter-ethnic relations during the time of the destruction of ex-Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

For the reason to understand a whole scope of a tragedy resulted from the last Yugoslav civil wars, which were fought to transform ethnographic borders into the national-state borders, and consequently were followed by the policy of ethnic cleansing, it is necessary to

present in the tables below the national composition of the SFR of Yugoslavia and her socialist republics in 1991 (according to the official census results):

²⁵⁹ On the WWII atrocities in Yugoslavia see: Ривели М. А., *Надбискуп геноцида. Монсињор Степинац, Ватикан и усташка диктатура у Хрватској, 1941–1945*, Никшић: Јасен, 1999.

²⁶⁰ In this respect, there are some similarities between the Yugoslav case on one hand and the USSR/Czechoslovak case on the other. See: Bunce V., “Peaceful versus Violent State Dismemberment: A Comparison of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia”, *Politics and Society*, Vol. 27, № 2, June 1999, pp. 217–237.

Table № 4. The Population Structures (in percents) of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and her republics and provinces according to the last pre-war census held in 1991²⁶¹

	SFR Yugoslavia 1991
Muslims	10,0
Serbs	36,2
Croats	19,7
Albanians	9,3
Slovenes	7,5
Macedonians	5,8
Montenegrins	2,3
Yugoslavs	3,0
Others	6,2
TOTAL of SFR YUGOSLAVIA	100 % (23,528,230)
	Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991
Serbs	31,4
Croats	17,3
Muslims	43,7
Yugoslavs	5,5
Others	2,1
TOTAL of BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA	100% (4,354,911)
	Serbia “proper” 1991
Serbs	87,3
Yugoslavs	2,5
Others	10,2

²⁶¹ Sources: Petrović R., “Nacionalni sastav Jugoslavije, 1991”, *Jugoslovenski pregled*, № 1, Beograd, 1992, p. 12; *Statistički kalendar Federativne Republike Jugoslavije*, Beograd, 1993; Baletić M. (ed.), *Hrvatska 1994*, Zagreb, 1994; Sellier A., Sellier J., *Atlas des peuples d’ Europe centrale*, Paris, 1991; *Statistical Office of Republic of Slovenia*, 1993; Denitch B., *Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia*, Minneapolis, London, 1994, p. 29; *Statistički kalendar Jugoslavije 1982*, Savezni zavod za statistiku, Beograd, February 1982, pp. 19–20; *The Republic of Macedonia*, group of authors, Skopje.

	Vojvodina 1991
Serbs	57,2
Hungarians	16,9
Yugoslavs	8,4
Croats	4,8
Montenegrins	2,2
Slovenes	0,8
Others	9,7
	Kosovo-Metohija 1991
Albanians	90,0
Serbs	10,0
Yugoslavs	0,2
TOTAL of whole SERBIA	100% (9,721,177)
	Slovenia 1991
Slovenes	87,8
Croats	2,7
Serbs	2,4
Muslims	1,4
Yugoslavs	0,6
Macedonians	0,2
Montenegrins	0,2
Albanians	0,2
Others	4,7
TOTAL of SLOVENIA	100% (1,966,000)
	Croatia 1991
Croats	78,1
Serbs	12,2
Yugoslavs	2,2
Slovenes	0,5

Montenegrins	0,2
Muslims	0,9
Albanians	0,3
Macedonians	0,1
Others	5,5
TOTAL of CROATIA	100% (4,760,344)
	Macedonia 1991
Macedonians	65,3
Albanians	21,7
Serbs	2,1
Turks	3,79
Romanies	2,56
Vlachs	0,3
Moslems	1,5
Others	2,6
TOTAL of MACEDONIA	100% (2,033,964)
	Montenegro 1991
Montenegrins	61,8
Muslims	14,6
Albanians	6,6
Serbs	9,3
Yugoslavs	4,0
Others	3,7
TOTAL of MONTENEGRO	100% (616,327)



A map of ethnographic dispersion of six Yugoslav nations and biggest minorities with administrative borders of six republics and two autonomous provinces in 1991 according to the last census. This map of western origin is fake in two points: Serbian population is not presented in major part of Kosovo and northern Montenegro and the ethnic structure of Montenegro is much more complex as it is on the map

One of the most relevant estimations of the Yugoslavs who emigrated from their home countries or places of living, becoming officially or not refugees or displaced persons during the civil war of 1991–1995 is between 3,5 to 5 million according to *The Economist*.²⁶² According to the western sources, only six months from the outbreak of the warfare there were already 2,3 million of the Yugoslavs whom we can call as displaced persons. Joanne van Selm-Thorburn suggests that there were only from Bosnia-Herzegovina around 2,3 million of displaced persons; 1,3 million of them were living somewhere within Bosnia-Herzegovina, either inside of the “safe areas” or not.²⁶³ Around half of a million displaced peoples were situated on the territories of Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), while another half of a million were in refuge in some of foreign countries, but main part of them in the Western Europe. Former Bosnian-Herzegovinian ambassador in Budapest, Dr. Biserka Turković, claimed that “during aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Yugoslav People's Army” in the first two years of the war there were 140,000 killed persons and about 1,8 million Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees only in 1992.²⁶⁴

A number of casualties in Bosnia-Herzegovina (dead, missing, injured) that was recurrently mentioned by global western media from the year of 1994 onward is c. 200,000.²⁶⁵ However, this figure is based on the estimations offered by the Bosnian-Herzegovinian government and the Bosnian Institute for Research on Atrocities against Humanity and International Law in 1994. According to the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Institute for public Health of the Republic Committee for Health and Social Welfare, there were 146,340 killed, and 174,914 injured inhabitants within a territory controlled by the Army of

²⁶² “Nations on the move”, *The Economist*, Vol. 336, № 7928, August 19–25, 1995.

²⁶³ Selm-Thorburn J., *Refugee Protection in Europe: Lessons of the Yugoslav Crisis*, The Hague, Boston, London, 1995. The same numbers are proposed in ICMPD, *Newsletter on Bosnia and Herzegovina*, № 1, December 1994.

²⁶⁴ Turkovic B., *Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Changing World Order*, Sarajevo, 1996, appendix map № 12. However, these claims by B. Turković are very questionable and have a strong political dimension. For instance, the International Red Cross Organization claims that during the whole four years of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina there were 98,000 of killed people on all sides.

²⁶⁵ For instance: U.S. Committee for Refugees, *World Refugee Survey 1994*, New York, 1995, p. 120; Borden A., Caplan R., “The Former Yugoslavia: The War and the Peace Process”, *SIPRI Yearbook*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, p. 203.

Bosnia-Herzegovina.²⁶⁶ The CIA put the number of 156,500 civilians who lost their lives in Bosnia-Herzegovina without around „8,000“ killed Muslims from Srebrenica’s “safe zone”. The same report claims that there were 81,000 killed soldiers in Bosnia-Herzegovina: 45,000 of Bosnian-Herzegovinian government, 6,500 of Croat forces and 30,000 of Serb military troops.²⁶⁷ These displacements and phisical exterminations of civilians during the war were surely result of intended and planned “ethnic cleansing policy” of belligerent Yugoslav parties.

The crucial question became why did ethnic cleansing occur on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia during the last two decades? The reason is because the Yugoslav “communities of peoples” understood themselves as ethnonations but not as statenations, and consequently according to the 19th century well-known German slogan “Ein-Sprache-Ein Volk-Ein Staat”, each separate ethnolinguistic nation has a „natural“ right to create and live in its own national state. The right of ethnolinguistic nation to have its own independent national state became the main principle of “national self-determination” in ex-Yugoslavia in the 1990s. It ultimately revised political map of the Balkans by creating the new borders of independent states, which were successors of the former Yugoslavia. Since the basic right of ethnolinguistic nation is understood by entire Balkan population as the right to have its own national state, all Balkan states are ethnolinguistic-national but not civic. A crucial feature of “ethnolinguistic national way of thinking” is that a certain group of people (nation) has very specific ethnic²⁶⁸ attributes and it is bound to a specific piece of land. The land is one of the basic components of the group’s identity and consequently it represents group’s homeland, even in the case that this group represents a phisical minority of a population on that territory (for instance, the Serbs in Kosovo-Metohija).²⁶⁹

A proclamation of state independence of the Republic of Croatia in June 1991 (together with the Republic of Slovenia) has as a direct consequence the challenge of her (communist

²⁶⁶ “Socijalno-zdravstvene posljedice agresije na republiku BiH”, *Biltenn Zavoda za zdravstvenu zaštitu R/F BiH*, № 182, October 9th, 1995, p. 1.

²⁶⁷ The CIA memorandum, *Humanitarian Costs of the Fighting in the Balkans*, November 25th, 1995.

²⁶⁸ A simplified formula of ethnicity is: Ethnicity = Kinship + Ancestry + Genetic parameters.

²⁶⁹ About complexity of the “Kosovo question” see: Sotirović V., “Koszovó Csomója”, *Beszélő*, Budapest, № 6, June 1999, pp. 30–35.

fixed) state's borders by Serbia and Croatia's Serbs. Serbian government claimed that only external (state's) borders of the SFR of Yugoslavia were legitimate and inviolable, while the borders between republics were only "administrative" (or „inner“) and set up only by several top communists after the WWII but without a common Yugoslav consensus or general referendum.²⁷⁰ It means that the "inner" borders within the SFR of Yugoslavia had to be reestablished according to the principle of national self-determination. According to Belgrade, a policy of reshaping the "inner" borders (which from June 1991 became in fact the external borders as Slovenia and Croatia proclaimed unilateral independence) has to be founded on a democratic formula "the wish of the people".²⁷¹ According to Serbia's officials, the inner, i.e. just administrative, borders cannot be used as the basis for the creation of the state's borders. If the inner inter-republican borders (*de jure* just the boundaries)²⁷² will be automatically recognized as the borders of independent states then several Yugoslav regions with the Serb and Croat majorities would be out of their national states. It means that 25 percents of total Serb national body will be out of Serbia, or the remains of Yugoslavia ("Serboslavia"), and 22 percents out of all Croats outside Croatia. Such situation can provoke new conflicts in the future. In order to keep all Serbs together and to meet a justice some Serbian historians proposed that post-Yugoslav "Serboslavia" will embrace all ethnographic territories of the former Yugoslavia where the Serbs were in majority before the anti-Serb genocide during the WWII committed by Croats, Bosniaks and Albanians.²⁷³

On the opposite side it was a Croatian point of view that, according to the last Yugoslav Constitution of 1974 (Article 5), the borders between (six) federal republics and (two) autonomous provinces cannot be changed without bilateral

²⁷⁰ The main portion of external borders of SFR Yugoslavia was set up in 1919 during the Versailles' Peace Conference and by peace treaties that followed it in 1919/1920 (Treaties of Neuilly, Saint Germain and Trianon).

²⁷¹ According to the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974, the self-determination rights are valid only for the "Nations of Yugoslavia", but not for the Yugoslav ethnic minorities, republics or autonomous provinces.

²⁷² However, after the Constitution of 1974 the boundaries between six Yugoslav republics and two autonomous provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohija within Serbia) became *in fact* real state's borders of eight independent political unites.

²⁷³ About historical background of Serbian national question at the Balkans see: Екмечић М., *Дуго кретање између клања и орања. Историја Срба у новом веку (1492–1992)*, Београд: Еуро-Giunti, 2010.

agreement by the republics (or autonomous provinces) which borders are in the question: “the boundary between republics can be only changed on the basis of their mutual agreement”. It practically means that Croatia favoured a communist post-WWII based solutions to solve the border questions between Yugoslav republics and autonomous provinces.²⁷⁴

Nevertheless, this border dispute was „internationally“ resolved by the European Community in autumn 1991 by implementation of four basic principles in regard to the question of delimitation between Yugoslavia’s federal republics:

- Yugoslavia’s state’s (external) borders are unchangeable;
- the inter-republican borders can be changed only by collective agreement of the republics;
- until the time when such agreement is reached the former inter-republican borders are recognized as the borders protected by international law (the principle of *uti possidetis iuris*);
- a forcible change of inter-republican borders of ex-Yugoslav (con)federation is not producing any legal effect.²⁷⁵

It became such legal/theoretical foundation on which the European Community recognized on January 15th, 1992 the inner borders between Yugoslavia’s republics as the external borders of newly independent states emerged after destruction of the former Yugoslavia. The same pattern was followed by the European Community/Union in both cases of recognition of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian independence on

²⁷⁴ It has to be noticed that the top leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia during and after the WWII was not Serb but primarily Croat and Slovenian. The party’s general secretary, Josip Broz Tito, was half Croat and half Slovenian, born in Croatia on the very border with Slovenia (Zagorje). Up to now, the Yugoslav historiography still do not have any archival documentary source to use as an explanation for a double standards upon “solving the national questions” in Yugoslavia by the communist leadership in 1945/1946: autonomous regions/provinces for the national minorities were created only in federal unit of Serbia but not in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia or Montenegro. After the war Croatia became even territorially enlarged by annexation of Southern Dalmatia, Dubrovnik, biggest part of Istrian Peninsula and North Adriatic islands likewise Slovenia by annexation of northern portion of Istria. However, at the same time, Serbia became decomposed into three parts: Vojvodina, Kosovo-Metohija and Central Serbia.

²⁷⁵ The European Community by such solution for the border problems between the Yugoslav republics in fact supported Slovenian and Croat point of view. Such solution of the border question encouraged the Muslim government of Bosnia-Herzegovina to proclaim a state’s independence in the spring of the next year claiming that the borders of (Socialist) Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina are inviolable and internationally recognized.

April 6th, 1992 and independence of Albanian Republic of Kosovo in February 2008.²⁷⁶

A part of Yugoslav intellectual leadership, who was thinking in “ethnonational way”, inscribed to their own nations a set of specific characteristics bounding the nation to a specific “national” territory, which has a clear border. The „national“ territory became one of the pivotal ethnonational markers founded on the principle: “there is no separate nation without separate territory”. A specific “national” territory, as one of the crucial points of ethnonational identity, represents the nation's eternal native land, even in the case when ethnonation became, under different historical circumstances, already minority at this territory as, for instance, the Serbs in Kosovo-Metohija.²⁷⁷ In conclusion, territorial demands in the Yugoslav (and Balkan) case are not only inspired by the principle that entire national ethnographic space has to be incorporated into the united national state, but also it is inspired by the argument that certain territory was historically part of a national state (a combination of the „ethnic“ and „historic“ rights).

One can “understand” (but not to justify) why ethnic cleansing, genocide and forced displacement of the people practiced during the last civil war on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia if she/he knows that the leading principles of the Yugoslav political leaderships in solving the national questions were “Ein Sprache–Ein Volk–Ein Staat” and “there is no separate nation without separate territory” combined with a general fear of having large ethnic minorities within its own national state borders as the minorities were considered as the “burden” and “troublemakers”, but not as the “bridges” of cooperation between the Yugoslav nations and their republics.

²⁷⁶ The European Community's/Union's principles upon the border questions in ex-Yugoslavia were directly implemented and in the cases of Czechoslovakia and the USSR.

²⁷⁷ There were three crucial reasons for demographic changes in Kosovo-Metohija after 1945: 1) high Albanian natural birth rate, 2) Albanian run anti-Serb policy of ethnic cleansing, and 3) illegal migrations of Albanians from Albania to Kosovo-Metohija. Serbian intellectuals announced for the first time a “Memorandum” about anti-Serb policy (ethnic cleansing) run by Kosovo-Metohija's Albanians in January 1977. It was followed by a “Petition against the Persecutions of Serbs in Kosovo” in January 1986. This petition was signed by 212 eminent Serb intellectuals and addressed to both people's assemblies of the SR of Serbia and the SFR of Yugoslavia. A second “Memorandum” was drafted in September 1986 by Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts denouncing a demographic de-Serbization and ethnic cleansing of the Serbs in the province of Kosovo-Metohija. All these three protests, which were demanding radical changes of the position of the Serbs in Kosovo-Metohija, were rejected by non-Serb Yugoslavia's communist political party nomenclature as “tendentious and propaganda style documents”. At the same time, the authors and signatories of these three documents of protest were proclaimed by the same nomenclature as the Serb nationalists whose ultimate political aim was to create a greater Serbia.

For instance, Belgrade University's professor of Serb origin from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dr. Vaso Čubrilović, proposed in 1937 to the Yugoslav authorities to reach a deal with the Turkish government regarding the transfer of 200,000 Yugoslav Albanians to Anatolia – a proposal that was finally accepted by the Turkish government.²⁷⁸ This proposal is based on the example of agreed inter-governmental exchange of the ethnic minorities between Turkey and Greece in 1923 after the Greco-Turkish War of 1919–1923.

The „ethnic cleansing“ is usually described as a process in which (para)military detachments of one ethnic group expel civilians of the other ethnic group from their settlements in order to create ethnically pure areas for the members of their own ethnic group. For that reason, military commanders in many cases were ordering to their subordinates to shell a particular village or a part of town/city more than others. It happened also that

refugees of one ethnic group who were already cleaned from their original homes were settled to live in cleaned territory by their own ethnic military groups.²⁷⁹ The policy of ethnic cleansing caused more than 2,000,000 refugees and displaced



persons in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991–1995. This number increased for c. 200,000 with the expulsion of ethnic Serbs from Croatia (i.e. from a self-proclaimed the “Republic of Serbian Krajina”) in August 1995 (a Croatian military-police operation “Oluja”/”Storm”).

Among all sides involved into the last Yugoslav civil war the Serb military and paramilitary detachments were the most successful in ethnic cleansing till the spring of 1995. However, all other sides also adopted this method from the very beginning of the war, even starting the first as it was a case of

²⁷⁸ Hofbauer H., *Eksperiment Kosovo. Povratak kolonijalizma*, Albatros Plus, Beograd, 2009, 55–56. This is in fact a *Memorandum* presented by Vaso Čubrilović in 1937 to the Prime Minister of the Yugoslav government, Milan Stojadinović.

²⁷⁹ For instance, see a documentary movie from 1992: *A Town Called Kozarac* (ÖRT, Austria).

the Croats.²⁸⁰ Croatian regular armed forces became particularly successful during the „Bljesak“ (flash) and „Oluja“ (storm) military and police operations against the „Republic of Serbian Krajina“ in May and August 1995 alongside with the Albanian paramilitary UÇK (*Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës* - „Kosovo Liberation Army“) after the *Kumanovo Agreement* (between Belgrade and the NATO) in June 1999. The most „representative“ blitzkrieg ethnic cleansing operation on the territory of the ex-Yugoslavia was a Croat-lead „Operation Oluja“ in early August 1995 when at least 150,000 (according to some sources between 200,000 and 250,000) ethnic Serbs were forcibly displaced from the „Republika Srpska Krajina“ by Croatian army and police.²⁸¹ A total part of J. B. Tito's Republic of Croatia that was „occupied“ by the local Serbs from 1991 to the summer of 1995 was 30%. A fall of Croatia's Serb-ruled Krajina and Western Slavonia within the borders of the Socialist Republic of Croatia in the summer of 1995, despite UN presence (similar to the case of Srebrenica in July 1995), „was accompanied by the destruction of Serb property and settlements and the evacuation of large numbers of Serb refugees to Serbia, with a knock-on effect for some Croats in Serbia and an attempt to resettle a number of displaced Serbs in Kosovo“.²⁸² In addition, Sarajevo, Bosnian-Herzegovinian capital, was over 1000 days under the shelling from neighboring mountains by the Serb military which resulted, according to the Muslim Bosniak sources, in 10,000 killed and 50,000 injured inhabitants of that city.²⁸³

Even in 1997 there were some 27,000 „missing“ inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Raping was as well very used „mechanism“ of ethnic cleansing policy: only in Bosnia-Herzegovina, according to the official governmental reports, there were around 20,000 raped women by Serb military or

²⁸⁰ See a documentary movie: *Truth is a Victim in Bosnia* (1992, USA).

²⁸¹ „Croatia's Blitzkrieg“, *The Economist*, Vol. 336, № 7924, August 12-18, 1995, p. 31. See: Мишина Ђ. В. (уредник), *Република Српска Крајина. Десет година послуже*, Добра воља, Београд, 2005.

²⁸² Danta D., Hall D., „Contemporary Balkan questions: the geographic and historic context“, in Danta D., Hall D. (eds.), *Reconstructing the Balkans: A Geography of the New Southeast Europe*, John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 1996, p. 28.

²⁸³ Some Muslim authors made equality between Serbian siege and bombardment of Sarajevo in 1992–1994 with the fall of Islamic Kingdom of Granada in Southern Spain in 1492. See as well: „Pregled Istorije Genocida nad Muslimanima u Jugoslavenskim zemljama“, published by the Supreme Islamic Authorities in SFR Yugoslavia, *Glasnik*, № 6, 1991. However, the Serb sources are claiming that during the Muslim/Croat terror in Sarajevo during the war c. 5,000 Serb civilians in the city of Sarajevo have been brutally killed (see documentary movie: *Istina* [truth], 2005). One of those terrorized Serbs from Sarajevo was a famous historian and a member of the Serbian Academy of Science and Art - Milorad Ekmečić.

paramilitary units.²⁸⁴ However, Croatian irregulars carried out as well the policy of mass raping in the region of Posavina in Northern Bosnia,²⁸⁵ while only in the city of Sarajevo have been, according to the Serbian sources, c. 5,000 killed ethnic Serbs by Muslim and Croat military and paramilitary forces.²⁸⁶

It is proposed by the western researchers that the ethnic cleansing during the Yugoslav civil war of 1991–1995 (especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina) was done in majority of cases according to the following (Srebrenica) standard of operation:

- I.** Concentration. Surrounding the area, which had to be cleansed. Warring the residents of their own nationality to leave the area;
- II.** Decapitation. Execution of political leaders and all those who are capable to replace them in the future;
- III.** Separation. Separation of woman, children and old persons from the men who are in “fighting-age” which is usually considered between 16 and 60 years of age;
- IV.** Evacuation. Transportation of women, children and old persons to the border of neighboring territory and expulsion of them to this territory; and
- V.** Liquidation. Execution of all “fighting-age” males and removal of their corps.

Some western authors are willing to compare in the points of similarity the methods of ethnic cleansing in ex-Yugoslavia with the methods of the Nazi “final solution” for the Jews during the WWII.²⁸⁷

A policy of ethnic cleansing in the context of transforming ethnographic into national-state borders in the ex-Yugoslavia from 1991 up today was in many cases combined with the policy of genocide. Genocide means “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- killing members of the group;

²⁸⁴ Mercier M., *Crimes without Punishment: Humanitarian Action in Former Yugoslavia*, Pluto Press, London, 1994, p. 118. However, this number was heavily beaten by several international human rights agencies (see the USA documentary movie: *Truth is a Victim in Bosnia*, 1992).

²⁸⁵ Stiglmayer A., “The Rapes in Bosnia-Herzegovina” in Stiglmayer A., (ed.), *Mass Rape: The War against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, NE, 1996.

²⁸⁶ A most infamous paramilitary leader of the private armed militia in Sarajevo, accused for mass murdering of the Serbs, was a Croat Juka Prazina.

²⁸⁷ See for instance: Gutman R, *A Witness to Genocide*, Shaftesbury: Element, 1993.

- causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and
- forcibly transferring children of one to another group.”²⁸⁸

The last example of ethnic cleansing, combined with the genocide, on the territory of the former Yugoslavia is the case of cleaning the Serb and other non-Albanian population alongside with their cultural inheritance in Kosovo-Metohija organized and committed by the Albanian UÇK in 1998–1999 and their redressed members after the mid-June 1999 when the NATO occupied this region.²⁸⁹

In regard to ethnic cleansing and genocide in Kosovo-Metohija during the conflict in 1998–1999 I refute a common western opinion by the politicians and a part of academics that the Yugoslav military and Serbian police had long-standing original idea to ethnically clean this province from the ethnic Albanians.²⁹⁰ According to this claim, the UÇK was established for the reason to defend ethnic Albanian population from Serb-lead genocide policy, which started on February 28th, 1998 with “Drenica military operation” lead by the Yugoslav Army.²⁹¹ Oppositely to this claim, I argue that the terrorist actions against the Yugoslav military, Serbian police and Serbian civilians launched by the UÇK in the-mid 1990s provoked heavy and bloody response by the Yugoslav authorities that finally lead to a human catastrophe in Kosovo-Metohija and the rest of FR of Yugoslavia caused by both the NATO’s military intervention and Serb-lead revange from March 24th

²⁸⁸ “Article 4, Genocide”, *Amended Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia*, United Nations, June 2001, p. 5.

²⁸⁹ See for instance: Hofbauer H., *Ekperiment Kosovo. Povratak kolonijalizma*, Albatros Plus, Beograd, 2009 (original in German: Hannes Hofbauer, *Experiment Kosovo. Die Rückkehr des Kolonialismus*); Чупић М., *Омета земља. Косово и Метохија (злочини, прогони, отпори...)*, Полит, Београд, 2006; *March Pogrom in Kosovo-Metohija, March 17–19, 2004, with a Survey of Destroyed and Endangered Christian cultural heritage*, Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Serbia and Museum in Priština (displaced), Belgrade, 2004.

²⁹⁰ Especially it is misused for pure political purpose a forged *Horseshoe* plan of ethnic cleansing by the Yugoslav military authorities as this plan was never proved to exist in reality. However, in 2011 it is proved that this plan was just a pure propaganda by the German intelligence service.

²⁹¹ About 1998 war between the UÇK and Yugoslav security forces see western documentary movie (70 min.): *The Valley* (of Drenica in Central Kosovo).

to June 10th, 1999.²⁹² My claim is based, among other sources, on official document of *Indictment Acte d'Accusation against Milošević, Milutinović, Šainović, Ojdanić & Stojiljković, "Kosovo, IT-99-37* filled by the Prosecutor of the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Carla del Ponte, on June 29th, 2001 in The Hague, The Netherlands. In "Additional Facts" of the accusation under paragraph № 83 is clearly written that "this group [UÇK/KLA] advocated a campaign of armed insurgency and violent resistance to the Serbian authorities. In mid-1996, the KLA [UÇK] began launching attacks primarily targeting FRY and Serbian police forces. Thereafter, and throughout 1997, FRY and Serbian police forces responded with forceful operations against suspected KLA [UÇK] bases and supporters in Kosovo".²⁹³ In other words, the Yugoslav and Serbian authorities did not have as its original and prime aim in Kosovo-Metohija's policy to transform ethnographical borders of Serbdom into national-state borders of the Serbs; vice-versa it can be concluded that transformation of ethnographical borders of Albandom into the national-state borders of the Albanians was the rudimental and pivotal political aim of the UÇK, which is actually realized after June 1999. Nevertheless, the terrorist actions of the UÇK surely led to violent responses by the Serbs. However, in some cases these actions led by Serbian security forces are falsificated and used for political propaganda by the western media and the NATO. The most infamous such case was from the mid-January 1999: "In one such incident, on January 15th, 1999, 45 unarmed Kosovo Albanians were murdered in the village of Račak in the municipality of Štimlj/-Shtime".²⁹⁴ This case caused negotiations in Rambouillet castle in France and NATO's ultimatum to the Yugoslav authorities. As ultimatum was rejected, the NATO launched military air-bombing campaign

²⁹² About the Albanian UÇK committed systematic terror acts against the Serbs in Kosovo-Metohija before, during and after the NATO's led military campaign in March-June 1999 see: Чупић М., *Омета земља. Косово и Метохија (злочини, прогони, отпори...)*, Нолит, Београд, 2006.

²⁹³ The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case № IT-99-37-I, "The Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Slobodan Milošević, Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainović, Dragoljub Ojdanić, Vlatko Stojiljković", p. 28.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 29. However, it is known today that all of those 45 killed Albanian males have been a combat members of the UÇK, killed in a fight with Serbian police forces a day before and on January 15th, 1999 brought redressed to the place for the western mass media (Чупић М., *Омета земља. Косово и Метохија (злочини, прогони, отпори...)*, Нолит, Београд, 2006, pp. 304–307; Сотировић Б. В., „Преко Рачка до Велике Албаније“, November 25th, 2010, *Нова српска политичка мисао*, <http://www.nspm.rs/kosovo-i-metohija/preko-racka-do-velike-albanije.html>).

against the FROF Yugoslavia.²⁹⁵ It is sure that this NATO's campaign intensified the armed struggle between the Serb forces and the UÇK that in turn significantly increased the number of refugees and casualties. In addition, there were c. 3,000 Yugoslav citizens-civilians killed by NATO's bombs



regardless that the western sources are minimizing this number to only 500.²⁹⁶

The UNO estimates that even in the autumn of 1998 there were approximately 300,000 displaced persons within Kosovo-Metohija or left the province.²⁹⁷

It was around 15% out of total Kosovo-Metohija's population. The number of over 1,500 killed Kosovo-Metohija's Albanians and 400,000 displaced ethnic Albanians in the province during 1998 calculated by the NATO's officials is very questioned by Ingram M.²⁹⁸ According to the western scholars and sources,

²⁹⁵ "There was an obvious disjunction between the stated military objective of degrading Serbia's military capability (a slow process) and the immediate political objective of halting the forced expulsions and associated killings in Kosovo", Mccgwire M., "Why did we bomb Belgrade?", *International Affairs*, Vol. 76, № 1, January 2000, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, p. 1. Surely, it was a great confusion in regard to the very precise purpose of NATO's military intervention against the FR of Yugoslavia in 1999. See: "The West versus Serbia", *The Economist*, March 25th, 1999, and "Catalogue of Confusion: The Clinton administration's war aims in Kosovo", *Backgrounder*, № 1281, The Heritage Foundation, May 13th, 1999. About the official NATO's goals in the campaign see: "NATO's role in relation to the conflict in Kosovo", <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm>; "Although strategic arguments like preventing the spread of the war or bringing stability to the Balkans were made after the conflict began, it is clear that the principal reason for waging the air campaign was to halt the ethnic cleansing inside Kosovo", "Lessons from the war in Kosovo", *Backgrounder*, № 1311, The Heritage Foundation, July 22nd, 1999.

²⁹⁶ Hyland J., "Human Rights Watch says NATO killed over 500 civilians in air war against Yugoslavia", February 14th, 2000, http://www.wswws.org/articles/2000/feb2000/nato-f14_prn.shtml.

²⁹⁷ The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case № IT-99-37-I, "The Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Slobodan Milošević, Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainović, Dragoljub Ojdanić, Vlatko Stojiljković", p. 28.

²⁹⁸ Compare two sources: "NATO's role in relation to the conflict in Kosovo", <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm>, and Ingram M., "War crimes tribunal report shows Western powers exaggerated Kosovo victims of ethnic cleansing", August 22nd, 2000, http://www.wswws.org/articles/2000/aug2000/koso-a22_prn.shtml. According to the former source "between March 1998 and March 1999, before NATO governments decided upon military action, over 2000 people were killed as a result of the Serb government's policies in Kosovo. During the summer of 1998, a quarter of million Kosovar Albanians were forced from their homes as their houses, villages and crops were destroyed". However, the latter source put 3000 dead bodies discovered in Kosovo immediately after the NATO's military campaign, but it is not clear how many of ethnic Albanians were executed before March 24th, 1999. The International Red Cross Organization claimed in 2010 that before the NATO's intervention it was in all killed 3000 inhabitants in Kosovo-Metohija of all nationalities.

as on March 24th, 1999 the NATO began military actions against the FR of Yugoslavia,²⁹⁹ the Yugoslav authorities proclaimed a state of war at the same day and from tomorrow morning started systematic campaign of killing and forcibly expulsion of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians from the province.³⁰⁰ According to the UNO official report, there were around 750,000 ethnic Albanians from Kosovo-Metohija who took refuge (it is 30% out of total population of this province) in addition to unknown number of killed local Albanians in the operations by the Yugoslav military and Serbian police forces.³⁰¹ According to some unproved estimations, only after two weeks of the NATO's military campaign there were 1,1 million displaced persons in the province.³⁰² The US administration claimed by no any relevant proof that in the same period of time there were even more than 90% of all ethnic Albanians „expelled“ from their homes in Kosovo-Metohija. According to the same source, in May 1999 there were 600,000 internally displaced persons in Kosovo-Metohija, while approximately 700,000 ethnic Albanians from the province took refuge in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the FYR of Macedonia and Montenegro. The same source claims that 500 residential areas, including 300 villages, were at least partially burned in Kosovo-Metohija “in an attempt to ensure that the ethnic Albanian residents do not

²⁹⁹ There are enough evidences today that the NATO used fals information and even the lies in regard to the real situation in Kosovo-Metohija in 1998–1999 for the sake to justify in fact military aggression on Serbia and Montenegro in March 1999. For example, see the article: Wolfgram A. M., “Democracy and Propaganda: NATO's War in Kosovo”, *European Journal of Communication*, Vol. 23 (2), 2008, pp. 153–171. In the abstract of the article is written: “This article uses the examples of Operation Horseshoe and the fighting at Račak and Rugovo during the Kosovo conflict of 1998 and 1999 to illustrate how democratic governments in the US and Germany attempted to manipulate public perceptions of the Kosovo conflict to justify the 1999 war”. It is also clear today that the final political task of joint NATO and UÇK forces was Kosovo separation from Serbia and formal political independence but not protection of human and minority rights. About this problem see: Vidaković Petrov K., “Kosovo: Minority Rights versus Independence”, *Serbian Studies: Journal of the North American Society for Serbian Studies*, 19 (2), 2005, pp. 231–244.

³⁰⁰ “There was strong evidence that atrocities against the Albanian communities carried out by Serb and Yugoslav forces [during NATO's campaign in 1999] were organized and systematic”, *As seen, as told*, OSCE report, part I, Executive summary, 1999, <http://www.osce.org/kosovo/reports/hr/part1/p0cont.htm>. Compare with the following statement: “In Kosovo, the persecution of the Kosovo Albanian population is clear, from the start of the armed conflict in 1998, and it should be viewed as a policy of persecution directed and controlled from Belgrade, for reasons best known to President Milosevic and his close advisers”, *Reality Demands. Documenting Violations of International Humanitarian Law in Kosovo 1999*, June 27th, 2000, p. 260, <http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=57>.

³⁰¹ The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case № IT-99-37-I, “The Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Slobodan Milošević, Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainović, Dragoljub Ojdanić, Vlatko Stojiljković”, p. 31.

³⁰² “Don't let the endgame be his”, *The Economist*, April 8th, 1999.

return”.³⁰³ The office of the UNHCR stated that there were 211,000 Kosovo-Metohija's refugees in Macedonia, 404,000 in Albania, 17,000 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 62,000 in Montenegro on May 5th, 1999. Finally, according to the NATO's official report from July 15th, 1999 “by the end of May 1999, over 230,000 refugees had arrived in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, over 430,000 in Albania and some 64,000 in Montenegro. Approximately 21,500 had reached Bosnia-Herzegovina and over 61,000 had been evacuated to other countries. Within Kosovo itself, an estimated 580,000 people had been rendered homeless. It is estimated that by the end of May, 1,5 million people, i.e. 90% of the population of Kosovo, had been expelled from their homes. Some 225,000 Kosovar men were believed to be missing. At least 5000 Kosovars had been executed”.³⁰⁴ In sum, “the bulk of the atrocities against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo occurred after the air war [NATO's air strikes] commenced on March 24th, [1999]”.³⁰⁵

If we will take into consideration the absolute number of refugees, displaced persons and displaced beneficiaries from the territory of the former Yugoslavia before the Kosovo conflict the scheme is as bellow:

Table № 5. Refugees and Displaced Beneficiaries (from the UNHCR) on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia in August 1995³⁰⁶

	Refugees	Displaced Beneficiaries	% of Beneficiaries
Bosnia-Herzegovina	2,749,000	2,749,000	80,47

³⁰³ “Erasing History: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo”, Report released by the U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., May 1999, http://www.state.gov/www/regi...pt_9905_ethnic_ksvo_exec.html. According to the same source “the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ generally entails the systematic and forced removal of members of an ethnic group from their communities to change the ethnic composition of a region”.

³⁰⁴ “NATO's role in relation to the conflict in Kosovo”, <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm>.

³⁰⁵ “Lessons from the war in Kosovo”, *Background*, № 1311, The Heritage Foundation, July 22nd, 1999. About the problem of credibility dilemma upon the NATO's military intervention in 1999 see: Sean K., “After Kosovo: NATO's Credibility Dilemma”, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 31 (1), 2000, pp. 71–84; Hadjimichalis C., “Kosovo, 82 Days of Undeclared and Unjust War: A Geopolitical Comment”, *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 7 (2), 2000, pp. 175–180.

³⁰⁶ Source: UNHCR, <http://www.igc.apc.org/balkans/refugees.html>; UNHCR, *The State of the World's Refugees*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, p. 118.

Croatia	385,000	385,000	11,27
Macedonia	6,300	6,300	0,18
Montenegro	44,000	25,000	0,73
Serbia	405,000	160,000	4,68
Slovenia	26,000	26,000	0,76
TOTAL for ex-Yugoslavia	3,680,300	3,416,300	100

The population of Bosnia-Herzegovina suffered mostly during the last civil war³⁰⁷ in the former Yugoslavia. The number of refugees and displaced inhabitants from this republic is given in the table below:

Table № 6. Refugees and War-Affected persons in Bosnia-Herzegovina in August 1995 by the regions and municipalities³⁰⁸

	Displaced persons	War-Affected persons	TOTAL
Banja Luka	183,000	100,000	283,000
Bihać	65,000	140,000	205,000
Eastern Bosnia	248,000	224,000	472,000
Sarajevo	140,000	300,000	440,000
Southern Bosnia	106,000	202,000	308,000
Tuzla	237,000	193,000	430,000

³⁰⁷ “This was no conventional ‘civil war’, but a series of conflicts embodying very definite territorial ambitions within and against an independent sovereign state as recognized by the EC, set within a framework of even wider (competing) territorially expressed newly unleashed nationalist aspirations”, Danta D., Hall D., “Contemporary Balkan questions: the geographic and historic context”, in Danta D., Hall D. (eds.), *Reconstructing the Balkans: A Geography of the New Southeast Europe*, John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 1996, p. 30.

³⁰⁸ Source: UNHCR, <http://www.igc.apc.org/balkans/refugees.html>; UNHCR, *The State of the World's Refugees*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, p. 118.

Zenica	348,000	263,000	611,000
TOTAL for Bosnia-Herzegovina	1,327,000	1,422,000	2,749,000

Only few months since the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina broke out (April 6th, 1992) a total number of all refugees and internally displaced persons from the territory of the ex-Yugoslavia was 2,6 million including and 500,000 people from the territory of J. B. Tito's Republic of Croatia according to the report by the UNHCR. The Croatian Office for Refugees announced in February 1992 that there were 320,000 refugees and displaced persons on the territory of Republic of Croatia, but already in October 1992 the number of refugees in Croatia (including and „Republika Srpska Krajina“), according to the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, mounted to 700,000.³⁰⁹ However, only six months later there were already 3,6 million of Yugoslavs together with 2,3 million from Bosnia-Herzegovina who required protection and assistance from the UNHCR.³¹⁰

The situation at that time deteriorated as on the territory of Western Herzegovina in March 1993 an armed conflict followed by ethnic cleansing started between the Croats (the HVO - “Croatian Defence Council” and the HOS – “Croatian Defense League”)³¹¹ and the Muslims (the “Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina” and the “Green Berets”)³¹² especially in the area of Mostar, Konjic and Jablanica.³¹³ In March 1993 the Muslim

³⁰⁹ Cunliffe S. A., Pugh M., “The Politization of UNHCR in the Former Yugoslavia”, *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. 10, № 2, 1997, p. 144; Minear L. *et al.* (eds.), “Humanitarian Action in the Former Yugoslavia: the U.N.’s Role 1991–93”, *Occasional Paper*, № 18, Thomas J. Watson Jr., Institute for International Studies and Refugee Policy Group, 1994, p. 92. According to the data by Croatian government presented on the press conference on January 22nd, 1992, there were 322,000 refugees in this republic but majority of them were internally displaced persons.

³¹⁰ *The State of the World’ Refugees. The Challenge of Protection*, UNHCR, Penguin Books, New York, 1993, p. 79.

³¹¹ The HOS paramilitary detachments of 5000 men were organized and led by ultra-right Croatian Party of Right of Dobroslov Paraga. In addition to those Croatian units there were also Croat units of “Black Legion” and “Zebra” operating in both Croatia and Herzegovina. During the whole war in Bosnia-Herzegovina the presence of the regular army forces of Republic of Croatia was constant in Western Herzegovina.

³¹² The Green Berets were formed by the leading Muslim political party in Bosnia-Herzegovina – the SDA (“Party of Democratic Action”).

³¹³ *The State of the World’ Refugees. The Challenge of Protection*, UNHCR, Penguin Books, New York, 1993, pp. 79, 91; Woodward S. L., *Balkan Tragedy. Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*. The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1995, p. 254.

army started military campaign against the Croats in Konjic area, while the Croat local militia attacked Mostar in May 1993. In the mid-June 1993 Croatian (western) part of Mostar was already ethnically cleansed likewise the towns of Stolac and Chapljina in Herzegovina, mainly populated until that time by the Muslims.³¹⁴ In Eastern Herzegovina combined Croat-Muslim offensive in May 1992 against the Serbs resulted in 45,000 expelled Serb civilians from the area of the valley of Neretva and the city of Mostar.³¹⁵ During the Croat-Muslim conflict in 1993, ethnic Croats were forced to live their homes in Travnik and Vareš or were killed especially in the area of Konjic.³¹⁶ In Central Bosnia, for instance in the valley of Lashva, Muslim offensive in spring 1993 was also accompanied by ethnic cleansing of the Croats.³¹⁷ The Serbs affirm that from May to October 1992 Muslim army burned all Serbian villages around Gorazde including and Serb populated quarter in this city.³¹⁸ The town of Srebrenica in Eastern Bosnia was in March-April 1993 on the edge of total humanitarian catastrophe with 45,000 Muslim refugees under Serb encirclement. The Eastern Bosnia became depopulated of both Serbs and Muslims even in the mid-1993.

If we would take into consideration the fact that the hundreds of thousands of Bosnian-Herzegovinian civilians fled to the neighboring countries or emigrated far further we can conclude that around 70% of total population from this republic was directly affected by the warfare and constant violations of human rights. According to the CIA sources, there were between 900,000 and 1,200,000 Bosnia-Herzegovina's

³¹⁴ *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, March 22nd, 1994; *Fourth Periodic Report...*, UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights document, E/CN.4/1994/8, September 8th, 1993.

³¹⁵ *Synaxi*, № 44, October-December 1992, pp. 47–51; Bojić D., (ed.), *Stradanja Srba u Mostaru i dolini Neretve: Knjiga dokumenata*, Komesarijat za izbeglice Republike Srbije, Beograd, 1996; *Report submitted to the Commission of Experts...*, UN document YU/SC 780–92/DOC-1/E, Belgrade, 1992; Jevremović P., “An Examination of War Crimes Committed in the Former Yugoslavia”, *Međunarodni Problemi/International Problems*, Vol. 46, № 1, Beograd, 1994, pp. 39–73.

³¹⁶ *Statements of Eye-witnesses to the Massacres at the Village of Doljani on July 28th, 1993*, UN/SC document S/26617, October 23rd, 1993; UN/SC document S/1994/154, February 10th, 1994.

³¹⁷ UN/SC document S/26454, September 16th, 1993; UN/SC document S/26616, October 22nd, 1993.

³¹⁸ *Washington Post*, August 31st, 1992, p. A 12; *New York Times*, September 10th, 1992, p. 10; *Politika*, September 7th, 1992; TANJUG, October 1st, 1992; The Committee for Collecting Data on Crimes Committed against Humanity and International Law, *War Crimes against Serbs on the Territory of Gorazde (1992–1994)*, Belgrade, 1994; *Borba*, August 3rd, 1992, p. 2; *Borba*, October 6th, p. 3; Ivanišević M., *Hronika naših groblja: ili slovo o stradanjima Srpskog naroda Bratunca, Milića, Skelana i Srebrenice*, Komitet za prikupljanje podataka o izvršenim zločinima protiv čovečnosti i međunarodnog prava, Beograd, Bratunac, 1994.

refugees that left the country and around 1,500,000 displaced persons still were living in Bosnia-Herzegovina.³¹⁹

Slovenian Red Cross claimed that already in May 1992 there were 30,000 refugees in Slovenia: 22,000 of them from Bosnia-Herzegovina.³²⁰ This number of “protection seekers” in Slovenia increased in July 1992 to 70,000.³²¹ The Office for Immigration and Refugees of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia admitted in December 1994 that there were 23,000 refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina located in Slovenia, but this number decreased in May 1995 to 21,500.³²² However, the number of people from Bosnia-Herzegovina who sought any kind of protection in Slovenia during the whole period of the civil war in this ex-Yugoslav republic was 170,000. Ethnic background of these refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina



situated in Slovenia was as such: Muslims 77%, Croats 17%, Serbs 2%, and “others” 4%. The figures of ethnic background

³¹⁹ The CIA memorandum, *Humanitarian Costs of the Fighting in the Balkans*, November 25th, 1995.

³²⁰ According to Milanovich Natasha, “as a consequence of the war a significant number of refugees fled to Slovenia from Croatia in 1991 and Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1992. The official figures range between 40,000 and 70,000 people” (Milanovich N., “Slovenia in the new geopolitical context” in Carter F. W. and Norris H. T. (eds.), *The Changing Shape of the Balkans*, UCL Press Limited, London, 1996, pp. 44–45.

³²¹ Helsinki Watch, *War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, Human Rights Watch, Washington, 1992, p. 140.

³²² The Office for Immigration and Refugees: the Government of the Republic of Slovenia, *Persons under Temporary Protection in the Republic of Slovenia* (undated); The Office for Immigration and Refugees: the Government of the Republic of Slovenia, *A Cry to the World*, June 1995.

of Bosnia-Herzegovina's refugees in Austria was: Muslims 62%, Croats 13%, Serbs 16%, and "others" 9%.³²³

Over 125,000 Bosnia-Herzegovina's inhabitants got official status of refugees in Croatia already after first two weeks of the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina who wanted to emigrate to Croatia were choosing only two directions: either towards Slavonia (Slavonski Brod) or Dalmatia (Split, Ploče, Makarska). However, many of them had to pass through the areas controlled by Croat or Serb forces. An average price for "the passage" through the "enemy's territory", likewise for escaping from besieged Sarajevo via the Tunnel (under the airport), was usually DM 5,000 per person. The territory of "Bihac's pocket" or Cazinska Krajina (Muslim controlled enclave of Northwestern Bosnia between Serb-controlled "Republika Srpska" in Bosnia-Herzegovina and "Republika Srpska Krajina" in Croatia) accepted till the end of April 1992 approximately 45,000 Muslim refugees from other "cleaned" areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina.³²⁴ According to some Hungarian sources, there were about 25,000 ethnic Hungarians fled forcibly the territory of the Northern Serbia (Vojvodina) in 1992. Serbia had 166,000 refugees even before Bosnian-Herzegovinian civil war started, while only after the first month of Bosnian-Herzegovinian conflict according to the Serbian Red Cross organization there were 243,289 refugees in Serbia, of whom there were 73,975 from Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the same time, Montenegro accepted 14,227 refugees.³²⁵

All in all, more than 1,000,000 Bosnia-Herzegovina's people were under category of "internally displaced persons", while 1,200,000 Bosnia-Herzegovina's inhabitants fled to other countries, mainly to other republics of the former SFR of Yugoslavia.³²⁶ The table below presents the figures regarding the UNO appeals for assistance in the SFR of Yugoslavia 1991–1994:

³²³ ICMPD, *Background Data on Refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina in the C.E.I. States*, March 1995.

³²⁴ Source: Office of the Bihac Red Cross.

³²⁵ Minority Rights Group, *Refugees. Asylum in Europe?*, Minority Rights Publications (undated), pp. 84–85.

³²⁶ CRPC, UNHCR, *Return, Relocation and Property Rights. A discussion paper*, Sarajevo, 1997, pp. 3–5.

*Table № 7. UNO Appeals for Assistance in the Former Yugoslavia, December 1991– June 1994*³²⁷

	Decemb er 1999	May 1992	Decem ber 1992	March 1993	Decem ber 1993	June 1994
Refugee s	500,000	1,00 0,00 0	2,780,0 00	3,055,0 00	3,820,0 00	4,259, 000
Aid (US\$ 000s)	24,3	174, 4	561,7	642,5	1335,3	1675

One of the most realistic estimations how many Bosnian-Herzegovinian citizens either fled the country or were forcibly expelled from their residence places during the war is 2,5 million.³²⁸ This number includes around 700,000 Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees, asylum seekers or emigrants who are stationed in one of European states and over 600,000 in some of areas of the former Yugoslavia which are not under military control of the forces of their own nationality. For instance, according to the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, the number of refugees located in the FR of Yugoslavia in June 2001 (not included a huge number of expelled Serbs from Kosovo-Metohija after June 9th, 1999) is as bellow:

³²⁷ Sources: *The State of the World' Refugees. The Challenge of Protection*, UNHCR, Penguin Books, New York, 1993; *Refugees at a glance: The Monthly Digest of UNHCR Activities*; Cunliffe S. A., Pugh M., "The Politization of UNHCR in the Former Yugoslavia", *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. 10, № 2, 1997, p. 141; Minear L. *et al.* (eds.), "Humanitarian Action in the Former Yugoslavia: the U.N.'s Role 1991–93", *Occasional Paper*, № 18, Thomas J. Watson Jr., Institute for International Studies and Refugee Policy Group, 1994.

³²⁸ Cviic C., "Running Late: But is Dayton Still on Truck?", *The World Today*, June, 1996.

Table № 8. Refugees in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in June 2001 (not included Serb refugees from Kosovo-Metohija)³²⁹

	Number of refugees in FR of Yugoslavia in June 2001
From Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina	165,811
From Republic of Croatia	284,336
From FYR of Macedonia	148
From Slovenia	1,685
TOTAL in the FR of Yugoslavia	451,980

However, today total number of refugees in Republic of Serbia (without Kosovo-Metohija) includes and around 200,000–220,000 ethnic Serb refugees from Kosovo-Metohija what practically means that in Serbia there are so far approximately 650,000–670,000 refugees that is a highest number of refugees in Europe. Unfortunately, only minority of them are receiving a legal help in order to solve their status and improve life conditions. For instance, in June 2001 Cooperation Office in the FR of Yugoslavia of Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation has provided 153,000 legal services to over 85,000 refugee clients within the FR of Yugoslavia.³³⁰

There were nearly 1,000,000 of ex-Yugoslav citizens from the wartime of 1991–1995 who escaped the country and became refugees in some of European states:³³¹

³²⁹ Source: Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation Office FR of Yugoslavia, Belgrade. The data presented to the author by the officer from the agency during the “Summer Course Human Rights 2001” held in Tilburg, the Netherlands and Leuven, Belgium, organized by School of Human Rights Research, Faculty of Law, Tilburg University and Institute for Human Rights, Faculty of Law, Catholic University of Leuven, August 20–31st, 2001.

³³⁰ Source: *Ibid.*

³³¹ Cunliffe S. A., Pugh M., “The Politization of UNHCR in the Former Yugoslavia”, *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. 10, № 2, 1997, p. 151.

Table № 9. Refugees and Displaced Persons from ex-Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in European Countries on July 24th, 1992³³²

	Number of Refugees and Displaced Persons from Bosnia-Herzegovina based in Europe on July 24th, 1992
Accepted by Germany	200,000
Accepted by Hungary	60,000
Accepted by Austria	50,000
Accepted by Sweden	44,000
Accepted by Switzerland	12,200
Accepted by Italy	7,000
Accepted by the UK	1,100
TOTALLY accepted	374,300

Table № 10. Total Number of “Accepted persons” from the ex-Yugoslavia by Countries including and Internally Displaced Persons by July 1992 according to “The New York Times”³³³

	Number of “accepted persons” from the ex-Yugoslavia in July 1992
In Croatia	630,000
In Bosnia-Herzegovina	593,000
In Serbia	375,000
In Germany	200,000
In Slovenia	66,000

³³² Helsinki Watch, *War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, Human Rights Watch, Washington, 1992, p. 141.

³³³ “Yugoslav Refugee Crisis Europe’s worst since 40s”, *The New York Times*, July 24th, 1992, p. 1. However, according to *The Independent*, there were 40,000 “accepted persons” from the former Yugoslavia in Switzerland and 2,000 in Italy (“Britain attacked for ignoring Bosnian refugees”, *The Independent*, July 27th, 1992, p. 1.

In Hungary	60,000
In Austria	50,000
In Sweden	44,000
In Macedonia	31,000
In Switzerland	12,000
In Italy	7,000
In The Netherlands	3,400
In Norway	2,000
In The United Kingdom	1,300
TOTAL	2,074,700

From the matter of fact, in many cases safely repatriation and return to their homes is practically impossible for the reason that refugees are facing once again hostile policy of other ethnic groups based on ideology of ethnonationalism. Other solution is to set them at homes on safe but unfamiliar ground. A negative aspect of implementation of this option in the practice is *de facto* ratification of the policy of ethnic cleansing and ethnic persecution, that is nevertheless already internationally ratified by signing Washington administration made the Dayton–Paris Agreement that created officially two, but in fact three, ethnonational political entities without significant number of ethnic minorities in each of them (see *Table No 1*).³³⁴ Bosnia-Herzegovina after November 1995 became a patchwork of ethnically homogeneous territories what was original war aim of the inspirers of the war on all sides. Actually, a destiny of the post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina became the US-style “Cyprusization” on clear ethnic lines but not cantonized “Balkan Switzerland” according to the EU proposals and attempts to solve post-Yugoslavia's inter-ethnic disputes in the „Bosnian pot“. Today, seventeen

³³⁴ According to Annex 7, First article, of Dayton Peace Agreement, “All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their homes of origin. They shall have the right to have restored to them their property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any property that cannot be restored to them. The early return of refugees and displaced persons is an important objective of the settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, cited from: Phuong C., “‘Freely to Return’: Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina”, *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. 13, No 2, June 2000, Oxford University Press, p. 165.

years after the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina this country is the most unfunctional state in Europe.

Clearly, ethnic cleansing, persecution and genocide were done for the purpose to establish ethnically “clean” territory composed by homogenous nationality in order to claim later a political control over the territory which had to be incorporated into a single national state. It should be noticed that reportedly it was committed ethnic pressure in some parts of Sanjak (Sandžak or Raška) region between Serbia and Montenegro in 1992 against local Muslims who are considered by Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslim officials as the people of the same “national” background as Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims. According to the official apprehension of the leading political party of Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims, the SDA (the „Party of Democratic Action“), Sanjak's Muslims (Bosniaks) are “blood of our blood.”³³⁵

That was a reason, together with the idea of „Holy War“, why Sanjak's Muslim Bosniaks during the whole war in Bosnia-Herzegovina participated as a volunteers on the Muslim side



committing war crimes against the Serbs and Croats even in the uniforms of the official Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.³³⁶

In post-Dayton's Bosnia-Herzegovina a big number of politicians and civil servants who provoked and waged the war 1992–1995 are still in political power occupying important

³³⁵ This slogan is taken from Yugoslav Muslim Organization from inter-war period (Purivatraa A., *Jugoslovenska Muslimanska Organizacija u političkom životu Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, Svetlost, Sarajevo, 1972. See also: Karić E., “Islam in Contemporary Bosnia”, *Q News*, February 16th – March 1st, № 10, 1996.

³³⁶ About Islamic fighters in Bosnia-Herzegovina see: Миловановић М., *Исламски терористи у Босни и Херцеговини*, Бања Лука, 2001; SKY News documentary video material about Mujahedins in Bosnia-Herzegovina as paramilitary troops of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina: <http://s916.photobucket.com/albums/ad1/vsotirovic/PRIVATE%20VIDEOS/?action=view¤t=Mudza hediniuBosniinEnglish8minutai17sekundi.mp4>

administrative posts.³³⁷ It is assumed that exactly those people are actually the main obstacles to the return process of national minorities in this unfunctional republic. The same situation is in the post-war Croatia as well. The local politicians mainly used the method of warning their own ethnic compatriots about returning of national minorities (the Serbs) in certain area by the advertisements in local newspapers discreetly calling for “spontaneous” riots or mass protests against the returning process.³³⁸ The another method, used either in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Croatia, is public classification by “wanted” announcement of local expelled inhabitants into the category of indicted “war criminals”; for instance, “during the summer [2000], in Karlovac, Sisak and Erdut [in Croatia] a number of posters with the photographs and names of local Serbs appeared, accusing them of war crimes... The motivation behind these incidents was more than obvious: intimidation of all possible Serb refugees who have, perhaps, decided time for return was ripe”. According to the same report, “incidents of harassment and intimidation of Serbs [in Croatia] have continued to occur in war stricken regions [of Croatia] during the entire duration of the past year [2000]. In May [2000], around 50 Croats interrupted the memorial service held in Veljun [Croatia] commemorating the victims of a WWII fascist [Croatian “Ustasha”] massacre, chiefly attended by Serbs. Certain Biserka Legardic, a Croatian woman, took her panties off and urinated on the memorial tablet. No one called her to account for her deed, nor did she suffer any consequences for the barbaric act. Two weeks later, five Croats invaded the memorial grounds and vandalized the monument”.³³⁹ Additionally, there are many examples that restoration or rebuilding of damaged and destroyed national cultural heritages (mostly churches and mosques) became a clear signal that the return of refugees of other nationalities is not welcomed by victorious nationality, now ethnic majority within the cleansed area. The case of Ottoman time *Ferhadija*

³³⁷ Cox M., “The Right to Return Home: International Intervention and Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, *International Comparative Law Quarterly*, 47 (3), 1998, pp. 599–631.

³³⁸ Stavropoulou M., “Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Right to Return in International Law”, in O’Flaherty, M and Gisvold G. (eds.), *Post-war Protection Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1998.

³³⁹ Greek Helsinki Monitor, *Minorities in Post HDZ Croatia*, Zagreb, March 5th, 2001, sent to the author on March 15th, 2001. The author of this report is Ivana Erceg. See: Balkan Human Rights web page: <http://www.greekhelsinki.gr>.

mosque in Serb-dominated Banja Luka (destroyed in 1992) is one of the best examples.

The fact is that during the first four post-war years only 121,000 refugees returned to their homes in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement while there were still approximately 800,000 Bosnia-Herzegovina's internally displaced persons who were waiting to return to their pre-war homes.³⁴⁰ Total number of displaced persons in Bosnia-Herzegovina was around half of the total pre-war population. According to the US media, only the number of Muslims expelled from the territories under Serb-army controll was between 700,000 and 1,000,000.³⁴¹ The authorities of self-proclaimed independent "Republika Srpska" claimed that in the mid-1992 there were 200,000 Serbs fled Bosnia-Herzegovina: 80,000 of them from Sarajevo, 40,000 from Posavina region and 30,000 from the valley of Neretva (Herzegovina). For the same period of time, according to the UNO sources, there were 400,000 refugees from the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nevertheless, consequently the majority of 2,000,000 people who left their residential places in war years 1992–1995 during the first four years of the peace did not return to their original place of living as it can be seen from the next two statistics:

Table № 11. Minority Returns to Bosnia-Herzegovina from January 1996 to December 1999³⁴²

	Minority Returnees to Bosnia-Herzegovina from January 1996 to December 1999
Year of 1996	11,666
Year of 1997	33,837
Year of 1998	35,000
Year of 1999	41,007

³⁴⁰ Phuong C., "‘Freely to Return’: Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina", *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. 13, № 2, June 2000, Oxford University Press, p. 173.

³⁴¹ *Washington Post*, November 16th, 1994, p. A 19; *The New York Times*, April 24th, 1995, p. 1.

³⁴² Sources: European Stability Initiative, *Interim Evaluation of RRTF Minority Return Programmes in 1999*, Berlin, 1999, p. 11; UNHCR, *Statistics Package, 1. September 1999*, Sarajevo, 1999.

TOTAL for 1996–1999	121,510
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Table № 12. Returned persons to Bosnia-Herzegovina as of December 1999³⁴³

	Refugees	Displaced Persons
“Croat-Muslim Federation”	325,944	205,448
“Republika Srpska”	24,025	90, 543
TOTAL for the whole Bosnia-Herzegovina	349,969	295,991
TOTAL Refugees and Displaced Persons for the whole Bosnia-Herzegovina	645,960	

Regardless on NATO officials’ report that since the Kumanovo’s Military Technical Agreement of June 9th, 1999 there were around one million displaced persons who returned back to Kosovo and Metohija (ethnic Albanians), the majority of Kosovo-Metohija’s population of non-ethnic Albanian background faced many serious uncertainties in regard to return to their homes in this region which in February 2008 proclaimed independence. A huge majority of ethnic Serbs from Central and Southern Kosovo-Metohija left their homes after the KFOR and the UÇK unites entered the same province after June 9th, 1999. The northern part of Kosovo-Metohija became in fact the only ethnic Serb enclave and gheto in Kosovo-Metohija especially after the „March Pogrom“ in 2004. More than 200,000 of non-ethnic Albanians, majority of them ethnic Serbs, left the region forever after the Yugoslav Army withdrew its troops from Kosovo-Metohija. According to some estimations, only 90,000 Serbs left in (Northern) Kosovo-Metohija.³⁴⁴ Ethnic groups of Gorani and Roma suffered from the same policy of ethnic cleansing waged by the UÇK after “the liberation of Kosova” from Serbian police and the Yugoslav

³⁴³ Source: UNHCR, *Statistics Package, 1. September 1999*, Sarajevo, 1999.

³⁴⁴ Source: “One step forward, one step back”, *The Economist*, April 5th, 2001.

Army.³⁴⁵ The UNHCR's estimation in the year of 2000 of ethnic breakdown of Kosovo-Metohija out of ethnic Albanians was: 70,000 ethnic Serbs; 11,000 Roma, 20,000 Muslim Slavs accompanied by Gorani; and 15,000 ethnic Turks.³⁴⁶ The Yale University professor Ivo Banac claimed that "NATO's moral victory will ultimately depend on postintervention reconstruction and recovery".³⁴⁷

Clearly, taking into consideration the total number of displaced persons from the territory of the ex-Yugoslavia from 1991 to 2001, the SFR of Yugoslavia became a European refugee crisis "Number One". As a consequence of the war, ethnic cleansing, persecution and genocide, demographic picture of pre-war Yugoslavia is drastically changed: there are almost no Serbs in Croatia, Kosovo-Metohija and Croat-Muslim Federation; Republika Srpska is nearly ethnically cleansed, while according to the OSCE, post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina is composed by 48% Muslims/Bosniaks, 39% Serbs and 12% Croats.³⁴⁸ It is assumed that in Bosnia-Herzegovina a Serb-led ethnic cleansing in the areas of Eastern Bosnia, parts of Eastern Herzegovina, the valley of Sava River, Bosanska Krajina, and the suburbs of capital Sarajevo in April-June 1992 were the most "effective" ethnic cleansing operations,³⁴⁹ while a Croat-led ethnic cleansing of territory of "Republika Srpska Krajina"³⁵⁰ in August 1995 and Albanian-led ethnic cleansing of Kosovo-Metohija from June 1999 onward can be studied as the best examples of totally successful policy of transformation of ethnographical into national-state borders.

³⁴⁵ Source: "Kosovo Report Card", International Crisis Group, August 28th, 2000, <http://www.crisisweb.org/project/showreport.cfm?reportid=11>; "Violence in Kosovo: Who's Killing Whom", *Balkans Report*, № 78, International Crisis Group, November 2nd, 1999.

³⁴⁶ "Kosovo Report Card", International Crisis Group, August 28th, 2000, <http://www.crisisweb.org/project/showreport.cfm?reportid=11>.


³⁴⁷ Banac I., "Sorting out the Balkans", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, № 3, May/June 2000, p. 71.

³⁴⁸ *BH Opština's population, 1996*, <http://www.oscebih.org>.

³⁴⁹ The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, *The Prosecutor of the Tribunal versus Duško Tadić*, Case № IT94-1-T, Maz 21st, 1996; *Vreme*, August 17th, 1992; "Bosnia-Herzegovina: 'Ethnic Cleansing' Continues in Northern Bosnia", *Human Rights Watch/Helsinki*, Vol. 6, № 16, November 1994; Paul D., "No Escape: Minorities Under Threat in Serb-Held Areas of Bosnia", *Refugee Reports*, November 30th, 1994, pp. 1-9.

³⁵⁰ The ethnic composition of the territory of "Republika Srpska Krajina" was before inter ethnic war which started in Croatia in 1991 as: 287,830 Serbs (52,4%), 203,656 Croats (37,1%) and 57,597 others (10,5%).

A planned transferring of population, likewise the ethnic cleansing and genocide, was in the function of changing demographic picture of certain settlements. For example, in January 1992 around 2,500 Serb refugees from Croatia were resettled in the city of Ilok (today in Croatia on the very border with Serbia but at that time controlled by rebellious Serbs) where from almost all Croats fled to Western Croatia. On other



hand, Croatian government resettled majority of these Croatian refugees from Ilok in Istria in order to dilute ethnic Italian population at this peninsula. One part of Serb refugees from Croatia after operation “Oluja” in August 1995 was resettled in Kosovo-Metohija. It is known that by August 1991 the region of Baranja (in Croatia) but under Serb-military domination at that time was depopulated by 18,000 ethnic Croats and Hungarians and 2,000 Serbs who fled the region. Serbian refugees from Baranja were resettled in Serbia's province of Vojvodina, Croatian in Istria or other parts of Croatia, and Hungarian refugees mainly went to the Northern Vojvodina (dominated by ethnic Hungarians) or to Hungary. One of the crucial

reasons why Croatian officials resettled Croatian refugees from other Croatia's war-infected areas to Istria was “because of Istria's unique historical development, the population has rejected Tudjman's often vociferous nationalism”.³⁵¹

³⁵¹ Markotich S., “Croatia's Istrian Democratic Alliance”, *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 3, № 33, August 26th, 1994, p. 16.

Ultimately, a total number of emigrated (young) people from the territory of ex-Yugoslavia abroad is officially unknown. However, unofficial non-governmental organizations or opposition parties claim that several hundreds of thousand of young men legally emigrated from the country to the western countries during the 1990s. For instance, only from FR of Yugoslavia the number of legal “immigrants” to the West is around 450,000. Majority of them belongs to the university educated young generation, which is “lost” for its native country and nation for good. The “fleeing of mind” was one of the most tragic consequences of the Yugoslav turbulence in the 1990s.

Conclusion

“Nationalism always involves a struggle for land, or an assertion about rights to land; and the nation, almost by definition, requires a territorial base in which to take root” (Smith A., “States and Homelands: the Social and Geopolitical Implications of National Territory”, Millenium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 10, № 3, p. 187).

Historically speaking, peoples, nations, ethnic groups and states have always found themselves living in periods of transition. The mankind is living now through an epochal turning point in history that is usually called as “Globalization”. The process of “Globalization” is a kind of journey. It is a journey towards a final destination – “the Globalized world”.³⁵² One of the most advocated features of “the Globalized world” and “Globalization” is *global integration* in economic, cultural, financial, technological, political, taxation, etc., points of view. However, one of the mostly predicted possible consequences of “Globalization”, i.e. integration of the world, is a disappearance of national-states and their replacement with “supra-national” political-economic organisations as it can be the case, for instance, with European Union especially through introduction of a common “supra-national” currency – the *Euro*.³⁵³

However, the process of “Globalization” through international and inter-state integration imagined as the world

³⁵² Wolf M., “Will the Nation-State Survive Globalization?”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, № 1, January/February 2001, p. 178.

³⁵³ See: Serfaty S., “Europe 2007: From Nation-States to Member States”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, № 4, Autumn 2000, pp. 15–29.

without strict national-state borders can not be implied to all nations, states and regions all over the globe because of different historical developments, living conditions and probably mostly because of the heavy “burden of historical experiences” in regional inter-national and inter-states relations. One of the most representative examples of these cases are the peoples from the former Yugoslavia. I would argue that the road towards “Globalization” for the people from former Yugoslavia is peaceful and above all justifiable separation, conducted by 1) the highest authority of the international community (the UNO) and 2) specially created *Yugo Council of Historians* composed by the most prominent and morally perfect Yugoslav and international specialist in this area, as the way toward integration and cooperation with

defining strict national-state borders between them.³⁵⁴

In my paper, I concentrated on the problem of the influence of ethnic nationalism to ethnic cleansing and persecution in the context of regional integration of the people from



the former Yugoslavia in the era of “Globalization”. To my mind, many politicians and scholars have not proper comprehension of the basic nature of the problems of integration and co-existence of former Yugoslavia’s nations and ethnic minorities in the future. “A score of them is still stuck to the idea that “blue” corps and “white” tanks will guarantee permanent stability and [regional] peace”³⁵⁵ as a precondition for regional integration and “Globalization” of this segment of the world. In fact, what the so-called “international

³⁵⁴ As a metatar of example of contemporary processes of re-writing a national history see: Djokic D., “Nationalism, Myth and Reinterpretation of History: The Neglected Case of Interwar Yugoslavia”, *European History Quarterly*, 42:1, 2012, pp. 71–96; Сотировић Б. В., *На одру титографије. Збирка деветнаест чланака*, Вилнус: приватно издање, 2012.

³⁵⁵ Jeršovas M., “Separation as the path to integration: The Yugoslavia case”, unpublished student’s seminar work for V. B. Sotirovic’s course “Balkan Security – Problems and Perspectives”, Vilnius, 2001, p. 1.

community” proposes as a solution for the ex-Yugoslavia only delays the next inter-ethnic war between the Yugoslavs.

The crucial outline for the settling the problem of inter-ethnic relations on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia drafted in this text is vitally different from usually favoured (by the western Balkan “experts”) multinational, multicultural and multireligious model of the coexistence for the peoples from the former Yugoslavia. The argument is based on the fact that different Yugoslav nationalities can not be forced to live together in any kind of ethnically mixed political community, as it shows, for instance, already failed attempt with post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina. In other words, “hybrid” states composed by different “Yugoslavs” will not lead them to live peacefully in “globalized” world.³⁵⁶

I argue that stability, security and peaceful coexistence integration in the case of the former Yugoslav’s peoples can be achieved only through drawing of the new regional map fully based on the principle of national-state borders. These peoples of different cultural, ethnic and religious backgrounds, who have extremely “bad historical experience” of living together, can not be kept together in the same state(s) by permanent international (in fact western) military protection forces (IFOR, SFOR, KFOR, MACFOR, EUFOR, etc.). Therefore, a peaceful separation will be the basic precondition to the formation of the nation-states, which would lead to cooperation and integration of the peoples from the former Yugoslavia. Separation by clear ethnic-state borders as a predicament to the integration and cooperation can be functional in the case of the nations and ethnic minorities from the former Yugoslavia as their cooperative way to “Globalization”. Shortly, historically based justifiable division into nation-states with clear ethnic majorities or without ethnic minorities at all, including and internationally sponsored and supervised transnational exchange of the minorities (like in Greece-Turkey case in 1923 or South Cyprus-North Cyprus case in 1974), leads towards full integration and stability. Ultimately, the strength of the state does not lay in its size but it lays in its inner unity expressed in the homogeneity of the state’s ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious composition.

³⁵⁶ Regarding the role of democracy and limits of democratization of the Yugoslav societies see: Džihic V., Segert D., „Lessons from ‘Post-Yugoslav’ Democratization: Functional Problems of Stateness and the Limits of Democracy“, *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2012, pp. 239–253.

Surely, “the disintegration of Yugoslavia’s multicultural community has become the most dramatic and brutal event in post World War II Europe”.³⁵⁷ The real reason for this disintegration was a wish of each of Yugoslav nation to live in its own independent state, which should embrace a total national population.³⁵⁸ However, crucial motive for the bloodshed was the fact that there were no made clear borders between Yugoslavia’s nations and nationalities based on all three relevant rights: historic, ethnic and moral. Consequently, one of the crucial lessons learned from bloody dissolution of the ex-Yugoslavia by the international community had to be that clearly fixed inter-ethnic borders in the Balkans are one of the preconditions for the proper and successful inter-ethnic cooperation of the local population.

Various political, religious and cultural separations as result of existing historic division lines that run through the region (like between Latin and Greek language and culture, Eastern and Western parts of the Roman Empire, Byzantine Empire and Frankish Empire, Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy, Habsburg Monarchy and Ottoman Empire, NATO and Warsaw Pact)³⁵⁹ were, are and will be the destiny of the Balkan and Yugoslav peoples. The best example is current state border between Croatia³⁶⁰ and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was in fact set up in 1699 after the war between the Habsburg Monarchy and Venice against the Ottoman Empire. However, the crucial feature of historical division between the Yugoslavs is a separation between the Roman Catholic Slovenes and Croats from Orthodox Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians with the Muslims³⁶¹ between. This “Yugoslav

³⁵⁷ Várady T., “Minorities, Majorities, Law and Ethnicity: Reflections of the Yugoslav Case”, *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 19, 1997, The Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 9.

³⁵⁸ It was the exact reason why several international plans dealing with the peace settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina from territorial point of view failed: 1) the EC or Lisbon proposal of cantonization of B-H signed on March 18th, 1992; 2) the Vance-Owen plan of cantonization of B-H from October 1992; 3) the Owen-Stoltenberg plan of ethnically dominated territories within B-H from September 1993; and 4) the Contact Group plan of federalization of B-H from 1994. All of these plans partitioned Bosnia-Herzegovina along ethnic lines but a high number of all ethnic groups were left at “other” ethnic area. In fact, as the UN human rights representative, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, pointed out in 1993, publishing the “Vance-Owen plan” encouraged ethnic cleansing.

³⁵⁹ Sotirović B. V., “Balkanai: Civilizacijų ir Politinės įtakos sferų Kryžkelėje”, *Naujoji Romuva*, № 2 (535), Vilnius, p. 18.

³⁶⁰ It should be stressed that several historical regions, which from 1991 belong to independent Republic of Croatia were never parts of any Croatia before 1945.

³⁶¹ There were around 4,5 million Muslim inhabitants of the former Yugoslavia in 1991 including and Muslim Albanians and Muslim Romanies (Gypsies). This is approximately 20% of total (23,5 million) SFR Yugoslavia’s population.

Wall of Separation” was never destroyed.³⁶² Moreover, this wall became significantly stronger and even “higher” after the last civil war(s) and it will be for the long period of time in the future a basis for both identifying national territory and for the delineation of the national states. Probably the best proof of this opinion can be the fact that overwhelming majority of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo-Metohija share the feeling “...that Serbs who had left Kosovo [after June 9th, 1999] should never be allowed to return”.³⁶³

I should stress that “nationalism is the will to have a particular way of being and the possibility to build up one’s own country”.³⁶⁴ I agree that by ‘nationalism’ one should mean “an *ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity of a human population, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’*”.³⁶⁵ I strongly believe that naturally peoples who are sharing the same collective identity, like religion, language, traditions, history, etc., seek to live together within the same state, while the territory and the will to live together are the most significant elements of national determination.³⁶⁶ One of the best and long-term guaranties for implementation of the group self-determination was and still is an *independent national state* that encompasses a whole national body.³⁶⁷ In other words, group’s awareness of common origin and mindfulness of exact borders of its own nationality causes the natural tendency among the people to overlap the borders of national-state with the borders of their ethnic/national territorial distribution. A nation, “as a *named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and memories, a mass, public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members*”,³⁶⁸ can be in the best way “realized” within its own national state as for the fact that in the South-East Europe a strongest loyalty is expressed

³⁶² On this issue see for instance: Mishkova D., “Symbolic Geographies and Visions of Identity: A Balkan Perspective”, *European Journal of Social Theory*, 11: (2), 2008, pp. 237–256; Razsa M., Lindstrom N., “Balkan in Beautiful: Balkanism in the Political Discourse of Tudman’s Croatia”, *East European Politics & Societies*, 18 (4), 2004, pp. 628–650.

³⁶³ Rohde D., “Kosovo Seething”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, № 3, May/June 2000, p. 71.

³⁶⁴ Pujol J., *Construir Catalunya*, Pòrtic, Barcelona, 1980, p. 22.

³⁶⁵ Smith D. A., “Nations and their pasts”, *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 2, № 3, November 1996, p. 359.

³⁶⁶ See: Dumont L., *Religion, Politics and History in India*, Mouton, Paris, 1970, pp. 69–71.

³⁶⁷ See: Margalit A., Raz J., “National self-determination”, *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 87, № 9, pp. 439–461.

³⁶⁸ Smith D. A., “Nations and their pasts”, *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 2, № 3, November 1996, p. 359.

exactly to such kind of state. This truth has a regional validity and should be respected by “international community” in dealing with the “Yugoslav Question” either now or in the future.

I agree with Anthony Smith that predominate condition for better “effectuated” freedom in the globe is to make stronger national states.³⁶⁹ I disagree with the opinion that “there is no clear basis for mapping state boundaries onto the distribution ‘peoples’ within the territory that formerly constituted Yugoslavia”.³⁷⁰ In my opinion ethnographic distribution, historical facts and association³⁷¹ and moral reason based on historical truth have to be taken into consideration as crucial criteria for the foundation of both stable and legitimate national state frontiers. For the reason that these three criteria were not respected when inner administrative borders of the former Yugoslavia were drawn after the Second World War by the Communists the transformation of them into internationally recognised borders of the newly independent states that emerged on the wreckage of the ex-Yugoslavia led the Yugoslav nations and nationalities into the civil war at the end of the 20th c. A lesson from this civil war is that strong national states (set up on ethnographic, historical and morally based borders) will be the cornerstones of cooperative international relations between the Balkan nations and states in the era of Globalization.

Finally, I would not like that what appears by the Dayton Agreement as solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina could turn out to be a signal for ethnic cleansing elsewhere, but it can be concluded that such signal played a significant role in ethnic cleansing in Kosovo-Metohija after June 1999 and probably in inter-ethnic conflicts in the future in Macedonia and Montenegro.³⁷²

³⁶⁹ See: Smith D. A., *Theories of Nationalism*, London, 1983.

³⁷⁰ Allcock B. J., “Borders, states, citizenship: unscrambling Yugoslavia” in Carter F. W., Norris H. T. (eds.), *The Changing Shape of the Balkans*, UCL Press Limited, London, 1996, p. 73.

³⁷¹ Each of Yugoslav people has a strong historical association with territory: Slovenes with the state borders of Principality of Pribina (847-862) and Kozel (862-876); Macedonians with Samuil’s empire (976-1014); Croats with Zvonimir’s kingdom (1076-1089); Serbs with Dushan’s empire (1331-1355); and “Bosnians” with Tvrtko’s kingdom (1353-1391).

³⁷² See: Sotirovičius B. V., “Kosovo albanai plečia tėvynę”, *Veidas*, № 2 (408), January 11–17th, 2001, p. 30; Sotirovičius B. V., “‘Kosovo scenarijus’ Makedonijoje”, *Veidas*, № 34, August 23–30th, 2001, p. 32.

8. POSTFACE

This book is composed by seven scientific articles written by Vladislav B. Sotirović and originally published in different international scientific journals during the last twelve years.

The purpose of this collection of articles is to put all of them together in one joint edition for all of those who are dealing with the Balkan studies but especially for the researchers, readers and students interesting in the Balkan history of diplomacy and politics. More precisely, the book is primarily intended to the students of my courses *Balkan Nationalism and Ethnic Conflicts* and *Politics of the Balkan States, 19th–21 cc.* as an optional literature.

All here published articles are updated with a new scientific literature and found sources in comparison to the original printed version. In this edition all articles are accompanied with relevant and useful historical maps and photos for the purpose of better illustration of the text.

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